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LAW REFORM COMMISSION‟S ROLE 
The Law Reform Commission is an independent statutory body established by 
the Law Reform Commission Act 1975. The Commission‟s principal role is to 
keep the law under review and to make proposals for reform, in particular by 
recommending the enactment of legislation to clarify and modernise the law. 
Since it was established, the Commission has published over 160 documents 
(Consultation Papers and Reports) containing proposals for law reform and 
these are all available at www.lawreform.ie. Most of these proposals have led to 
reforming legislation. 
 
The Commission‟s law reform role is carried out primarily under a Programme 
of Law Reform. Its Third Programme of Law Reform 2008-2014 was prepared 
by the Commission following broad consultation and discussion. In accordance 
with the 1975 Act, it was approved by the Government in December 2007 and 
placed before both Houses of the Oireachtas. The Commission also works on 
specific matters referred to it by the Attorney General under the 1975 Act.  
 
The Commission‟s role also involves making legislation more accessible 
through three other related areas of activity, Statute Law Restatement, the 
Legislation Directory and the Classified List of Legislation in Ireland. Statute 
Law Restatement involves the administrative consolidation of all amendments 
to an Act into a single text, making legislation more accessible. Under the 
Statute Law (Restatement) Act 2002, where this text is certified by the Attorney 
General it can be relied on as evidence of the law in question. The Legislation 
Directory - previously called the Chronological Tables of the Statutes - is a 
searchable annotated guide to legislative changes. The Classified List of 
Legislation in Ireland is a list of all Acts of the Oireachtas that remain in force, 
organised under 36 major subject-matter headings. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A Background to this Report 
1. This Report forms part of the Commission‟s Third Programme of Law 
Reform 2008-20141 and follows the publication in 2009 of a Consultation Paper 
on Children and the Law: Medical Treatment.2 The Consultation Paper made 
provisional recommendations for reform of the law concerning consent to, and 
refusal of, medical treatment involving persons under the age of 18. In the 
Consultation Paper and in this Report, the Commission uses the term “young 
person” to refer to 16 and 17 year olds; and the term “minor” to refer to persons 
under the age of 16. 
2. Following the publication of the Consultation Paper, the Commission 
received a large number of submissions, which made clear the importance of 
this project and the sensitive nature of the issues it raised. While the 
submissions received expressed diverse views on the Commission‟s provisional 
recommendations, virtually all of them emphasised the need to clarify to the 
greatest extent possible the law, whether from the point of view of those under 
the age of 18, their parents and guardians,3 or health care professionals who 
provide for their medical treatment.  
3. The Commission very much appreciates the great interest shown in 
this project, in particular through the large number of submissions received 
since the Consultation Paper was published, as well as through additional 
consultative meetings held with interested parties. These have greatly assisted 
the Commission in its deliberations leading to the preparation of this Report. 
Having taken into account the submissions received and the other elements of 
consultation mentioned, this Report therefore contains the Commission‟s final 
recommendations on this area, together with a draft Health (Children and 
Consent to Health Care Treatment) Bill to implement them. 
                                                     
1  Report on the Third Programme of Law Reform 2008-2014 (LRC 86-2007) 
Project 26. 
2  Consultation Paper on Children and the Law: Medical Treatment (LRC CP 59-
2009). This is referred to as the Consultation Paper in the remainder of this 
Report.  
3  The Commission, in its Report on Legal Aspects of Family Relationships (LRC 
101-2010), recommended that the term “parental responsibility” should replace 
the term “guardianship” in connection with this aspect of family law. Pending the 
implementation of this recommendation, the Commission uses the term 
“guardianship” in the remainder of this Report.  
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4. The Commission notes that in 2009 it received the invaluable 
assistance of the Office of the Ombudsman for Children in arranging a 
Consultation Day with 15 to 18 year olds prior to the publication of the 
Consultation Paper. During this Consultation Day, the Commission heard the 
perspectives and voices of many young people. These views, which were 
summarised in the Consultation Paper, indicate that among the key issues to be 
considered in this context are: openness, the need for clear information on 
medical treatment (including information relevant to sexual relationships), and 
taking into account of the actual maturity of an individual, as well as his or her 
age. The Commission acknowledges the assistance provided by the 
Ombudsman for Children and her staff for organising the Consultation Day.   
5. This project involves a continuation of the Commission‟s long-
standing work on reform of the law concerning young persons and children. 
This has included the Commission‟s 1983 Report on the Age of Majority4 in 
which the Commission recommended that the general age of majority – the age 
at which a person is regarded as an adult for many purposes – should be 
reduced from 21 to 18. This was implemented in the Age of Majority Act 1985, 
and this change brought Ireland into line with other states in Europe, in North 
America and in Australia and New Zealand. The Commission emphasises that 
this current project does not involve a general review of whether the age of 
majority should be reduced but, as the detailed discussion in this Report 
indicates, the issue of medical treatment involving those under 18 has often 
featured in such general reviews and subsequent legislative changes.    
6. Because this Report involves an examination of capacity to consent 
to, and to refuse, medical treatment, it also complements the Commission‟s 
more recent work on the law concerning mental capacity as it applies to those 
over 18 years of age. This work culminated in the Commission‟s 2006 Report 
on Vulnerable Adults and the Law,
5
 which contained a draft Scheme of a Mental 
Capacity Bill. The Report was based on a presumption of capacity for those 
over 18 years of age and a functional test of capacity, that is, a case-by-case 
test of capacity based on whether the person understands the nature and effect 
of the specific decision being made. The Commission‟s approach in the 2006 
Report reflects recent international trends in this area, including the rights-
based analysis found in the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The Commission is conscious that the Government is committed to 
publishing by the end of 2011 a Mental Capacity Bill that is consistent with the 
                                                     
4   (LRC 5-1983). 
5  (LRC 83-2006). 
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2006 UN Convention.6 The Commission‟s work in this area also includes the 
2009 Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives,7 in which the Commission 
reiterated the discussion in the 2006 Report that highlighted the movement 
towards the view that patients have the right to make informed decisions about 
their treatment.8 As stated in the 2006 and 2009 Reports, this involves a 
significant shift from a paternalistic approach – that decisions about healthcare 
options and treatment are primarily for health care professionals – towards the 
view that the patient must be actively engaged in a process that leads to 
informed decision making about his or her care and treatment options, including 
in the specific context of making an advance care directive.9 The Commission 
reiterates the importance of these developments in the current Report. 
7. This Report also reflects some of the analysis on the rights of 
children, and their parents and guardians, discussed in detail in the 
Commission‟s 2010 Report on Legal Aspects of Family Relationships.
10
 In that 
Report, the Commission emphasised the importance of the voice of the child, as 
well as reflecting the weight to be given to the decision-making responsibility of 
those having parental responsibility for a child. These themes are also reflected 
in this Report. 
8. The Commission is conscious that this Report is being published at a 
time when the rights of children, which currently includes all those under 18 
years of age, are subject to wide-ranging debate in Ireland. This has involved at 
least two very different, but intersecting, matters. First, how the law should 
respond to the reports published since 2005 into the widespread abuse of 
children in the State, including abuse in institutional settings and clerical child 
sexual abuse, which had occurred during the second half of the 20
th
 Century 
and into the first decade of the 21
st
 Century.11 Second, whether the rights of 
                                                     
6  The Programme for Government 2011-2016 (March 2011), at 38, available at 
www.taoiseach.ie, contains a commitment to “introduce a Mental Capacity Bill 
that is in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” 
The Government Legislation Programme, Summer Session 2011 (April 2011), 
available at www.taoiseach.ie, states that the Mental Capacity Bill is scheduled 
for publication in late 2011. 
7  (LRC 94-2009). 
8  (LRC 94-2009) at  paragraph 1.08. 
9  Ibid. 
10  (LRC 101-2010).  
11  See, for example, the Ferns Inquiry Report (Government Publications, 2005), 
Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009) (available at 
www.childabusecommission.com), Dublin Archdiocese Commission of 
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children should be given explicit recognition in the Constitution, arising from 
inquiries into vulnerable children and into the operation of the law concerning 
sexual offences involving, in particular, adolescents and young adults.12 In the 
wake of these matters, for example, revised 2011 Children First: National 
Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of Children were published by the 
Minister for Children and Youth Affairs in July 2011.13 The Commission is aware 
that these matters – including the nature of any constitutional amendment to 
underpin more clearly the rights of children, whether the current age of consent 
in the criminal law of sexual offences should be reduced from 17 to 16 and also 
whether the voting age should be reduced from 18 to 16 – remain under active 
consideration as this Report is published. The Commission therefore 
emphasises that this Report does not deal with these wider matters, other than 
where they provide relevant analysis of the respective rights of children and 
their parents and guardians, and of the interests of the State, in the context of 
the scope of this Report.  
B Scope of Report and Relevant Roles and Interests 
9. The Commission considers that it is important to describe the scope of 
the Report, including what it does and does not address. The Report involves 
an examination and discussion of the law concerning medical treatment and 
health care as it applies to children and young people who are under 18 years 
of age. The Commission emphasises that this involves a wide range of health-
related issues concerning persons under 18 years of age, including: dental care 
and treatment; over-the-counter medicines of specific relevance to adolescents, 
such as products related to skin conditions; prescriptions for antibiotics or 
contraceptives; counselling and treatment concerning mental health; an X ray; 
                                                                                                                                  
Investigation Report (2009) (available at www.dacoi.ie) and Report by 
Commission of Investigation into Catholic Diocese of Cloyne (December 2010, 
published July 2011) (available at www.justice.ie). 
12  See, for example, Report of the Kilkenny Incest Investigation (Government 
Publications, 1993) and Third Report of Joint Committee on the Constitutional 
Amendment on Children (2010) (available at www.oireachtas.ie).  
13  The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs also indicated that these would be 
placed on a statutory footing: see The Irish Times 16 July 2011. The Minister for 
Justice and Equality also published in July 2011 the Scheme of a Criminal Justice 
(Withholding Information on Crimes against Children and Vulnerable Adults) Bill 
2011 (available at www.justice.ie) which would, if enacted, require reporting of 
allegations of child sexual abuse.   
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treatment related to a soft tissue sports injury or broken arm; and surgery and 
treatment connected to cancer or a chronic condition such as cystic fibrosis.14  
10. The Commission underlines, therefore, that this Report is not restricted 
to a narrow issue such as contraception, although the Commission 
acknowledges that this is a matter on which a good deal of media and public 
attention is likely to be focused. The Commission also notes that the Report 
does not deal with many of the wider policy issues with which this area is 
connected, such as the policies in place to deal with teenage pregnancy, reform 
of the law concerning the availability of contraception or whether health-related 
matters such as access to sunbeds by those under 18 should be regulated. 
Similarly, although the Commission recommends in this Report that persons 
under the age of 18 may be regarded as being capable of consenting to, or 
refusing, medical treatment, the proposals made do not involve a general 
reduction in the age of majority. 
11. In approaching the preparation of this Report, the Commission was 
conscious that it must reflect the rights, roles and interests of children, parents 
and guardians, healthcare professionals and the State. In this respect, the 
Commission is conscious of the rights of children under the Constitution and 
under international human rights standards. Equally, the Constitution and 
international human rights standards recognise that parents have an integral 
role to play concerning their children, including in the context of medical 
treatment and health care received by them. Moreover, parents are generally 
well placed to safeguard the health and wellbeing of their children. As the 
relevant literature, health care practice and international human rights standards 
of recent years indicate, of course, parents must carry out their responsibilities 
in a manner that respects the evolving capacities of their child as they approach 
and reach adulthood. Parents and health and social care professionals have a 
responsibility to act in the best interests of those under 18 and to care for them 
in a manner that respects their dignity and wellbeing. Both parents and 
healthcare practitioners have a responsibility to adjust the levels of direction and 
support offered to a child, gradually enabling children to participate more in the 
realisation of their rights.  
12. The Commission is also conscious that the State is required by the 
Constitution and under international human rights standards to ensure the 
protection and welfare of the child in general. Under the Constitution, and under 
specific legislation such as the Child Care Act 1991, carefully-judged 
intervention to protect children may be required where a child‟s parents have 
failed in their duty to the child. The State, through the courts, has also been 
required to intervene where children are in immediately life-threatening 
                                                     
14  See the examples given in paragraph 1.37, below. 
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situations. Under the Constitution, the courts have an inherent jurisdiction to act 
to vindicate the rights of, and to protect, vulnerable persons. Prior to the coming 
into force of the Constitution in 1937, this was referred to as the parens patriae 
jurisdiction of the courts, which clearly indicated a paternalistic approach; but 
under the Constitution, any such intervention would occur to vindicate and 
protect the rights of children.15 Thus, the Commission notes that, in one form or 
another, such necessary intervention remains a feature of the relevant law in 
Ireland – and also in the law of other States discussed in this Report.   
13. Mason & McCall Smith refer to the triangular relationship of medicine, 
society and the law: 
“The general rules of doctoring are being developed within a moral 
framework which is constantly being restructured by contemporary 
society while, at the same time, doctors frequently find themselves 
operating in an atmosphere of legal uncertainty.”16  
14. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission also captured the 
complexity of such questions:  
“This is an area where there are no easy answers about who should 
have a say and who should not... The law is a blunt instrument to 
have to deal with these sorts of considerations, and the formulation of 
an appropriate legislative framework to fall back on in these 
situations is particularly challenging. Any attempt at devising such a 
framework should acknowledge from the start the moral and 
emotional dimensions of this area of law, and its controversial nature 
which is susceptible to provoking at times, heated debate.”17 
15. Ideally, through informed discussion and participation by all those 
involved – children, parents, guardians and health care professionals – practical 
                                                     
15  In North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622 
(discussed in paragraph 1.16, below), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the pre-
constitutional parens patriae jurisdiction concerning children had, in effect, been 
subsumed under the courts‟ inherent jurisdiction under the Constitution to 
vindicate and protect rights where necessary. In that case, the Supreme Court 
declined to intervene to override the refusal of parents to give their consent to 
allow doctors to carry out the “heel prick” PKU blood test on their baby boy, 
because it was not clearly evident that the refusal threatened his life or immediate 
health. 
16  Mason & McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics (2006) at 23.  
17  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Young People and Consent to 
Health Care Report 119 (2008), at 31.  
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solutions and consensus can be reached that respect the rights and interests of 
all parties. When this is not possible, however, it is important to have in place a 
clear statutory framework that contains general principles. Nonetheless, given 
the complexities of the issues raised, it would not be possible to draft legislation 
that could provide definitive solutions to all the moral, ethical and public policy 
questions involved. For this reason, and reflecting the approach taken in most 
other countries, the Commission has taken the view in this Report that, on a 
number of specific matters, a statutory Code of Practice, based on the 
principles in the draft Health (Children and Consent to Medical Treatment) Bill 
attached to the Report, should provide detailed guidance as to how specific 
scenarios would be worked out in practice.  
16. The Commission now turns to provide a brief overview of the Report. 
C Outline and Overview of this Report  
17. In Chapter 1, the Commission discusses the general literature on child 
and early adulthood development, which reflects the reality that individuals 
mature in a gradual manner from infancy to adulthood and that this is also 
affected by their particular environment. This literature has influenced the 
development of the law concerning children and young adults, both nationally 
and internationally, with the result that some laws refer to a specific age as the 
basis for determining the legal competence or liability of a person under 18, 
while others focus on the maturity of the person. These laws often include the 
need to have regard to the continuing role of parents or guardians, and the 
need to ensure that the welfare of children is a paramount factor. The 
Commission then sets out the principles that flow from the literature, and from 
the relevant constitutional and international human rights instruments in this 
area. These principles (which require respect for the rights of children and of 
their parents/guardians, having regard to the need to ensure that the best 
interests of the child are a primary consideration) form the basis for the 
Commission‟s detailed analysis in this Report. The Commission then discusses 
in Chapter 1 the broad scope of health care and medical treatment covered in 
the Report, the voice of the child in the health care setting and the nature and 
extent of confidentiality.  
18. In Chapter 2, the Commission discusses the detailed aspects of 
consent to, and refusal of, healthcare treatment by individuals under the age of 
18, having regard to the general principles set out in Chapter 1. The 
Commission discusses decision-making by young persons, that is, 16 and 17 
year olds, and, separately, minors, that is, those under the age of 16. In Chapter 
2, the Commission begins by discussing the current legal position in Ireland, 
including the effect of section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person 
Act 1997 which provides, in the context of criminal law, that consent to medical 
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treatment by a 16 and 17 year old has the same status as if he or she was an 
18 year old. The Commission also discusses the position in Irish case law of 
those under 16, which reflects the general literature as well as legal 
developments in other countries concerning mature minors. The Commission 
then discusses in detail statutory provisions and case law concerning health 
care involving those under 18 in a number of countries, in particular, England 
and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
The Commission concludes Chapter 2 by setting out its recommendations 
concerning consent to and refusal of treatment for those under 18. The 
Commission‟s approach is that this should be as consistent as possible with the 
proposed reform of the law on mental capacity for those over 18, and the 
Commission therefore favours a functional test of capacity. The Commission 
sets out its recommendations concerning 16 and 17 year olds, and then sets 
out separately its recommendations for those under 16.  
19. In Chapter 3, the Commission discusses issues of capacity and 
healthcare decision-making involving children and young people who engage 
with mental health services. The Commission notes that the general principles 
and detailed recommendations set out in Chapters 1 and 2 also apply in the 
context of mental health provision. In Chapter 3, the Commission‟s discussion 
does not deal with mental health law in general, but focuses primarily on the 
admissions process under the Mental Health Act 2001. The Chapter contains a 
brief overview of the extent of mental health issues involving children and young 
people in Ireland and the appropriateness of available services. The 
Commission then examines the rights of children and young people in the 
context of mental health legislation and service provision, followed by a 
discussion of the provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 as they relate to 
children and young people, including its shortcomings in this respect. The 
Commission then sets out recommendations for reform of the Mental Health Act 
2001 as it applies to children and young people, which includes recommending 
the introduction of a new category of “intermediate” admission and treatment. 
20. Chapter 4 is a summary of the Commission‟s recommendations in 
the Report. 
21. Appendix A contains a draft Health (Children and Consent to Health 
Care Treatment) Bill to implement the general recommendations for reform 
made in the Report. 
22. Appendix B contains an Outline Scheme of a Mental Health 
(Amendment) Bill to implement the recommendations in Chapter 3 for reform of 
the Mental Health Act 2001 as it applies to persons under 18. 
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1  
CHAPTER 1 CHILD AND EARLY ADULTHOOD DEVELOPMENT 
AND GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES  
A Introduction 
1.01 In this Chapter, the Commission begins in Part B with a brief 
discussion of the general literature on child and early adulthood development, 
which reflects the reality that individuals mature in a gradual manner from 
infancy to adulthood and that this is also affected by their particular 
environment. This literature has influenced the development of the law 
concerning children and young adults, both nationally and internationally, with 
the result that some laws refer to a specific age as the basis for determining the 
legal competence or liability of a person under 18, while others focus on the 
maturity of the person. These laws often include the need to have regard to the 
continuing role of parents or guardians, and the need to ensure that the welfare 
of children is a primary consideration. In Part C, the Commission then sets out 
the principles that flow from the literature, and from the relevant constitutional 
and international human rights instruments in this area. These principles (which 
require respect for the rights of children and of their parents/guardians, having 
regard to the need to ensure that the best interests of the child are a primary 
consideration) form the basis for the Commission‟s detailed analysis in this 
Report. In Part D, the Commission discusses the broad scope of medical 
treatment covered in the Report. In Part E the Commission discusses the voice 
of the child in the health care setting and in Part F the Commission discusses 
the nature and extent of confidentiality.  
B Gradual Maturing From Childhood to Adulthood and Influence 
on the Law 
1.02 In this Part, the Commission briefly surveys the general 
international literature on childhood and early adulthood development,1 which is 
                                                     
1   Much of the recent international literature is summarised in Lansdown, The 
Evolving Capacities of the Child (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005). See 
also Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law 3
rd
 ed (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  
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also mirrored in comparable material in Ireland.2 The literature emphasises that 
there is no universal definition of childhood, and that the concept varies 
according to the societal setting in which it is discussed. An accurate description 
of the concept of “childhood” must, therefore, include not merely a biological 
aspect but also a social element. Thus, the reality that individuals mature in a 
gradual manner from infancy to adulthood must take account of the particular 
society in which they grow up. The biological development of children to puberty 
is, largely, dependent on the general standard of nutrition in a society. In 
developed countries such as Ireland, children now reach puberty earlier by 
comparison with previous Irish generations and also by comparison with 
children in some contemporary developing countries. The general literature also 
notes that some societies differentiate between the approach taken to male and 
female children, but in Ireland (at least in recent decades) male and female 
children are treated equally. 
1.03 Conversely, while children in Ireland are developing biologically to 
puberty at an earlier age, their exposure to some aspects of the adult world, 
notably the paid work environment, has increasingly been postponed to a later 
age. Developed countries and economies require a workforce that is highly 
educated, communicative and independent, which means that more children 
and young people will remain in education for extended periods. By contrast, in 
developing countries many very young children continue to join the labour 
market at an early age. For young people in developed countries such as 
Ireland, postponing participation in the paid workforce may lead, at some levels 
and relatively speaking, to reduced responsibility and a greater degree of 
dependency (or even risk-taking, as in the case of “boy racers”), whereas their 
contemporaries in developing countries, who are actively engaged in paid (and 
domestic) work, may have taken on, again at certain levels, relatively high 
levels of responsibility.  
1.04 It is also important to note, of course, that exposure of very young 
children to the labour market does not indicate that, in those countries, the child 
was asked for their views and willingly participated after a mature, informed, 
                                                     
2  See Greene, “Children as Social Actors”, paper delivered at Irish Human Rights 
Commission and Law Society of Ireland Conference on Achieving Rights-Based 
Child Law (14 October 2006), available at www.ihrc.ie, and Shannon, Fourth 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Child Protection: A Report Submitted to the 
Oireachtas (December 2010), available at www.dohc.ie. In the specific context of 
this Report, see Logan, “The Rights of Children in Healthcare: the Views of the 
Ombudsman for Children” (2008) 14, 2 MLJI 66 and McMahon et al, “The 
Prescribing of Contraception and Emergency Contraception to Girls Aged Less 
than 16 – What are the Views and Beliefs of GPs and of Parents?” (2010) 16, 2 
MLJI 91. 
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reflective analysis; still less that there was any informed assessment by their 
parents or guardians that this was in their best interests. Equally, the earlier 
onset of puberty in developed countries such as Ireland may lead to earlier 
engagement with another aspect of the adult world, the development of 
personal and intimate relationships – and related issues of sexualisation. As 
with early participation in the labour market, the fact of earlier engagement in 
personal and intimate relationships – and sexualisation – does not, as such, 
indicate that the young people involved have willingly participated after a 
mature, informed, reflective analysis, or that they have developed a level of 
maturity that matches their activities. 
1.05 The Commission also discusses in this Part how the literature on 
childhood and early adulthood development has influenced the law in Ireland. In 
this respect, the Commission notes that society (including the relevant legal 
framework) has a responsibility to support children‟s rights as they develop, 
must involve them in decision-making and at the same time provide appropriate 
protection bearing in mind their level of maturity (including immaturity). 
(1) Stages of development from infancy to adulthood 
1.06 The most significant international human rights instrument in this 
area, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), defines a 
child as a person under the age of 18. This reflects the position in Ireland, 
where the view that adulthood begins generally at 18 is reflected in the 
Constitution which sets the voting age at 18 (since 1972, when by referendum 
the voting age was reduced from 21), in the Age of Majority Act 1985 which 
specifies 18 as the age at which a person reaches adulthood for the purposes 
of commercial contracts and others aspects of civil liability (again reducing it 
from 21), and in the Family Law Act 1995 which provides that a person must be 
18 to marry (in this instance, raising it from the previous age of 16). This also 
reflects the general position in many developed countries where 18 is currently 
marked as the boundary between childhood, or minority, and adulthood, 
majority.  
1.07 As to the development of those under 18, and bearing in mind the 
difficulty in drawing clear lines in this area, the literature on childhood and early 
adulthood development refers to various stages including infancy, early 
childhood, puberty, adolescence and adulthood. Since individuals reach these 
stages at different times, and since childhood is nowadays accurately described 
as involving not only a biological aspect but also a social aspect, the literature 
also contains various “age bands” rather than specific ages which broadly 
correspond to these stages of development. In general terms, therefore, these 
can be described in this way: 
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Infancy: this usually refers to the first year of a child‟s life, though 
sometimes it is also taken to include up to 3 years of age (“toddler”).3 
Early childhood: generally refers to age 3 to 10 or 11, often coinciding in 
developed countries with primary level schooling. 
Pre-adolescence: approximately age 10 to 12. 
Puberty: the age at which the human body becomes capable of 
reproduction. For girls, this usually begins at about 10 or 11, while for 
boys it begins at 12 or 13. Girls usually complete puberty by 15 to 17, 
while boys do so at 16 to 18. 
Adolescence: generally taken to coincide with the teenage years from 
13 to 19. It also often coincided with puberty, but pre-adolescent 
puberty is, in many countries, now more common because of improved 
living conditions and better nutrition. “Early adolescence” is generally 
taken to run from about 13 to 15. The end of adolescence, at 18 or 19, 
marks the beginning of adulthood in biological terms. 
(2) Development of decision-making capacity from infancy to 
adulthood 
1.08 In parallel with the physical and reproductive development of 
children and young persons, the literature also focuses on the development of 
decision-making capacity of human beings through these ages. Again, in broad 
terms, these can be described in this way:4 
Infants to pre-adolescents: up to age 12. Children up to 3 years are not 
able to understand the perspective of others, and lack any significant 
decision-making capacity. From age 3 to 11, children are increasingly 
able to recognise that people have different perspectives, and gradually 
acquire the ability to see another‟s point of view. By age 11, children 
begin to be able to understand a third-person perspective and 
appreciate that people may have mixed feelings about something. 
Children up to about 12 are, broadly, focused on the immediate, and do 
                                                     
3  In law, the word “infant” has often meant a person up to 18 years of age, as was 
the case in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 as originally enacted. Section 12 
of the Children Act 1997 provides that any reference in the 1964 Act to “infant” 
should be read as “child”. In its 2010 Report on Legal Aspects of Family 
Relationships (LRC 101-2010), the Commission has recommended that the 1964 
Act be replaced by a Child and Parental Responsibility Act, a draft Bill for which 
was appended to the Report. 
4  See the literature summarised in Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child 
(UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005) at 23ff. 
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not have, in general terms, the ability to distinguish between the actual 
and the possible. They do not, therefore, tend to be able to test 
hypotheses and plan for the future or to be able to be introspective and 
make judgements. The majority of those under 12 do not, therefore, 
generally have the cognitive ability or judgement skills to make major 
decisions that could affect their lives. 
Pre-adolescents and early adolescents: age 12 to 15. In general, typical 
12 and 13 year olds may believe that a problem has only one solution, 
and that acts or solutions are either right or wrong. By 14 and 15, there 
is a considerable growth in the ability to make critical and pragmatic 
decisions and choices and the development of moral reasoning. Many 
in this age group can, therefore, test hypotheses, plan for the future and 
have the cognitive ability or judgement skills to make major decisions 
that could affect their lives. Others may, however, find it difficult to 
imagine risks and consequences of decisions and to recognise the 
vested interests of others, and this may be associated with the loss of 
brain tissue in those areas of the brain controlling impulses, risk-taking 
and self-control. . 
Adolescents: 16 and 17 year olds.5 By this age, most adolescents are 
capable of quite sophisticated decision-making. This does not mean 
that their judgement is well-informed or mature, and risk-taking is still a 
characteristic of decision-making at this age. This in turn may lead to 
behaviour which is dangerous for the young person or society. Equally, 
many 16 and 17 year olds make more mature decisions by comparison 
with those over 18.  
1.09 The Commission notes that the literature on childhood and early 
adulthood development does not suggest that policy, or laws, concerning 
children should be divided into these three broad age bands, in which children 
under 12 are “presumed to lack capacity”, those between 12 and 15 “presumed 
to have some capacity” and those aged 16 and 17 “presumed mostly to have 
capacity.” The literature emphasises, indeed, that children, just like adults, 
demonstrate differing levels of competence in different contexts. The 
Commission now turns to a brief overview of this aspect of the literature. 
 
                                                     
5  While adolescence stretches past 17, the Commission is particularly concerned 
with the capacity of 16 and 17 year olds because the age of majority in Ireland is 
(since the enactment of the Age of Majority Act 1985) already 18, so that 18 and 
19 year olds are already deemed legally competent for most important decisions, 
including healthcare decisions. 
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(3) The influence of context in the development of decision-making 
capacity in those under 18 
1.10 Studies have indicated, for example, that a child‟s place within a 
family, such as whether they have older or younger siblings, is likely to impact 
on capacity and levels of assumed responsibility. The level of support and 
encouragement that a child is given also has a significant impact on 
competence. Equally, the exposure of children to specific, and unusual, 
situations can greatly influence their competence in decision-making.  
1.11 In the specific context of this Report, an English 1993 study6 on 
children‟s capacity to consent to surgery indicates that children as young as 8 
years old who have experienced extensive levels of medical treatment can 
acquire the ability not only to understand their condition and propose 
treatments, but also to make wise decisions, often involving life or death 
implications. Children‟s levels of understanding were developed according to 
their individual experience, coupled with the levels of expectation and support 
available to them. Extremely young children who had experienced high levels of 
medical intervention often had the capacity to make painful and difficult 
decisions. It is clear, therefore, that a person under 18 with, for example, cystic 
fibrosis is likely to have developed a greater level of maturity and decision-
making capacity in connection with their healthcare treatment than a similarly-
aged person who has not had a similar level of interaction with healthcare 
professionals. This approach emphasises, therefore, the need to avoid an 
exclusive focus on age.7  
1.12 The literature also indicates that particular difficulties arise in the 
context of adolescence, a period of significant life change, characterised by 
rapid physical development, sexual maturation and growing social expectations. 
While adolescents in developed countries are better-educated, better informed 
and healthier than ever before, this has the disadvantage that in a rapidly- 
changing and globalised world, they are exposed to many influences from the 
adult world at a vulnerable time in their development. While society must ensure 
a rights-based approach to children as they make decisions and develop 
towards adulthood, it is also recognised that adolescents will need some level of 
protection and help in personal decision-making, decisions that directly affect 
children‟s own lives but which they may lack the experience or knowledge to 
                                                     
6  Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, (Open University Press, 1993), cited in 
Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child (UNICEF Innocenti Research 
Centre, 2005), at 25. 
7  Greene, “Children as Social Actors”, paper delivered at Irish Human Rights 
Commission and Law Society of Ireland Conference on Achieving Rights-Based 
Child Law (14 October 2006), available at www.ihrc.ie. 
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make in their own best interests.8 Ultimately, the literature indicates that respect 
for children‟s evolving capacity to take responsibility for decision-making must 
be balanced against their relative lack of experience, the risks encountered, and 
the potential for exploitation and abuse. 
(4) Influence on the law  
1.13 This general overview of the literature on the stages of 
development from infancy to early adulthood indicates that, at various points, in 
particular through the teenage years, children and young people develop 
increasingly sophisticated cognitive capacity and related decision-making 
judgement. The Commission notes that, not surprisingly, this reality has had a 
major influence on the development of the law in this area.  
1.14 For the purposes of this Report, the two major issues are: firstly, 
when does a “child” or “young person” become an “adult” and, second, to what 
extent can a “child” or “young person” be deemed capable, or competent, to 
make decisions either together with, or independently from, their parents or 
guardians.  
1.15 As to when a “child” or “young person” becomes an “adult,” there 
has been general agreement that a defined age should mark that break. In 
medieval times, when the ability to hold a sword was important that age was set 
at 21, and for many “Western” countries such as Ireland this persisted as the 
“age of majority” until well into the 20
th
 Century. In the second half of the 20
th
 
Century, most countries reviewed the age of majority downwards, largely 
because people matured earlier due to improved living conditions and better 
nutrition with the resulting consequence that there was more active participation 
in society by 18 to 21 year olds. In the second half of the 20
th
 Century, many 
people between 18 and 20 were unable to obtain loans without a guarantee 
from their parents or guardians, and so commercial organisations were among 
those who argued for a reduction in the age of majority from 21 to 18.9 As a 
result, many states reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18, as happened in 
                                                     
8  In addition to this category of personal decision-making, three other categories 
requiring a protective approach have been noted: protection from physical and 
emotional harm, protection from harmful social or economic factors and protection 
from exploitation and abuse: see Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child 
(UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005), at 33. 
9  See, for example, the discussion in the Commission‟s Report on the Age of 
Majority, the Age for Marriage and Some Connected Subjects (LRC 5-1983). 
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Ireland under the Age of Majority Act 1985.10 As already mentioned, this also 
reflects the recognition at international level, in the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), that adulthood begins at 18 and that childhood 
runs to 18.  
1.16 As to whether a “child” or “young person” can be regarded as 
competent to make decisions either together with, or independently from, their 
parents or guardians, the law could, broadly, be described as mirroring the 
general literature and the understanding of how individuals mature over time. 
Thus, in respect of very young children, the law has long held the general view 
that parents and guardians must always be primarily accountable and 
responsible for their safety and welfare. Consequently, parents and guardians 
take the major decisions on behalf of their very young children, and this remains 
a key aspect of the law in this area in most countries, including Ireland. This 
means that, in general, a decision by parents or guardians concerning their very 
young children will be upheld even if this is in conflict with the views of 
professional persons. For example, in North Western Health Board v HW and 
CW11 the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of parents to allow doctors to carry 
out the “heel prick” PKU blood test on their baby son, even though the Court 
acknowledged that most parents are happy to consent to this test. In 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution (which as discussed 
below reflect international human rights instruments on the primacy of parental 
decision-making in this context), their decision as parents would only be 
overturned if the decision would threaten the life or urgent health needs of the 
very young child.  
1.17 As a child matures through pre-adolescence and adolescence, the 
role of the parent and guardian might lessen to one degree or another, so that 
the child‟s decision-making should be given some degree of recognition. 
Reflecting the general literature that different children mature differently, there 
has also been a general reluctance to specify a definite age under the age of 
adulthood (whether this has been set at 18 or 16) at which a child should be 
regarded as being competent or accountable for their decision-making. Instead, 
in some instances some quite young ages have been specified as thresholds 
for specific purposes, whereas a more general “maturity” or “understanding” 
test, without reference to a specific age, has been used for other purposes.  
                                                     
10  The 1985 Act implemented the main recommendations in the Commission‟s 1983 
Report on the Age of Majority, the Age for Marriage and Some Connected 
Subjects (LRC 5-1983). 
11  [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622. 
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1.18 Thus, the age of criminal responsibility in Ireland is based on a 
generally applicable age threshold of 12,12  which broadly corresponds with the 
beginning of adolescence and the type of understanding and insight that goes 
with that, as discussed above. Setting a specific age of responsibility, rather 
than legislating for a general “maturity” test, reflects the perceived importance of 
certainty in the context of the application of the criminal law. Equally, and 
reflecting the specific needs of those aged 12 to 17, the Irish criminal process 
also provides for different arrangements for dealing with breaches of the 
criminal law, including more concerted efforts to avoid the full rigours of the 
criminal process.13  
1.19 By contrast with this age-specific limit of 12 years, section 24(b) of 
the Child Care Act 1991 provides that, in child care proceedings, a court must 
“in so far as is practicable, give due consideration, having regard to his age and 
understanding, to the wishes of the child.” Similarly, section 24(2) of the 
Adoption Act 2010 provides that, where a child over 7 years of age is 
considered for adoption, the Adoption Authority must give due consideration to 
the wishes of the child “having regard to his or her age and understanding.” 
Authoritative case law in Ireland has taken the same approach. In McK v 
Information Commissioner,14 the Supreme Court recognised, in the context of a 
health care setting, that the views of a 17 year old young person “are very 
relevant”15 and may also override the general presumed entitlement of a parent 
to health information about their children. 
1.20 The approach taken in the Child Care Act 1991 and the Adoption 
Act 2010, and by the Supreme Court in McK v Information Commissioner, 
reflects the literature discussed above, as well as relevant international legal 
standards concerning children, notably set out in the 1989 UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 5 of the UNCRC provides that the 
                                                     
12  See section 52 of the Children Act 2001, as amended by section 129 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2006. The general age of criminal responsibility is set at 12, 
though it is 10 for murder, rape and aggravated sexual assault. This lower age, 
which attracted criticism during the Oireachtas debate on the 2006 Act, appears 
to have been influenced by the highly-publicised murder in 1993 of a 2-year-old 
English boy Jamie Bulger by two children, Robert Thompson and Jon Venables, 
who were both 10 at the time.  
13  Thus, the Children Act 2001, as amended, provides for various interventions to 
divert young offenders from the usual court-based consequences of breaches of 
the criminal code.  
14  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260.  
15  [2006] 1 IR 260, at 268. The case is discussed at paragraph 1.65, below. 
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State must respect the rights and responsibilities of parents, or other caregivers, 
to provide “appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of 
their rights in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.” 
Article 5 thus reflects the view that parental rights and responsibilities must also 
take account of the “evolving capacities of the child.” This is also linked with 
Article 18 of the UNCRC, which states that “the best interests of children will be 
[the] basic concern” of all those involved in ensuring the effective 
implementation of the rights of children.  
C Guiding Principles for this Report  
1.21 The Commission now turns to set out the guiding principles it has 
used in preparing this Report. The Commission considers that it would be useful 
to include these general principles in the draft Health (Children and Consent to 
Medical Treatment) Bill attached to the Report. This is consistent with the 
Commission‟s approach in the 2006 Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law,
16
 
which inserted a list of guiding principles in the draft Scheme of a Mental 
Capacity Bill attached to that Report. This approach has also been used in 
existing legislation in this area, such as the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, 
the Child Care Act 1991 and the Adoption Act 2010, each of which set out 
general principles concerning the paramount importance of the welfare of the 
child and also the need to take account of the views of the child.17 
(1) The Constitution and international standards concerning 
parental responsibility and the rights of children  
1.22 Reflecting the literature already discussed, Irish law has long 
recognised in a number of areas a gradual transition from complete 
dependency in childhood to independence at adulthood at 18 (or, before the 
Age of Majority Act 1985, at 21).18 Since the coming into force of the 
Constitution of Ireland in 1937 and the advent of a rights-based analysis to this 
area, a similar approach has been taken. Article 41.1.1º of the Constitution 
provides that: 
“The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and 
fundamental unit group of society.”  
                                                     
16  (LRC 83-2006). 
17  See section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, section 24 of the Child 
Care Act 1991 and section 24(2) of the Adoption Act 2010, discussed below. 
18  See the discussion in Chapter 2 of the various ages below 18 at which persons 
are deemed competent for specific purposes. 
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1.23 Article 41.1.1º is sometimes regarded as an unusually strong 
recognition of the importance of the family unit, but it is virtually identical to 
Article 16.3 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states: 
“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State.” 
1.24 Given that the 1948 UN Declaration was approved 11 years after 
the 1937 Constitution, it is clear that Article 41.1.1º cannot be described simply 
as reflecting a 1930s view of the family, still less the view of a particular 
religious perspective.19 Indeed, since the second half of the 20
th
 Century the 
relevant international instruments have continued to support this approach to 
the family. Thus, Article 23.1 of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) involves a remarkable reflection of the text of 
Article 41.1.1º and provides: 
“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State.” 
1.25 Similarly, the Preamble to the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC) reiterates that the family is “the fundamental group of 
society.” The 1966 and 1989 UN Conventions thus underline that Article 41.1.1º 
reflects a contemporary view at international level of the fundamental 
importance of the family unit. It is not surprising, therefore, that this approach is 
reflected not only in Article 41 of the Constitution of Ireland but also in the law of 
other states, such as Germany and Australia.20 For example, section 43(1)(b) of 
the Australian (federal) Family Law Act 1975 states that, in family law 
proceedings, Australian courts must have regard to “the need to give the widest 
possible protection and assistance to the family as the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society.” The Australian 1975 Act was clearly intended to codify 
Article 23.1 of the 1966 ICCPR.21 
                                                     
19  See the discussion in the following: Hogan and Whyte (eds) Kelly: The Irish 
Constitution 4
th
 ed (LexisNexis, 2003), paragraph 7.6.01, fn 1; Hogan, “DeValera, 
the Constitution and the historians” (2005) 40 Irish Jurist 293; and Gallagher, 
“The Irish Constitution – Its Unique Nature and the Relevance of International 
Jurisprudence” (2010) 45 Irish Jurist 22.  
20  Hogan and Whyte (eds) Kelly: The Irish Constitution 4
th
 ed (LexisNexis, 2003), 
paragraph 7.6.01, fn 2, citing Article 6 of the 1949 German Grundgesetz (the 
German Basic Law, in effect its Constitution) and section 43(1)(b) of the 
Australian (federal) Family Law Act 1975.  
21  See, for example, Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence – A 
National Legal Response (ALRC Report 114, 2010) paragraph 4.42, referring to 
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1.26 Article 42.1 of the Constitution reinforces the statement in Article 41 
that the family is the fundamental unit group of society by acknowledging that 
the family is “the primary and natural educator of the child.” Article 42.5 provides 
that only in “exceptional circumstances” where parents “fail in their duty towards 
their children” the State may “supply the place of parents.” Article 42.5 also 
states that any such role of the State must have due regard for the rights of the 
child. As with Article 41.1.1º, Article 42 is reflected in relevant international 
human rights documents. Thus, Article 18 of the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) states that “[p]arents or, as the case may be, legal 
guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development 
of the child” and that the State must provide appropriate assistance to parents 
and guardians. Article 9 provides that the State may only intervene to separate 
a child from parents against their will where “such separation is necessary for 
the best interests of the child.”  
1.27 The provisions of Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution, and the 
relevant international instruments such as the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1966 ICCPR and the 1989 UNCRC, contain the following 
important elements: (a) parents and guardians have primary responsibility for 
the upbringing and development of their children, (b) the State may intervene to 
supply the place of parents only in exceptional circumstances where this is 
necessary, and (c) the rights of the child, and their best interests, must always 
be taken into account in this context. 
1.28 In terms of the general status of the rights of the child under the 
Constitution, Walsh J stated in the Supreme Court decision G v An Bord 
Uchtála: 
“The child‟s natural rights spring primarily from the natural right of 
every individual to life, to be reared and educated, to liberty, to work, 
to rest and recreation, to the practice of religion, and to follow his or 
her conscience... The child‟s natural right to life and all that flows 
from that right are independent of any right of the parent as such.”22 
1.29 It is clear that the younger a child is, the greater the responsibility that 
is imposed on parents or guardians to ensure that the rights of children are 
implemented and protected; and that the State may only intervene to override 
any parental decision in exceptional instances. For example, in North Western 
                                                                                                                                  
the Second Stage speech on the Family Law Bill (which became the 1975 Act) of 
the then Australian Attorney General, Lionel Murphy (who had cited the ICCPR in 
this context). 
22
   G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32 at 69. 
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Health Board v HW and CW23 the Supreme Court did not override the refusal of 
parents to consent to doctors carrying out the “heel prick” PKU blood test on 
their baby boy. Even though the Supreme Court noted that most parents would 
be happy to have the test carried out and the medical view was that the test be 
done, it decided that any overriding of parental decision-making would only be 
suitable if the refusal threatened the child‟s life or immediate health. Equally, as 
the child grows and develops to maturity through adolescence and into their 
teenage years, their emerging capacity to exercise their rights jointly with, and 
then independently of, their parents must also be recognised. In McK v 
Information Commissioner,24 the Supreme Court recognised, in the context of a 
health care setting, that the views of a 17 year old young person are very 
relevant and may also override the general presumed entitlement of a parent to 
health information about their children. 
1.30 The approach of the Supreme Court in the G case, the North 
Western Health Board case and the McK case is consistent with the literature 
on child development discussed above and the relevant international 
instruments in this area. It is also consistent with the extensive case law and 
legislation in other states which the Commission discusses in Chapter 2, below. 
This approach recognises a number of important points: that a child has rights 
that are independent of any right of the parent as such; that these rights are, 
during the child‟s early years, exercised on behalf of the child, usually by the 
child‟s parents or guardians; that the rights remain the rights of the child as they 
develop towards maturity and adulthood; and that there are various points, 
sometimes based on an age threshold and sometimes based on an assessment 
of maturity and capacity, at which the law recognises that the child can exercise 
these rights independently of their parents or guardians even before they reach 
full adulthood at the age of 18. As a result, the law acknowledges that a person 
under 18 years of age is, in a number of contexts, an independent rights-holder 
that is commensurate with the progressive development and maturity of that 
person.  
1.31 The Commission has therefore concluded that this analysis of the 
rights of children in the context of the family should be reflected in the approach 
it takes to the specific issues addressed in this Report, and in the draft Bill 
appended to it. The Commission accordingly recommends that legislation 
should be enacted dealing with consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment 
concerning persons under the age of 18, and which would include the following 
general principles: having regard to the recognition in the Constitution and 
                                                     
23  [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622, discussed in paragraph 2.28, below.  
24  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260, discussed at 
paragraph 1.65, below.  
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international instruments of the family as the fundamental group in society, 
parents and guardians have primary responsibility for the upbringing and 
development of their children; the State may intervene to supply the place of 
parents in exceptional circumstances where this is necessary; the rights of the 
child, and their best interests, must always be taken into account in this context; 
a child has rights that are independent of any right of the parent as such; that 
these rights are, during the child‟s early years, exercised on behalf of the child, 
usually by the child‟s parents or guardians; that these rights remain the rights of 
the child as they develop towards maturity and adulthood; and that there are 
various points, sometimes based on an age threshold and sometimes based on 
an assessment of maturity and capacity, at which the law recognises that the 
child can exercise these rights independently of their parents or guardians even 
before they reach full adulthood at the age of 18. 
1.32 The Commission recommends that legislation should be enacted 
dealing with consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment concerning persons 
under the age of 18, and that it should include the following general principles: 
having regard to the recognition in the Constitution and international 
instruments of the family as the fundamental group in society, parents and 
guardians have primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of 
their children; the State may intervene to supply the place of parents in 
exceptional circumstances where this is necessary; the rights of the child, and 
their best interests, must always be taken into account in this context; a child 
has rights that are independent of any right of the parent as such; these rights 
are, during the child’s early years, exercised on behalf of the child, usually by 
the child’s parents or guardians; these rights remain the rights of the child as 
they develop towards maturity and adulthood; and there are various points, 
sometimes based on an age threshold and sometimes based on an assessment 
of maturity and capacity, at which the law recognises that the child can exercise 
these rights independently of their parents or guardians even before they reach 
full adulthood at the age of 18. 
(2) Best interests of the child  
1.33 The Commission also considers that it is important to recognise, 
bearing in mind the literature on the development of children, that while a child 
can develop a sense of maturity and capacity for decision-making before the 
age of 18, this capacity and decision-making cannot be equated with the 
decision-making of a person with longer experience. In that respect, another 
important feature in the literature on children‟s rights is the need to ensure that 
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any outcome is in the best interests of the child.25 In this context, it is important 
to ensure that respect for the rights of the child also takes account of an 
objective assessment of what is in the child‟s interests. In Irish law, the best 
interests test already forms part of the legal framework applicable to decisions 
about children. Thus, section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, section 
24 of the Child Care Act 1991 and section 24 of the Adoption Act 2010 require 
that decisions concerning children be based on their best interests.  
1.34 The best interests test has sometimes been criticised as amounting 
to no more than a simple paternalistic test of “parents know best” or, in the 
context of this Report, “doctor knows best”. When the best interests test is seen, 
however, in the light of a rights-based approach, it is clear that it is not 
paternalistic in nature but has an objective aspect that ensures an appropriate 
level of protection against outcomes that would be inconsistent with the rights of 
children. This objective aspect of the best interests test has been emphasised, 
for example, in the 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in AC v 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services).26 It is notable that the best 
interests test has also been incorporated into international rights-based 
instruments on children, including the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. This objective best interests test ensures, therefore, that the health care 
outcome in an individual case is not to be equated with the particular 
preferences of the person under 18, his or her parents or guardians (subject to 
the presumption that their views should be given priority under Article 41), still 
less of any person acting in the place of parents or guardians (such as the 
Health Service Executive exercising powers under the Child Care Act 1991). 
The Commission emphasises that this is as important in the context of physical 
health care as it is in the context of mental health care. Indeed, the Commission 
notes that, in the very specific context of the detention of a young person under 
the Mental Health Act 2001, an objective best interests test ensures that all 
those involved in decision-making under the 2001 Act do not equate any 
person‟s preferences for specific forms of treatment with the best interests of 
the child or young person. Viewed in this light, the Commission has therefore 
concluded, and recommends, that the “best interests” test, assessed objectively 
by reference to the rights of the child, should be included as a primary 
                                                     
25
  See Thomas & O‟Kane “When Children‟s Wishes and Feelings Clash with their 
Best Interests” (1998) 6 International Journal of Children’s Rights 137 at 138, 
Alston “The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and 
Human Rights” (1994) 8 International Journal of Law & Family 1 at 9. Eekelaar 
“The Interests of the Child and the Child‟s Wishes: The Role of Dynamic Self-
Determinism” (1994) 8(1) International Journal of Law Policy & Family 42. 
26  [2009] SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181, discussed at paragraph 2.118, below. 
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consideration in the approach it takes to the specific issues addressed in this 
Report, and in the draft Bill appended to it.  
1.35 The Commission recommends that its proposed legislation on 
consent to, and refusal of, health care and medical treatment concerning 
persons under the age of 18 should include as a primary consideration the best 
interests of the child, assessed objectively by reference to the rights of the child.   
D Definition of Health Care and Treatment  
1.36 The Commission now turns to discuss how to define the scope of 
the health care and medical treatment with which this Report is involved. This is 
important in the context of describing the scope of the recommendations in this 
Report, and of the draft Bill appended to the Report. 
1.37 In order to approach this aspect of the Commission‟s 
recommendations, it is important to note the range and scope of the types of 
health care and related medical treatments involving children and young people. 
These include: 
 dental care and treatment  
 eye care and treatment 
 over-the-counter medicine of specific relevance to adolescents, such as 
products related to skin conditions 
 prescription for antibiotics  
 prescription for contraception 
 advice and counselling on general health and development   
 counselling and treatment concerning mental health  
 prescription for anti-depressants 
 admission to mental health facility 
 X ray  
 treatment related to a soft tissue sports injury or broken arm 
 surgery for removal of the appendix  
 surgery and treatment connected to cancer 
 surgery and treatment connected with a chronic condition such as 
cystic fibrosis 
 paediatric research and clinical trials.  
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1.38 The Commission noted in the Consultation Paper that existing 
legislation does not contain a single, generally applicable, term to define 
“medical treatment” or “health care.” Given the wide range of care and 
treatment involved and the changing nature of health care and treatments, this 
is not surprising. 
1.39 The Commission notes that a number of definitions of health care 
and health services that have been enacted in the context of specific legislation 
concerning health care may provide some useful reference points. For example, 
section 2 of the Health Insurance Act 1994 defines health services as: 
“medical, surgical, diagnostic, nursing, dental, chiropody, 
chiropractic, eye therapy, occupational therapy, physiotherapy, or 
speech therapy services or treatment or services or treatment 
provided in connection therewith, or similar services or treatment.” 
1.40 In the specific context of consent to treatment, section 23 of the 
Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, discussed in detail in Chapter 
2 below, refers to consent concerning “surgical, medical or dental treatment” 
which section 23(2) of the 1997 Act states: 
“includes any procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis 
and this section applies to any procedure (including, in particular, the 
administration of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment 
as it applies to that treatment.” 
1.41  In the Consultation Paper, the Commission provisionally 
recommended a broad definition of health care and treatment, rather than a 
prescriptive one which would run the risk of excluding specific forms of care and 
treatment, including those that might develop in the future. The Commission 
affirms this approach in this Report, in particular because of the need to ensure 
that the definition is future-proofed, and to ensure that children and young 
people have access to the types of health care and treatment they need. The 
Commission considers that this should include, at the least, the scope of 
“surgical, medical or dental treatment” as defined in section 23 of the Non Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997, but that it should also extend beyond 
this to encompass the examples of care and treatment already mentioned. 
1.42 The Commission reiterates that, bearing in mind the wide range of 
these examples of care and treatment, a broad definition of health care and 
medical treatment should be used, encompassing diagnosis and treatment. The 
word “treatment” in this context would include invasive exploratory acts carried 
out for the purposes of diagnosis. The definition would include medical, surgical, 
nursing, pharmaceutical, dental and mental health services.  
1.43 Health care and treatment may be provided by a range of health 
care professionals. This can include dentists, doctors and nurses, as well as the 
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wider health and social care services such as dieticians, occupational 
therapists, physiotherapists, podiatrists, radiographers, social workers and 
social care workers. These professions are regulated under the Health and 
Social Care Professionals Act 2005. 
1.44 The definition of health care should also include aspects which are 
preventative, such as health promotion and the provision of advice, information 
and counselling. It is also without prejudice to specific areas of health care 
already regulated by, for example, the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987.  
1.45 As stated in the Consultation Paper, the Commission does not seek 
to differentiate between physical and mental health on the issues of capacity 
and consent.27 The definition of health care would therefore include psychiatric 
treatment and related mental health treatments. 
1.46 Bearing in mind the breadth of scope of the Report, the use of an 
inclusive, but non-exhaustive, list may be helpful to set out clearly what is 
included in the broad definition of health care and treatment. The Commission 
has therefore concluded, and thus recommends, that, for the purposes of its 
proposed legislation on health care and treatment concerning persons under 
the age of 18, health care and medical treatment should  be defined as 
including:  
(a) the provision of surgical, medical, nursing, pharmaceutical, 
dental and mental health care or treatment, including the 
prescription or supply of drugs; 
(b) any assessment or examination for the purposes of 
diagnosis, including invasive exploratory acts;  
(c) any procedure undertaken for the purposes of preventing a 
disease or illness; 
(d) any procedure which is ancillary to any treatment as it 
applies to that treatment (including but not limited to 
anaesthesia); 
(e) a course of treatment or a group of associated treatments; 
(f) any treatment carried out by a health and social care 
professional, within the meaning of the Health and Social 
Care Professionals Act 2005; 
(g) health promotion, and  
(h) the provision of advice, information and counselling in 
connection with any of the above. 
                                                     
27  (LRC CP 59-2009 at 6.123). 
 27 
1.47 The Commission recommends, that, for the purposes of its 
proposed legislation on health care and treatment concerning persons under 
the age of 18, health care and medical treatment should be defined as 
including:  
(a) the provision of surgical, medical, nursing, pharmaceutical, 
dental and mental health care or treatment, including the 
prescription or supply of drugs; 
(b) any assessment or examination for the purposes of 
diagnosis, including invasive exploratory acts; 
(c) any procedure undertaken for the purposes of preventing a 
disease or illness; 
(d) any procedure which is ancillary to any treatment as it 
applies to that treatment (including but not limited to 
anaesthesia); 
(e) a course of treatment or a group of associated treatments; 
(f) any treatment carried out by a health and social care 
professional, within the meaning of the Health and Social 
Care Professionals Act 2005; 
(g) health promotion, and  
(h) the provision of advice, information and counselling in 
connection with any of the above. 
E Voice of the Child in the Healthcare Setting 
1.48 In all areas of health care and medical treatment, it is important that 
the voice of the child is heard and respected. The Commission‟s examination of 
the treatment of the child in the healthcare setting in Ireland reveals a 
considerable emphasis on protecting the child and acting in his or her best 
interests. In this Report, the Commission examines this important matter in the 
context of the need to recognise what can be described as the participation 
rights of the child.  
1.49 There is currently no statutory guidance on the treatment of children 
and young people in a health care setting, although helpful non-statutory 
guidance has been published on the need for health care professionals to listen 
to the views of the young patient, regardless of the patient‟s age or maturity. 
Despite the existence of a range of different documents focusing on specific 
issues such as alcohol use and mental health, there is no single document 
setting out suitable standards of care for children, guidelines for treating 
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children in hospital, and appropriate levels of participation by children.28 
Furthermore, the separate issues of information provision, assent to treatment 
and consent to treatment are often dealt with together. As discussed below, the 
Oireachtas already recognises the capacity of 16 and 17 year olds to consent to 
health care treatment in section 23 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the 
Person Act 1997, although this is limited to the criminal law setting. As the 
Commission recommends in this Report, this should be extended to the civil law 
setting. While the Commission takes a different view concerning those under 16 
years of age – and many of those children may not have the capacity to consent 
to health or medical treatment – they nonetheless have a right to be informed as 
to health care matters that affects them and to express their views, and perhaps 
their assent even if not necessarily their consent. Thus, at least one Irish 
children‟s hospital advises staff as follows:  
“Decision-making involving the health care of children and 
adolescents should include, to the greatest extent feasible, the 
assent of the patient as well as the participation of the parents and 
the healthcare professional. Serious consideration must be given to 
each patient‟s developing capacity for participating in decision-
making.”29   
1.50 Section 23(1) of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 
1997, while it deals with consent to medical treatment by persons of 16 and 17 
years of age, does not explicitly acknowledge the right of a child or young 
person to participate in decisions regarding his or her medical treatment. 
1.51 As already discussed above, a very young child‟s rights will 
naturally be exercised by his or her parents or guardians, but as the child grows 
and matures the active participation by the child in the exercise of his or her 
rights becomes more and more important. Participation by children is highly 
beneficial, as it enhances their communication and development skills and 
improves the relationship between children and adults. Giving children a voice 
in matters that affect them does not require that they be given the sole 
responsibility for all decisions. A research study carried out in 2006 for the 
Office of the Minister for Children noted:  
“decision-making for children is a complex process that evolves over 
time and may be shared or contested with parents and health 
professionals depending on the type of decision. [The study] suggests a 
                                                     
28  Kilkelly, Children’s Rights in Ireland (Tottel Publishing 2008) at 405. For further 
discussion, see Consultation Paper at 4.94. 
29
  Staff Guidelines in Relation to Obtaining Consent for Children and Young People 
(Crumlin Children‟s Hospital, December 2007) at 2.2. 
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pragmatic approach, which recognises that children need protection 
while at the same time allowing flexibility for the child‟s emerging 
knowledge and self-determination.”30 
1.52 This approach, with which the Commission concurs, is echoed in 
some existing legislation concerning children. Thus, where a child over 7 years 
of age is considered for adoption, the Adoption Authority must give due 
consideration to the wishes of the child “having regard to his or her age and 
understanding;”31 and, in care proceedings, a court must “in so far as is 
practicable, give due consideration, having regard to his age and 
understanding, to the wishes of the child.” 32 
1.53 This is also reflected in relevant international Conventions on 
children. For example, Article 13 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction (which was implemented by the Child Abduction 
and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991) states that the designated 
national authority (in Ireland, the High Court) may refuse to order the return of 
an abducted child if the child objects and has attained “an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his views.” 
1.54 Similarly, Article 12(1) of the UN 1989 Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC) states:  
“States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or 
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.” 33 
                                                     
30
  Coyne et al Giving Children a Voice: Investigation of children’s experiences of 
participation in consultation and decision-making in Irish hospitals (Office of the 
minister for Children 2006) at 57. 
31  See section 24(2) of the Adoption Act 2010.  
32  See section 24(b) of the Child Care Act 1991.  
33  Section 6 of The Children (Scotland) Act 1995  reflects this aspect of the UNCRC: 
“A person shall, in reaching any major decision which involves (a) his fulfilling a 
parental responsibility or the responsibility mentioned in section 5(1) of this Act or 
(b) his exercising a parental right or giving consent by virtue of that section, have 
regard so far as practicable to the views (if he wishes to express them) of the 
child concerned, taking account of the child‟s age and maturity, and to those of 
any other person who has parental responsibilities or parental rights in relation to 
the child (and wishes to express those views); and without prejudice to the 
generality of this subsection a child twelve years of age or more shall be 
presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to form a view.” 
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1.55 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in commenting on 
the right of the child to be heard stated:  
“The realisation of the provisions of the [UNCRC] requires respect for 
the child‟s right to express his or her views and to participate in 
promoting the healthy development and well-being of children. This 
applies to individual health-care decisions, as well as to children‟s 
involvement in the development of health policy and services.”34 
1.56 This is also consistent with the Commission‟s general 
recommendation in its 2010 Report on Legal Aspects of Family Relationships35 
that the voice of the child be taken into account in circumstances which concern 
him or her.  
1.57 In this context, the Commission agrees with the sentiment 
expressed in the Government‟s 2000 National Children‟s Strategy:  
“It is important that giving children a voice is not interpreted as a 
passing responsibility for decisions and their consequences to children. 
The intention is to ensure that in achieving a decision which is in the 
best interests of the child, the child should have an active part and 
know that his or her views are respected.”36 
1.58 It is evident that, in this respect, it is necessary to ensure that the 
voice of the young patient is heard in the healthcare setting, to enable children 
and young people to grow and mature, reaching a point where the individual 
who has capacity can participate in and make decisions about his or her own 
healthcare and treatment. The Commission therefore recommends that when 
treating children, health care professionals must give children an opportunity to 
express their views and to give these views due weight, in accordance with the 
child‟s age and maturity. 
1.59 The Commission recommends that, when treating children, health 
care professionals must give children an opportunity to express their views and 
to give these views due weight, in accordance with the child’s age and maturity. 
  
                                                     
34
  Committee on the Rights of the Child “The Right of the Child to be Heard” 
(General Comment No.12 of 2009 CRC/C/GC/12) at 98. 
35  (LRC 101 – 2010), in particular, at paragraphs 4.18 and 4.22. 
36  The National Children’s Strategy: Our Children Their Lives (Stationary Office 
Dublin 2000) at 3.1.  
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F Confidentiality  
1.60 Related to the right of the child to have his or her voice heard in the 
health care context is the right of the child to be heard in a confidential setting. 
The importance of confidentiality as an aspect of the healthcare provider-patient 
relationship is clear and should not be limited by age. The importance placed on 
confidentiality by young people is consistently recognised in research and was 
echoed during the Commission‟s consultation with young people in 2009 in 
advance of the Consultation Paper. The Commission accepts that, regardless of 
the age at which young people should be legally capable of consenting 
independently to medical treatment, there is a need to respect confidentiality.  
1.61 Arising from the Commission‟s consultation, it appears that 
confidentiality is a particularly important issue for young people in the context of 
general health concerns and anxieties which they may discuss with a general 
practitioner. It is important to note that young people often visit their local GP or 
healthcare professional simply for advice or reassurance, particularly in relation 
to personal concerns about puberty and development. In such cases there is 
often no need for prescribed medical treatment, and the patient is satisfied by 
the provision of general information and guidance. 
1.62 In this context, the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Ethical Conduct 
and Behaviour states that confidentiality is a fundamental principle of medical 
ethics, central to the trust between patients and doctors and that patients are 
entitled to expect that information held about them will be held in confidence, 
save in certain limited circumstances. 37 
1.63 In relation to children and young people, the 2009 Guide states: 
“When treating children and young people, you should remember 
your duties of confidentiality... subject to parental rights of access to 
medical records which may arise by law. You should tell these young 
patients that you cannot give an absolute guarantee of 
confidentiality.” 
1.64 As the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide correctly notes,38 confidentiality 
can never be absolutely guaranteed to any patient (of whatever age), but health 
care professionals are aware that a general duty of confidentiality is owed to all 
patients, including those under 18 years of age. As also mentioned in the 
Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide, legislation such as the Freedom of Information 
                                                     
37  Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour 6
th
 ed (Medical Council, 2009), 
paragraphs 24 and 25. 
38  Disclosure may be required by law, or may be necessary to protect the patient or 
others from harm. Disclosure may also be necessary to protect the public interest. 
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Act 1997 (Section 28(6)) Regulations 1999,39 made under the Freedom of 
Information Act 1997, prescribe the classes of individuals whose records may 
be made available to parents and guardians. Regulation 3(1) of the 1999 
Regulations states that access to personal information “shall” be granted where 
the requester is a parent or a guardian of the individual to whom the record 
relates and where the individual is under 18 years of age. Regulation 3(1) also 
states that access to the personal information of a minor shall be granted where 
it would, having regard to all of the circumstances, and to any guidelines drawn 
up and published by the Minister, be “in the patient‟s best interests.”  
1.65 The application of the 1999 Regulations arose in McK v Information 
Commissioner.40 In this case, a father (who had separated from his wife some 
years before) had visited his 12 year old daughter in hospital, and was told that 
she had been admitted for an unspecified viral condition. He then applied under 
the 1999 Regulations for more detailed information concerning his daughter‟s 
admission, but this was refused by the hospital and, on appeal, the Information 
Commissioner upheld the refusal. The High Court and, on further appeal, the 
Supreme Court decided that the Information Commissioner should have 
approached the request for information by acknowledging that a parent was, in 
general, entitled under the 1999 Regulations to the information. The Supreme 
Court unanimously held that this arose by virtue of the central position of the 
parent under Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution and the consequent 
presumption that access by a parent to health information concerning their child 
would be in the child‟s best interests. This presumption should have been 
applied by the Information Commissioner before considering any evidence 
which could rebut that entitlement.  
1.66 The Supreme Court added an important caveat to this because, by 
the time the Court heard the case, which was 6 years after the hospital 
admission at issue, the daughter was 17½ years of age. In this respect, 
Denham J (who delivered the Court‟s judgment) stated that the Information 
Commissioner would have to reconsider the application in light of the specific 
circumstances of the case “especially the age of the minor, nearly 18 years of 
age, whose views now are very relevant.”41 In light of this analysis by the 
Supreme Court, the Information Commissioner reconsidered the matter.42 She 
                                                     
39  Freedom of Information Act 1997 (Section 28(6)) Regulations 1999 (SI No.47 of 
1999). 
40  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260.  
41  [2006] 1 IR 260, at 268. 
42  Annual Report of the Information Commissioner 2006 at 21-23, available at 
www.oic.gov.ie.   
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accepted that the father had a presumptive entitlement to the information, and 
she then heard evidence from his daughter. The Commissioner had regard to 
her age and to her maturity, as well as the cogent reasons she advanced for not 
disclosing the information sought by her father.43 In this context, the Information 
Commissioner also referred to section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the 
Person Act 1997 as indicating a recognition by the Oireachtas that minors aged 
16 have the capacity to determine what is in their best interests in the context of 
medical treatment. The Information Commissioner held that there was sufficient 
evidence that disclosure of the minor‟s medical records to her father would not 
serve her best interests, and that this rebutted the presumption of parental 
entitlement to a child‟s personal information. The Information Commissioner 
also stated that, taking into account that the daughter‟s welfare was paramount, 
to grant her father access to her personal medical records would, as a matter of 
probability, cause her damage, both educationally and emotionally. 
1.67 In light of this discussion, the Commission accepts that a combination 
of the relevant provisions of the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Ethical 
Conduct and Behaviour Guide and of the approach taken in the McK case 
provide useful reference points in the application of the principle of 
confidentiality to a person under 18. In that respect, the Commission has 
concluded, and recommends, that when treating persons under 18, health care 
professionals must ensure respect for confidentiality, subject to any specific 
statutory obligations to disclose medical records. The Commission also 
recommends that this confidentiality must also have regard to the rights of 
parents and guardians to access to relevant health information, and that this 
information should be given where it would, having regard to all of the 
circumstances, be in the best interests of the person under 18 and to the 
general principles already set out in this Report, above.   
1.68 The Commission recommends that when treating persons under 18, 
health care professionals must ensure respect for confidentiality, subject to any 
specific statutory obligations to disclose medical records. The Commission 
further recommends that this confidentiality must also have regard to the rights 
of parents and guardians to access to relevant health information, and that this 
information should be given where it would, having regard to all of the 
circumstances and to the general principles already set out in this Report, be in 
the best interests of the person under 18.  
  
                                                     
43  Ms McK had not spoken to her father for a number of years before the request for 
information and contact with her father caused her stress and anxiety. She 
viewed the request as an attack on her privacy and did not believe disclosure of 
the information would be in her best interests. 
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2  
CHAPTER 2 CAPACITY OF MINORS AND YOUNG PERSONS 
TO CONSENT TO AND REFUSE TREATMENT  
A Introduction 
2.01 In this Chapter the Commission discusses the detailed aspects of 
consent to, and refusal of, healthcare treatment by individuals under the age of 
18, having regard to the general principles set out in Chapter 1. The 
Commission discusses decision-making by young persons, that is, 16 and 17 
year olds, and, separately, minors, that is, those under the age of 16. In Part B, 
the Commission discusses the current legal position in Ireland, including the 
effect of section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 
which provides, in the context of criminal law, that consent to medical treatment 
by a 16 and 17 year old has the same status as if he or she was an 18 year old. 
The Commission also discusses the position in Irish case law of those under 16, 
which reflects the general literature as well as legal developments in other 
countries concerning mature minors. In Part C, the Commission then discusses 
in detail statutory provisions and case law concerning health care involving 
those under 18 in a number of countries, in particular, England and Wales, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In Part D, the 
Commission sets out its recommendations concerning consent to and refusal of 
medical treatment for those under 18. The Commission‟s approach is that this 
should be as consistent as possible with the proposed reform of the law on 
mental capacity for those over 18, and the Commission therefore favours a 
functional test of capacity. The Commission sets out its recommendations 
concerning 16 and 17 year olds, and then sets out separately its 
recommendations for those under 16.  
B Capacity of Persons under 18 to Consent to and Refuse 
Treatment in Ireland   
2.02 In this Part, the Commission discusses the current legal position in 
Ireland concerning people under 18 years of age, beginning with an outline of 
the general position. The Commission then discusses section 23 of the Non-
Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 which provides, in the context of 
criminal law only, that consent to medical treatment by a 16 and 17 year old has 
the same status as if he or she was an 18 year old. The Commission also 
discusses the need to examine any proposals for reform in the wider context of 
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proposals to introduce a modern statutory framework on mental capacity and 
decision-making by those over 18. The Commission‟s 2006 Report on 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law
1
 contained a draft Scheme of a Mental Capacity 
Bill. The Report was based on a presumption of capacity for those over 18 
years of age and a functional test of capacity, that is, a case-by-case test of 
capacity based on whether the person understands the nature of the specific 
decision being made. The Commission‟s approach in the 2006 Report reflects 
recent international trends in this area, including the rights-based analysis found 
in the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The 
Commission is conscious that the Government is committed to publishing by the 
end of 2011 a Mental Capacity Bill that is consistent with the 2006 UN 
Convention.2 
(1) Irish law on age categories generally  
2.03 Reflecting the literature on child development discussed in Chapter 
1, Irish law does not set out a single age at which a person suddenly takes on 
all the rights – and responsibilities – of a member of society. Instead, the law 
sometimes sets certain ages as thresholds, where rights and responsibilities are 
granted to young people as they move from childhood to adulthood, and 
sometimes refers to the need to have regard to a combination of age and 
maturity. 
2.04 Of course, the key threshold in law between childhood and 
adulthood is, in general, a person‟s 18
th
 birthday which, since the enactment of 
the Age of Majority Act 1985,3 is the date on which a person becomes an adult 
for many purposes of the civil law. Reaching 18, the age of majority, thus 
signals the end of many protections granted to children and young people by 
virtue of their young age, their position as children or minors, and marks an 
important legal watershed. 
2.05 Below the age of 18, a person‟s 16
th
 birthday is also another 
significant juncture in the progression, in law, from childhood to adulthood, from 
                                                     
1  (LRC 83-2006). 
2  The Programme for Government 2011-2016 (March 2011), p.38, available at 
www.taoiseach.ie, contains a commitment to “introduce a Mental Capacity Bill 
that is in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” 
The Government Legislation Programme, Summer Session 2011 (April 2011), 
available at www.taoiseach.ie, states that the Mental Capacity Bill is scheduled 
for publication in late 2011. 
3  The 1985 Act implemented the main recommendations in the Commission‟s 
Report on the Age of Majority, the Age for Marriage and Some Connected 
Subjects (LRC 5-1983). 
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minority to majority status. Traditionally, as outlined in the Consultation Paper,4 
a 16 year old was granted a significant measure of independence on his or her 
16
th
 birthday. This remains reflected in current legislation, for example the 
Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996 (many, though not all, 
restrictions on employment are lifted at age 16) and the Education (Welfare) Act 
2000 (16 is the school-leaving age). These Acts both use the age of 16 to 
distinguish between “children” and “young persons”, and they grant 16 year olds 
an increased measure of independence. 
2.06 In terms of health care and medical law, the age of 16 has also 
been largely accepted as the age of consent to medical treatment in a number 
of countries worldwide, including Ireland. As discussed below, section 23(1) of 
the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, which applies in the 
context of criminal law only, states that the consent of a 16 and 17 year old to 
medical treatment has the same legal status as if they were an 18 year old 
adult.  
2.07 Under the Health Acts 1947 to 1970, a person aged 16 years may 
choose his or her own doctor, obtain a medical card, consent to an operation 
and apply for a disabled person‟s maintenance allowance.5 Similarly, Regulation 
4(1) of the European Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for 
Human Use) Regulations 20046 states that, for the purposes of the 2004 
Regulations, “„adult‟ means a person who has attained the age of 16 years.” 
The 2004 Regulations, which supplement requirements in the Control of Clinical 
Trials Act 1987, implemented Directive 2001/20/EC on good clinical practice in 
the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use. The 2001 
Directive makes certain exclusions from its terms for “minors” but without 
defining the age under which a person is a minor for the purposes of the 
Directive. This is understandable given the diversity of opinion among EU 
Member States regarding the age of majority and, thus, when a person is a 
minor. The Irish 2004 Regulations that implemented the 2001 Directive would 
appear to have drawn on the existing Health Acts by defining an adult as a 
person aged 16 and over, and may also have been influenced in this respect by 
the comparable UK Regulations that implemented the 2001 Directive.7 Similarly, 
                                                     
4  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 2.23. 
5  See also the Commission‟s Working Paper The Law Relating to the Age of 
Majority, the Age for Marriage and Some Connected Subjects (Working Paper No 
2, 1977), Appendix B “Relationships Between Age and the Law”. 
6  SI No.190 of 2004.  
7  Regulation 2(1) of the UK Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004 (SI 1031/2004) (the 2004 Regulations implemented the 2001 Directive) 
provides: “„adult‟ means a person who has attained the age of 16 years.” 
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the Department of Health‟s Draft Human Tissue Bill 2009,8 published in 2009, 
proposes to define a child as a person under 16 years of age,9 and it appears 
that the proposed Health Information Bill will also take the same approach.10 
2.08 As noted in the Consultation Paper, children and young people are 
often treated in adult hospital wards before reaching 18 years of age, and 16 
seems to be considered a cut off point for admission to paediatric hospitals and 
wards.11 For example a 2007 report12 revealed that the maximum age of 
treatment in both the Emergency Department and in-patient admission in one 
children‟s hospital13 was 15 years of age. Another children‟s hospital14 operated 
on the basis of admitting children up to 16 years of age in both the Emergency 
Department and in-patient admission. A third15 also used the cut off point of 16 
years in respect of the Emergency Department, and the age of 14 years for in-
patient admission, with flexibility up to 16 years of age. While practice varies to 
some degree, therefore, depending on the hospital and the particular 
circumstances, the Commission notes that in general, young people are not 
treated in a paediatric setting once they reach 16 years of age.  
  
                                                     
8  Draft Proposals for General Scheme of the Human Tissue Bill 2009 (Department 
of Health and Children, 2009), available at www.dohc.ie. The Draft 2009 Bill 
proposes to implement the recommendations of the 2006 Report into Post-
Mortem Practice and Procedures (prepared by Dr Deirdre Madden), also 
available at www.dohc.ie.  
9  Sections 2.17 and 3.11 of the Draft Proposals for General Scheme of the Human 
Tissue Bill 2009, 65-66 and 97, respectively. 
10  Referred to in Draft Proposals for General Scheme of the Human Tissue Bill 
2009, 66. The Government Legislation Programme, Summer Session 2011 (April 
2011), available at www.taoiseach.ie, states that the Health Information Bill is 
scheduled for publication in 2011. 
11  LRC CP 59-2009 at 4.11. 
12  High Level Framework Brief for the National Paediatric Hospital: Final Report 
(Health Service Executive and Department of Health and Children, October 2007) 
at 47. 
13  Temple St Children‟s Hospital, Dublin. 
14  Adelaide and Meath Hospital, incorporating the National Children‟s Hospital, 
Tallaght. 
15  Our Lady‟s Children‟s Hospital Crumlin. 
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(2) Consent to treatment by those under 18 and the Non-Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997 
2.09 Section 23(1) of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 
1997 provides that, in the context of criminal law only, consent to medical 
treatment by a person aged 16 or 17 years of age has the same status as if he 
or she was an 18 year old, of full age. It is important to note that the 1997 Act 
implemented the main recommendations made by the Commission in its 1994 
Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person.16 In that 1994 Report, the 
Commission discussed the position in other countries where the criminal law 
concerning offences against the person, including assault, had been reformed.17 
In particular, in the context of the defence of consent to a charge of assault, the 
Commission recognised that many other countries had provided that the 
position concerning consent to medical treatment by 16 and 17 year olds should 
be clarified. The Commission emphasised in the 1994 Report the distinction 
between criminal liability on the one hand and civil liability on the other hand. 
The Commission noted that the capacity of 16 and 17 year olds to consent to 
treatment in the context of civil liability had been addressed in section 8 of the 
English Family Law Reform Act 1969, and that the position in the UK of those 
under 16 had been dealt with in 1985 in the landmark test case decision of the 
UK House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority.18 These developments on civil liability in the UK – and in other 
countries since the 1980s – are discussed in detail in Part C, below. In the 1994 
Report, the Commission clearly limited its recommendations to the criminal law 
area: 
“The Gillick decision might or might not be followed by our Supreme 
Court in a civil case but in criminal cases certainty should be imported, 
where possible, and we recommend that legislation be introduced 
similar to section 8 of the English Family Law Reform Act 1969.”19 
2.10 It is clear, therefore, that the Commission‟s intention was to confine 
its recommendation to the criminal law sphere. As the Commission noted, it was 
unclear in 1994 whether the approach in Gillick might or might not be followed 
                                                     
16  Law Reform Commission Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person (LRC 
45-1994). 
17  Law Reform Commission Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person (LRC 
45-1994), paragraphs 9.166-9.169. 
18  [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402. The Gillick case is discussed below, 
paragraph 2.62ff. 
19  Law Reform Commission Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person (LRC 
45-1994) at paragraph 9.169. 
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in Ireland. Since then, as already noted in this Report, the Supreme Court has 
decided in McK v Information Commissioner20 that, in a health care setting, the 
views of a young person who is 17 “are very relevant” and may sometimes 
override a parent‟s presumed entitlement to be able to access health care 
information concerning their children.21 Similarly, in D v Brennan and Ors,22 
which is discussed below, the High Court has acknowledged that a 16 or 17 
year old can, in certain circumstances, give a valid consent in the health care 
setting without the need for parental involvement. These decisions indicate that 
the general approach in the Gillick case, which in turn reflects the literature on 
child development and international instruments discussed in Chapter 1, above, 
as well as similar approaches in the law of the countries - discussed below, has, 
since 1994, been applied in Ireland.  
2.11 Because the 1994 Report recommended that legislation similar to 
section 8 of the English Family Law Reform Act 1969 be introduced to deal with 
consent in the criminal law setting, the Commission now turns to a comparison 
between section 8 of the 1969 Act and section 23 of the Non-Fatal Against the 
Person Act 1997, which implemented that recommendation. Section 8 of the 
English 1969 Act (which as the Commission discusses in Part C, below, was 
replicated in Northern Ireland in section 4 of the Age of Majority Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1969) states: 
“(1) The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years 
to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of 
consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as 
effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has 
by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it 
shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or 
guardian. 
(2) In this section “surgical, medical or dental treatment” includes any 
procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section 
applies to any procedure (including, in particular, the administration of 
an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that 
treatment. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective 
any consent which would have been effective if this section had not 
been enacted.” 
                                                     
20  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260.  
21  [2006] 1 IR 260. 268. See the discussion at paragraph 1.48ff, above. 
22  D v Brennan and Ors High Court, 9 May 2007. 
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2.12 The text of section 23 of the 1997 Act was clearly modelled directly 
on section 8 of the English 1969 Act (and section 4 of the Northern Ireland 1969 
Act). Section 23 of the 1997 Act states: 
“(1) The consent of a minor who has attained the age of 16 years to 
any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of 
consent, would constitute a trespass to his or her person, shall be as 
effective as it would be if he or she were of full age; and where a 
minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any 
treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from 
his or her parent or guardian. 
(2) In this section “surgical, medical or dental treatment” includes any 
procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section 
applies to any procedure (including, in particular, the administration 
of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to 
that treatment. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective 
any consent which would have been effective if this section had not 
been enacted.” 
2.13 The Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 deals with 
criminal liability only and, as recommended by the Commission in its 1994 
Report, section 23 of the 1997 Act provides a defence to a charge of assault 
where a health care professional provides treatment to a 16 and 17 year old. 
Given that the origins of section 23 of the 1997 Act can be traced to the 
Commission‟s 1994 Report, it is unlikely that section 23 could be interpreted as 
applying in the civil law context.  
2.14 As the Commission noted in the Consultation Paper,23 there is a 
fundamental difference between, on the one hand, the limited nature of a 
defence to the criminal offence of assault provided for in section 23 of the 1997 
Act and, on the other, the wider acknowledgement of a minor‟s entitlement to 
exercise a right concerning their autonomy in terms of healthcare.  
2.15 Section 23(1) of the 1997 Act does not contain any reference to 
persons under 16 years of age, which might be thought to create doubts as to 
whether the section is: (a) facilitative, in that it provides for consent by a person 
aged 16 or 17, without necessarily preventing persons under 16 from giving 
consent; or (b) preventative, in that persons under 16 are prevented from giving 
consent.24 This was also addressed in the Commission‟s 1994 Report. As 
                                                     
23  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 4.03. 
24  Ibid at 4.05. 
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already noted, section 23(3) of the 1997 Act, which is identical in wording to 
section 8(3) of the English 1969 Act (and section 4(3) of the Northern Irish 1969 
Act), states: 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any 
consent which would have been effective if this section had not been 
enacted.”25 
2.16 The Commission, commenting on section 8(3) of the English 1969 
Act in its 1994 Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person, suggested 
that this saver recognised existing common law legitimate consents by persons 
under 16 years of age.26 In this respect, the 1969 decision of the English Court 
of Appeal in Hewer v Bryant,27 discussed below, clearly supports this view that 
the common law recognised the independent decision-making capacity of 
persons under 16. To that extent, the decision in Gillick in 1985 built on this 
general legal position. 
2.17 Given that section 23(3) of the 1997 Act follows precisely the 
wording of the English 1969 Act (and Northern Ireland 1969 Act), the 
Commission considers that the Irish courts would interpret section 23(3) as a 
saver intended to incorporate and preserve the common law on the capacity of 
persons under 16.28 Nonetheless, and bearing in mind that section 23 of the 
1997 Act is a criminal law statute only, the Commission considers that the law 
should not remain in a state of doubt on such an important matter but should be 
clarified in terms of civil law liability. This would be of benefit not only to persons 
under 18 but also their parents and guardians and health care practitioners. 
(3) Refusal of treatment as a corollary to consent 
2.18 The right to refuse treatment is generally viewed as the natural 
corollary of the right to consent to treatment and therefore it is arguable that, 
under the 1997 Act, since a 16 or 17 year old can consent to medical treatment, 
he or she can therefore refuse medical treatment. The wording “as effective as 
it would be if he or she had attained full age” in section 23(3) of the 1997 Act is 
significant, because the refusal of a person of full age is treated as a corollary of 
consent; therefore the refusal of a 16 or 17 year old could also be viewed as a 
corollary of consent. 
                                                     
25  Section 25 of the New Zealand Guardianship Act 1968 contains an identical 
saver. 
26  Law Reform Commission Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person (LRC 
45-1994) at 9.168. 
27  [1969] 3 All ER 578, discussed at paragraph 2.54, below. 
28  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 4.07. 
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2.19 Much of the case law in Ireland in relation to refusal of treatment 
has centred on decisions concerning adult patients and the issue of life-
sustaining treatment. As already noted, however, the Supreme Court in McK v 
Information Commissioner29 dealt with the position of a 16/17 year old in a 
health care setting, and, in D v Brennan and Ors,30 discussed below, the High 
Court also dealt with this issue. The Commission first discusses the Irish case 
law on refusal concerning adults and then discusses the cases concerning 
those under 18. 
2.20 The decision of the Supreme Court in Re a Ward of Court (No.2)31 
and of the High Court case Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2)32 dealt with the refusal of 
medical treatment involving adults. Both cases emphasise the importance of 
respect for autonomy, dignity and bodily integrity in the context of refusal of 
medical treatment. In Re a Ward of Court (No.2)33 the Supreme Court clearly 
recognised a constitutional right to personal autonomy, stating that a competent 
person of full age and capacity has the right to refuse medical treatment, even 
though the consequence of the refusal may lead to death. One of the Supreme 
Court judges, O‟Flaherty J stated: 
“consent to medical treatment is required in the case of a competent 
person... and, as a corollary, there is an absolute right in a competent 
person to refuse medical treatment even if it leads to death.”34 
2.21 In Fitzpatrick v FK,35 the High Court ordered that a 23 year old 
Congolese woman (Ms K), who had refused a blood transfusion on the basis 
that this was contrary to her religious views as a Jehovah‟s Witness, should be 
                                                     
29  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260. See the 
discussion at paragraph 1.65ff, above. 
30  D v Brennan and Ors High Court, 9 May 2007. 
31  [1996] 2 IR 79. This case, which concerned the removal of artificial feeding and 
hydration from a 42 year old woman in a near persistent vegetative state, 
attracted a great deal of media coverage at the time. It was, however, heard in 
camera and the parties were not identified at the time of the court proceedings: 
see Re a Ward of Court (No 1) [1996] 2 IR 73. Ten years later, in 2006, her 
mother Margaret Chamberlain wrote to The Irish Times (11 April 2006) identifying 
herself and naming her daughter Lucy Chamberlain as the “Ward of Court” in the 
title of the 1996 case. 
32  [2008] IEHC 104, [2009] 2 IR 7. 
33  Re Ward of Court (No 2) [1996] 2 IR 79. 
34  Ibid at 129. 
35  [2006] IEHC 392, [2007] 2 IR 406. 
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given the transfusion in order to save her life. In Fitzpatrick v FK (No 2)36 Laffoy 
J concluded, after a full hearing, that the transfusion had been lawfully given. 
2.22 The case of Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2),37 which is discussed in detail in 
the Consultation Paper,38 provides a comprehensive analysis of the test to be 
applied to assess a person‟s capacity in the context of refusal of medical 
treatment. In brief, Laffoy J held that the test of capacity employed to assess 
such a decision is a functional one which is time and issue specific. In this 
respect, Laffoy J approved the following test set out in an English case: 
“whether the patient‟s cognitive ability has been impaired to the 
extent that he or she does not sufficiently understand the nature, 
purpose and effect of the proffered treatment and the consequences 
of accepting or rejecting it in the context of the choices available 
(including any alternative treatment) at the time the decision is 
made.”39 
2.23 The decision in Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2) turned on whether Ms K‟s 
capacity was impaired to the extent that she could no longer give an informed 
consent or refusal. Laffoy J concluded that Ms K‟s capacity was impaired to the 
extent that she did not have the ability to accept a blood transfusion. Therefore, 
the administration of the transfusion was not an unlawful act and did not 
constitute a breach of her rights under the Constitution. 
2.24 This functional, decision-specific, test of mental capacity is consistent 
with the Commission‟s key recommendation in its 2006 Report on Vulnerable 
Adults and the Law40 that a functional test of mental capacity should be enacted 
into law, which would reflect the rights-based analysis found in the 2006 UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The functional test was 
included in the draft Scheme of a Mental Capacity Bill appended to the 
Commission‟s 2006 Report and was also included in the Government‟s Scheme 
of a Mental Capacity Bill 2008, which is likely to form the basis for a Mental 
Capacity Bill, expected to be published in 2011.41  
                                                     
36  [2008] IEHC 104, [2009] 2 IR 7. 
37  Ibid. 
38  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 5.09. 
39  Citing Lord Donaldson in Re T (refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
40  (LRC 83-2006). 
41  The Programme for Government 2011-2016, at 38, contains a commitment to 
“introduce a Mental Capacity Bill that is in line with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” The Government Legislation Programme, 
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2.25 Laffoy J also explained that the assessment of capacity must have 
regard to:  
“the gravity of the decision, in terms of the consequences which are 
likely to ensue from the acceptance or rejection of the proffered 
treatment.” 
2.26 The reference by Laffoy J to the “gravity of the decision” has also 
featured in the case law on the capacity of persons under the age of 18. For 
example, in North Western Health Board v HW and CW42 the Supreme Court 
held that the primacy of parental decision-making for their children will only be 
overturned if the decision would threaten the life or urgent health needs of the 
very young child. A similar approach was taken by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services).43 
(4) The Constitution, parental responsibility and the rights of 
persons under 18 
2.27 As already discussed in this Report in the context of the relevant 
general principles,44 the position concerning the rights of children under the 
Constitution of Ireland was summarised in this way by Walsh J in the Supreme 
Court decision G v An Bord Uchtála:45 
“The child‟s natural rights spring primarily from the natural right of 
every individual to life, to be reared and educated, to liberty, to work, 
to rest and recreation, to the practice of religion, and to follow his or 
her conscience... The child‟s natural right to life and all that flows 
from that right are independent of any right of the parent as such.” 
2.28 As the Commission has also already noted, in the context of very 
young children a decision by parents or guardians concerning their children will 
be upheld even if this is in conflict with the views of professional persons. For 
example, in North Western Health Board v HW and CW46 the Supreme Court 
upheld the refusal of parents to allow doctors to carry out the “heel prick” PKU 
blood test on their baby son, even though the Court acknowledged that most 
parents are happy to consent to this test. The Court held that the primacy of 
                                                                                                                                  
Summer Session 2011 (April 2011), available at www.taoiseach.ie, states that the 
Mental Capacity Bill is scheduled for publication in late 2011. 
42  [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622, discussed at paragraph 2.28, below. 
43  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181, discussed at paragraph 2.119, below. 
44  See paragraph 1.21, above. 
45
   G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32 at 69. 
46  [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622. 
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parental decision-making under Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution (which the 
Commission has already noted reflect international human rights standards) will 
only be overturned (using the courts inherent jurisdiction to protect vulnerable 
persons, a post-constitutional version of the parens patriae jurisdiction) if the 
decision would threaten the life or urgent health needs of the very young child. 
In support of this analysis, Keane CJ‟s judgment in the North Western Health 
Board case referred to many court decisions from other states concerning the 
respective roles, responsibilities and rights of parents and young children. 
Keane CJ also referred to an English case, Re E (A Minor),47 which had 
involved a 15 year old boy, who was also a Jehovah‟s Witness and who had 
refused a blood transfusion. Keane CJ pointed out that the judge in the case, 
Ward J, had ordered the blood transfusion to proceed on the ground that, 
among other matters, the 15 year old in question “was not of sufficient 
understanding and maturity to give a full and informed consent.”48   
2.29 The North Western Health Board case involved a baby boy and the 
reference to the English case of a 15 year old was clearly not central to the 
Supreme Court‟s analysis, but it indicates an awareness that the case of a 15 
year old requires different analysis by comparison with that of a baby boy. 
Indeed, when the issue of the capacity of a young person at the age spectrum 
approaching adulthood arose directly in McK v Information Commissioner,49 the 
Supreme Court held that the views of a young person who is 17 “are very 
relevant”50 and may sometimes override a parent‟s presumed entitlement to be 
able to access health care information concerning their children.  
2.30 The authority and responsibility of parents concerning their children 
can, therefore, be analysed using a sliding scale. Their authority and 
responsibility is at the high end of this sliding scale when the children are very 
young; and, as the child reaches their teenage years and approaches 18, it 
gradually moves to the lower end of the scale. In the 1969 English case Hewer 
v Bryant,51 Lord Denning MR summarised this sliding scale by stating that the 
                                                     
47  Re E (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386, discussed at 
paragraph 2.80, below. 
48  North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622, at 
701 (judgment of Keane CJ, summarising Re E (a minor) (wardship: medical 
treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386). 
49  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260. See the 
discussion at paragraph 1.65ff, above. 
50  [2006] 1 IR 260, 268. 
51  Hewer v Bryant [1969] 3 All ER 578, 582, discussed at paragraph 2.54, below. 
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authority of parents in respect of their children “starts with a right of control and 
ends with little more than advice.” 
2.31 In D v Brennan and Ors,52 the High Court used the same sliding scale 
approach evident in the Supreme Court decisions in North Western Health 
Board v HW and CW53 and McK v Information Commissioner.54 Against the 
backdrop of a difficult and complex factual background, the Court discussed the 
decision-making capacity of children, in particular those who are almost 18, in a 
health care setting. In the D case, the applicant was 16 years of age when she 
became pregnant. A scan revealed that her unborn baby had the fatal brain 
condition anencephaly (in effect, the absence of any brain cavity development), 
indicating that the baby could not survive. Having considered this information, 
the applicant decided that she should travel to England to terminate the 
pregnancy.  
2.32 Independently of her pregnancy (arising from a domestic incident 
between the applicant and her mother, the details of which were not revealed), 
the Health Service Executive (HSE) obtained an interim care order in the 
District Court under the Child Care Act 1991, so that the applicant was then 
under the care of the HSE. In discussions between the applicant and her 
designated HSE social worker, the applicant reiterated her wish to travel to 
England for a termination. It appears that the HSE indicated that she should be 
prohibited from travelling to England for this purpose, but it also appeared that 
no decision had been made by the HSE as to whether this was consistent with 
the applicant‟s “welfare” or whether the views of the applicant had been taken 
into account, as required by section 3 of the 1991 Act.  
2.33 The applicant then applied to the High Court for a declaration that 
she had a right to travel to England for a termination and that any order 
prohibiting her from travelling would be invalid. The HSE initially opposed the 
                                                     
52  High Court, 9 May 2007. The judgment in this case had not been circulated 
publicly at the time of writing (July 2011). The Commission‟s discussion of the 
case in this Report is based on a number of sources: the detailed discussion in 
Shannon, Child Law (Round Hall, 2010), paragraphs 7.06-7.11; the applicant‟s 
submissions in the case, available at http://www.ihrc.ie/publications/list/ad-minor-
submissions; and newspaper reports of the hearing (The Irish Times, 4-5 May 
2007 and 10 May 2007). A transcript of the judgment in the case was made 
available to the European Court of Human Rights in connection with its decision 
in A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032: see paragraph 99 of the Court‟s 
judgment. 
53  [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622. 
54  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260.  
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application, but during the hearing in the High Court (in which the judge dealing 
with the case, McKechnie J, criticised the HSE for having failed to make a 
“welfare” determination under the 1991 Act) it was granted an adjournment in 
order to apply to the District Court to allow that court to determine whether an 
order should be made under the 1991 Act permitting the applicant to travel to 
England. Although all parties indicated to the District Court that the court was 
not prohibited from making such an order, it refused to make such an order. The 
HSE then applied to the High Court to have that refusal quashed, which the 
High Court heard together with the applicant‟s case. 
2.34 McKechnie J emphasised that the case did not involve any 
substantive issue concerning abortion, and was limited to the question of 
whether the applicant could lawfully be prohibited from travelling abroad. The 
applicant had turned 17 by the time of the court hearing, but as she remained a 
minor the Court had to determine her capacity to make this decision and 
whether her decision-making could operate independently of either the HSE or 
her mother. The applicant submitted that the HSE was, at most, acting in loco 
parentis under the 1991 Act and had no greater rights than her mother. She 
also submitted that her mother‟s constitutional right as a parent would have to 
yield to the applicant‟s constitutional right to travel, and that the HSE was not in 
any greater position than her mother would have been.55 The case therefore 
involved submissions on the constitutional rights of children and their 
connection with, and independence from, the rights of parents.  
2.35 As already discussed, some laws such as section 23 of the Non-Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997 set a specific age at which a person is 
deemed to have capacity, whereas others, including the Child Care Act 1991 
refer to tests based on maturity. Bearing in mind that, in the D case, the issue 
was primarily whether the applicant had the maturity to decide whether to travel 
to England, the applicant submitted that the case fell within the parameters of 
the Supreme Court‟s analysis in McK v Information Commissioner56 that the 
views of a young person who is nearly 18 “are very relevant,”57 and that the 
“applicant is 17 years and is at a time when her constitutional rights are waxing 
to full maturity and those of a parent waning accordingly.”58 This clearly 
reflected the “sliding scale” approach discussed above.  
                                                     
55  See paragraph 42 of the applicant‟s submissions in the case, available at 
http://www.ihrc.ie/publications/list/ad-minor-submissions. 
56  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260.  
57  [2006] 1 IR 260, at 268. See the discussion at paragraph 1.65ff, above. 
58  See paragraph 8 of the applicant‟s submissions in the case, available at 
http://www.ihrc.ie/publications/list/ad-minor-submissions 
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2.36 In the D case, both the applicant and her mother were actually in 
agreement that she should travel to England for a termination, but McKechnie J 
had to consider whether, given that the HSE was in loco parentis under the 
Child Care Act 1991, the HSE (or the District Court exercising its powers under 
the 1991 Act) could override the expressed wishes of the applicant. In this 
respect, McKechnie J stated: 
“It is imperative to recognise that children are born with rights and 
those rights continue right throughout childhood into teenage years, 
and become unaffected in their entirety by the parental relationship 
on reaching majority. These rights, which originally must be 
exercised on behalf of infants, usually by their parents, remain the 
rights of the children; and, commensurate with the progressive 
development and maturity of such a child, become capable of partial 
and, thereafter, full expression as adulthood arrives.” 
2.37 McKechnie J commented that the applicant had displayed good 
moral judgement because she could have travelled to England without saying 
anything to the HSE, or could have pretended that she was feeling suicidal, 
which would have brought her within the parameters of a lawful termination in 
accordance with the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v X.59 Instead, 
she had chosen to resolve the issues involved by engaging in the judicial review 
proceedings. McKechnie J concluded that the applicant had shown “courage, 
integrity and maturity” throughout her ordeal in the wake of discovering the 
condition of her unborn baby. On this basis, McKechnie J held that there was no 
impediment to the applicant exercising her right to travel to England and he 
accordingly made the declarations sought by her.  
2.38 By way of briefly summarising the case law in this area, the 
Commission notes that in G v An Bord Uchtála60 the Supreme Court affirmed 
that the rights of children are “independent of any right of the parent as such.” 
Where a child is very young, the Supreme Court concluded in North Western 
Health Board v HW and CW61 that these rights are, in general, exercised on 
behalf of the child by his or her parents, subject to the exceptional 
circumstances referred to in Article 42 of the Constitution, and this in turn 
reflects the relevant international human rights instruments in this area. Where 
the child is at the other end of the age spectrum and is approaching adulthood 
in their teenage years, the Supreme Court has held, in McK v Information 
                                                     
59  [1992] 1 IR 1. 
60
   [1980] IR 32 at 69. 
61  [2001] IESC 90, [2001] 3 IR 622. 
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Commissioner62 (and the High Court also took this approach in the D case), that 
the child‟s maturing capacity must be taken into account, which is of course 
consistent with the analysis in the G case that the child‟s rights are independent 
of the parent‟s rights. As already indicated, this sliding scale approach is also 
consistent with the long-standing approach of the common law, exemplified in 
the 1969 English decision Hewer v Bryant.63 This sliding scale approach also 
has the advantage that it is in keeping with the literature on child development 
already discussed in this Report as well as the development of case law and 
legislation in other countries, which is discussed in Part C, below.  
(5) Problems arising in practice for those under 18, for 
parents/guardians and healthcare practitioners, and the 2009 
Medical Council Guidelines  
2.39 The decisions in the Irish cases discussed support the general view 
that, as a child moves towards 18 years of age, their decision-making capacity 
waxes (increases) as, correspondingly, the decision-making position of their 
parents gradually wanes (decreases). In the specific context of this Report, the 
enactment by the Oireachtas of section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against 
the Person Act 1997 reflects a similar approach. In addition, a test based on 
maturity broadly mirrors the capacity test for those over 18 which, as already 
discussed in this Report, the Commission fully supports.  
2.40 Nonetheless, the position is not as clear as in other countries where 
well-developed case law – as well as legislation that applies to both the civil and 
criminal law settings – has provided a clear framework under which health care 
practitioners can work with those under 18. As discussed in Part C, in England 
and Wales, the enactment of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (and, in Northern 
Ireland, the equivalent Age of Majority Act (Northern Ireland) 1969) provided 
clarity in the civil law setting in respect of 16 and 17 year olds. The decision of 
the UK House of Lords in 1985 in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority64 provided a degree of comparable clarity concerning those 
under 16, at least in the context of contraception. The Gillick decision reflected 
the then-developing concept of the “mature minor” and the Commission 
discusses in Part C developments in other countries, both before and after the 
Gillick decision. This has included many legislative provisions that clarify the 
position, as well as other landmark court decisions, including the 2009 decision 
                                                     
62  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260. See the 
discussion at paragraph 1.65ff, above. 
63  [1969] 3 All ER 578, at 582, discussed in paragraph 2.54, below. 
64  [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
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of the Supreme Court of Canada in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family 
Services).65  
2.41 Thus, while the decisions in the McK case and the D case are at 
least consistent with the view that 16 and 17 year olds often have the capacity 
to make significant health care decisions, and that the concept of a “mature 
minor” is also consistent with this approach, there is no definitive legal 
framework that clarifies the respective rights and responsibilities of those under 
18, their parents and guardians, still less the health care professional who come 
in contact with them.   
2.42 The Commission is especially conscious in this respect that clarity 
is needed in the healthcare setting in respect of the legal capacity of 16 and 17 
year olds (in particular, as far as civil liability is concerned) and of those under 
16. The ambiguity surrounding this area has created practical problems for 
health care practitioners. A 2005 training manual of the Irish College of General 
Practitioners highlights the present difficulties: 
“The legal situation regarding consent and minors remains confused 
and there is no indication that legislation addressing the issue is 
imminent. However doctors, and GPs in particular, encounter this 
issue in clinical practice on a regular if not daily basis.” 
2.43 It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the submissions received 
by the Commission on the Consultation Paper stated that reform of the law on 
children and medical treatment would be welcome and is overdue. 
2.44 In the absence of a clear legislative framework, health care 
practitioners have referred to section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the 
Person Act 1997 to support their approach to consent from 16 and 17 year olds. 
The confusing nature of the present legal situation is brought sharply into focus 
when one considers the legal position of a person under 16 years of age who is 
a parent. It is largely accepted that a young mother can consent to medical 
treatment on behalf of her child yet her legal capacity to make decisions in 
relation to her own medical treatment is unclear.66 The Commission received a 
number of submissions debating this issue, and highlighting the difficulties 
faced by healthcare providers, when treating a child whose mother is 14 or 15 
years of age. These situations are often complex, involving a sick child, a young 
                                                     
65  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181. 
66  Staff Guidelines for Obtaining Consent for Non Emergency Treatment/Services 
from Parents of Children and Young People under 18 Years of Age. See: 
http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/Publications/services/Children/medicalconsent.pdf  
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mother,67 a grandparent and a healthcare practitioner who must adhere to the 
requirements of an uncertain law while also acting in the best interests of the 
child. One of the points raised by healthcare providers is that the mother of the 
child and the grandparent of the child may not have a very good relationship, or 
perhaps the grandparent may not be willing or available to commit to acting as a 
quasi-guardian for his or her grandchild. 
2.45 In this context, and in the absence of a general statutory 
framework, the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics68 provides useful guidance as to the approach of doctors when dealing 
with persons under 18. The relevant provisions in the 2009 Guide are:  
“43 Children and minors  
43.1 Children and young people should be involved as much as 
possible in discussions about their healthcare. When you are talking to 
a child or young person, it is important to give them information in an 
age-appropriate manner, listen to their views and treat them with 
respect.  
43.2 Patients aged 16 years and over are entitled by law to give their 
own consent to surgical, medical or dental treatment [the 2009 Guide 
refers in a footnote to section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the 
Person Act 1997]. This entitlement does not apply to other areas such 
as organ or tissue donation or participation in medical research. 
43.3 A refusal of treatment by a patient between 16 and 18 years, 
which is against medical advice and parental wishes, is of uncertain 
legal validity. In this event, you should consider seeking legal advice 
before acting on such a decision. 
43.4 Where the patient is under the age of 16 years, it is usual that the 
parents will be asked to give their consent to medical treatment on the 
patient‟s behalf. 
                                                     
67  A father‟s right to consent to medical treatment on behalf of his child is largely 
dependent on whether or not the father is a guardian of the child. Currently, non-
marital fathers do not have automatic joint guardianship responsibility. In the 
Commission‟s Report on Legal Aspects of Family Relationships (LRC 101-2010), 
the Commission recommended that non-marital fathers should have automatic 
joint guardianship responsibility (which the Commission also recommended 
should be renamed joint parental responsibility). 
68  Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics (7
th
 ed, 2009), 
available at www.medicalcouncil.ie.  
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43.5 In exceptional circumstances, a patient under 16 might seek to 
make a healthcare decision on their own without the knowledge or 
consent of their parents. In such cases you should encourage the 
patient to involve their parents in the decision, bearing in mind your 
paramount responsibility to act in the patient‟s best interests. 
43.6 When treating children and young people, you should remember 
your duties of confidentiality as provided in paragraph 24 [of the 2009 
Guide], subject to parental rights of access to medical records which 
may arise by law [the 2009 Guide refers in a footnote to the Freedom of 
Information Act 1997 (Section 28(6)) Regulations 1999]. You should tell 
these young patients that you cannot give an absolute guarantee of 
confidentiality.” 
2.46 The Commission notes the following aspects of the Medical 
Council‟s 2009 Guide: 
 As to 16 and 17 year olds, paragraph 43.2 of the 2009 Guide is 
consistent with the existing legislative provisions in this area, notably 
section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. 
While the Commission has already pointed out that the 1997 Act is 
limited to the criminal law only, the 2009 Guide correctly refers to the 
1997 Act for the purpose of providing guidance to doctors. 
 Paragraph 43.2 of the 2009 Guide also correctly notes, as has the 
Commission in this Report, that the definition of medical treatment in 
the 1997 Act is limited in scope. The Commission has recommended in 
this Report that the scope of health care and treatment should be 
expanded, without prejudice to other specific provisions such as the 
legislation dealing with clinical trials.  
 It is clear that the Medical Council felt constrained by the fact that 
section 23 of the 1997 Act refers to consent to treatment only, so that 
paragraph 43.3 of the 2009 Guide takes a more cautious approach to 
refusal of treatment. As discussed above, the Commission has 
concluded that it is appropriate to view capacity to refuse treatment as 
a corollary to capacity to consent to treatment, and paragraph 43.3 of 
the 2009 Guide underlines the need for a clearer legislative framework 
in this area.  
 As to those under 16, paragraphs 43.4 and 43.5 of the 2009 Guide 
also reflect in general terms the current law as set out in the Irish 
decisions already referred to, such as the G, McK and D cases, which 
in turn reflect the provisions on the family in Article 41 of the 
Constitution and in the relevant international standards already 
discussed in this Report. Thus, the 2009 Guide correctly identifies that 
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the “usual” position is that parents should be asked for their consent, 
but that in “exceptional circumstances” the doctor would “encourage” 
the under 16 year old to involve their parents, bearing in mind the 
doctor‟s “paramount responsibility to act in the patient‟s best interests.” 
While this general guidance is useful, the Commission notes that it 
does not provide specific guidance on the nature of the “best interests” 
test. Nor does it refer to a maturity test, which as the Commission has 
already noted is already part of Irish law (through both the case law 
and legislation already noted in this Report). 
 Paragraph 43.6 of the 2009 Guide refers to the competing interests of 
patient confidentiality and of access by parents to health information 
concerning their children; and the 2009 Guide refers in this respect in a 
footnote to the Freedom of Information Act 1997 (Section 28(6)) 
Regulations 1999. The Commission has already noted in this Report 
that the 1999 Regulations were discussed by the Supreme Court in the 
McK case, in which the Court concluded that a maturity test could 
displace the usual presumption in favour of parental access. The 
Commission considers that a general legislative framework would also 
bring greater clarity and specificity to this aspect of health care 
treatment for those under 18.   
2.47 The Commission acknowledges that the Medical Council‟s 2009 
Guide has provided as much general guidance to doctors as is feasible in the 
absence of any general legislative framework in Ireland. Because the 2009 
Guide is necessarily limited to doctors, and in the absence of any general legal 
framework or comprehensive guidance, a number of hospitals in Ireland have 
developed practice guidelines for all health professionals. Guidelines developed 
by one of the leading children‟s hospital in Dublin state that, in the light of 
current legal uncertainty, it is prudent practice to attempt to obtain the consent 
of an appropriate next of kin who is competent to consent (where the consent is 
in the best interests of the child), including all parties in the consent process. 
These guidelines state that it is also important to ensure that, if the next of kin 
gives or give consent, their signature is recorded and that such situations are 
recorded in detail in the patient‟s medical records. In cases of doubt or 
uncertainty these guidelines recommend, in line with the Medical Council‟s 2009 
Guide, that healthcare providers seek further legal advice. From the 
Commission‟s point of view, it seems highly impractical and burdensome for 
healthcare providers to obtain the consent of a child‟s grandparent, and possibly 
seek legal advice, before they can feel legally secure in treating the child.  
2.48 A number of submissions received by the Commission drew attention 
to other areas of difficulty and confusion in respect of capacity and consent for 
the medical care of a person under 16 years of age. For example, issues often 
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arise over who may consent to medical treatment for a foster child,69 or a child 
who is in care. In relation to attempts to obtain consent from parents or 
guardians when a child or young person is in foster care or in the care of the 
Health Service Executive under the Child Care Act 1991, the situation creates 
practical problems and delay in obtaining consent for necessary treatment. This 
is particularly the case where the child or young person in question does not 
have a good relationship with his or her parents or guardians, or in situations 
where the parent or guardian is hostile and uncooperative.  
2.49 In connection specifically with children under 16 years of age, 
health care practitioners have, in the absence of any clear legislative framework 
and in an attempt to implement the general approach in the Medical Council‟s 
2009 Guide, adopted the “mature minor” concept developed in other countries, 
which the Commission discusses below. In a 2009 study of Irish GPs,70 some 
doctors viewed as persuasive the “Fraser Guidelines”, the criteria set out by 
Lord Fraser in the 1985 UK House of Lords decision in Gillick v West Norfolk 
and Wisbech Area Health Authority,71 discussed below. Indeed, the approach in 
the Irish cases discussed, such as the McK case and the D case, are consistent 
with the “mature minor” concept in Gillick and in the comparable case law and 
legislation in other countries discussed below. Nonetheless, it is not perhaps 
surprising that the 2009 study found that 53.8% of the surveyed GPs felt “legally 
exposed” when consulted by girls under 16 seeking contraception. The survey 
also found that 33.9% of parents felt that a GP who prescribed to a girl under 16 
could be pursued legally by her parents, though in this respect the Commission 
notes that Irish case law – and the proviso in section 23(3) of the Non-Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997 – suggests that the consent of some 
persons under 16 is valid and that some element of parental responsibility may 
be “waning” even at that age. 
                                                     
69  Regulation 16(2)(d) of the Child Care (Placement of Children in Foster Care) 
Regulations 1995 (SI No.260 of 1995), made under the Child Care Act 1991, 
states that foster parents must seek appropriate medical aid for the child if the 
child suffers from illness or injury. Guidance issued by the Department of Health 
and Children suggests that foster carers have the capacity to consent to urgent 
medical treatment if, in the clinical judgement of the medical practitioner, it is 
necessary in the interest of the child‟s welfare: see Appendix 2 of the National 
Standards for Foster Care (Department of Health and Children, 2003). 
70  McMahon et al, “The Prescribing of Contraception and Emergency Contraception 
to Girls Aged Less than 16 – What are the Views and Beliefs of GPs and of 
Parents?” (2010) 16, 2 MLJI 91. 
71  [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
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2.50 The 2009 study of actual prescribing by GPs indicates that 82% 
had prescribed to a girl under 16.72 Of these, 38% said it was always with 
parental consent, 59% said they sometimes had parental consent and 3% never 
obtained parental consent. Those involved in the study were also asked 
whether they considered such prescribing was lawful. In response, 60.2% of 
parents and 38.5% of GPs considered that it was not legal, while 14% of 
parents and 31.6% of GPs thought it was legal. The Commission notes that this 
view appears to confuse the age of consent in the context of the criminal law, 
which is 17, with the lawfulness of providing contraceptive treatment; these are 
two distinct legal matters. 
2.51 The 2009 study also indicated that existing practice may focus 
largely on age rather than a maturity test. This is so even though, as already 
noted, some legislation in Ireland as well as decisions such as the McK case 
and the D case have already applied such a maturity test, and that this 
approach also reflects relevant international standards concerning children. The 
2009 study also indicated that all those involved in the process would welcome 
clear guidance on the matter, and this reinforces the Commission‟s approach in 
this project. Indeed, the necessarily general nature of the discussion in the 
Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide also supports the need for a clearer legislative 
framework. 
C Capacity of Persons under 18 to Consent to and Refuse 
Treatment in Other Countries 
2.52 The Commission now turns to examine the development of the 
approach in other countries concerning consent to, and refusal of, health care 
treatment by persons under 18. The Commission examines the relevant 
developments in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. Some of these countries have enacted clear 
legislative rules on 16 and 17 years olds which clarify that they have capacity to 
consent to and refuse medical treatment. Indeed, in Scotland the general age of 
majority has been reduced from 18 to 16, and this includes of course the right to 
consent to, and refuse, treatment. As to those under 16, variations on a “mature 
minor” rule have been developed, and the issue has often been incorporated 
into suitable legislative frameworks supported by detailed guidance. In parallel 
with legislation, “mature minor” tests have been developed through landmark 
test cases, such as the 1985 decision of the UK House of Lords in Gillick v 
                                                     
72  McMahon et al, “The Prescribing of Contraception and Emergency Contraception 
to Girls Aged Less than 16 – What are the Views and Beliefs of GPs and of 
Parents?” (2010) 16, 2 MLJI 91.  
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West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority73 and the 2009 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family 
Services).74  
(1) England and Wales 
2.53 As already mentioned, since the enactment of section 8 of the 
English Family Law Reform Act 1969, English law has clearly provided that 16 
and 17 year olds have capacity to consent to medical treatment. The 1969 Act 
implemented the key recommendations in the 1967 Report of the Committee on 
the Age of Majority, the Latey Report,75 which had recommended that the 
general age of majority be reduced from 21 to 18, and that 16 and 17 year olds 
should be deemed to have capacity to consent to, and to refuse, medical 
treatment. As also already noted, while section 8 of the English 1969 Act 
formed the basis for the almost identical text in section 23 of the Non-Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997, the 1969 Act dealt with the issue of civil 
and criminal liability whereas the Irish 1997 Act deals with criminal liability only.  
2.54 The position of those just under 18 years of age had also been 
discussed in 1969 by the English Court of Appeal in Hewer v Bryant,76 a case 
decided just one month before the 1969 Act was enacted77 and in which one of 
the judges, Lord Denning MR, referred with approval to the general approach 
taken in the 1967 Latey Report, on which the 1969 Act was based. The Hewer 
case concerned the statutory time limit for bringing a personal injuries action. 
When the plaintiff was 15 years old, he was injured in a car driven by the 
defendant while on a farm training vocational course. Because he was a minor 
at the time, any claim would have to have been taken on his behalf by an adult 
such as his father; but his father decided not to do so.78. Under the relevant 
                                                     
73  [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
74  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181. 
75  Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority (chaired by Latey J), Cmnd.3342, 
July 1967. 
76  [1969] 3 All ER 578. 
77  The Hewer case was decided in June 1969, and the English Family Law Reform 
Act 1969 was enacted in July 1969. 
78  This was because the father thought that (a) the plaintiff, his son, would make a 
full recovery and (b) there was no insurance in place to deal with the type of car 
crash that had occurred. When his father later realised that his son was, in fact, 
quite badly affected by the accident and that the claims would be covered by 
insurance, it was too late for the father to bring proceedings, and this was why the 
son brought the claim.  
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provisions of the UK Limitation Act 1939, there was a general three year time 
limit for bringing the claim, but this only applied to adults. For those under the 
age of majority, which was 21 at the time, the English Limitation Act 1939 
regarded such persons as being under an “age disability” and so the general 
three year time limit only began to run when the plaintiff reached 21. Three 
weeks after his 21
st
 birthday, the plaintiff began a claim against the defendant, 
which was over 5 years after the car crash. The defendant argued that the claim 
was statute-barred under the 1939 Act because of another provision in the 1939 
Act which stated that the normal three year limitation period applied if the 
person under 21 was, at the time of the accident, “in the custody of a parent.” If 
this provision applied, the plaintiff‟s claim would have been statute barred. 
2.55 The English Court of Appeal had to decide whether “custody” as 
used in the UK Limitation Act 1939 was: (a) a legal concept meaning that all 
minors, at that time those under 21, remained completely under the custody and 
control of their parents until they reached the then age of majority at 21; or (b) a 
factual concept, so that a person such as the plaintiff was only in the custody of 
their parents if the parents were actually exercising “care and control” over him. 
The Court decided that the 1939 Act was intended to mean the factual concept, 
that is, actual care and control. In this respect, the evidence indicated that the 
plaintiff was not in his father‟s “custody” within the meaning of the 1939 Act, 
because when he had been attending the farm training vocational course he 
paid his own way while on the course, including paying his own bus and train 
fares home on his occasional free weekends. On that basis, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiff‟s claim was not statute-barred, and the case against 
the defendant was allowed to proceed. 
2.56 One of the judges in the case, Karminski LJ, also noted that if, for 
example, the father had applied to court for a custody order over his son it 
would probably not have been given. He stated: 
“in the circumstances of this case the court would be at least very slow 
to make an order in respect of a mature boy approaching the age of 16, 
especially as such an order would be very difficult to enforce if the boy 
refused to obey it.”79   
2.57 Another judge in the Hewer case, Lord Denning MR, took a similar 
view, namely that the concept of “custody” by a parent was a factual concept 
rather than a legal concept. He therefore rejected the “legal concept” view, set 
out in 1883 in Re Agar-Ellis,80that a person remained under the complete 
                                                     
79  [1969] 3 All ER 578, at 588. 
80  (1883) 24 Ch D 317, at 326, in which Brett MR had stated: “... the law in 
England... is, that the father has control over the person, education and conduct 
of his children until they are twenty-one years of age. That is the law.” 
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custody and control of their parents until they were 21. Lord Denning MR 
pointed out that Re Agar-Ellis: 
“reflects the attitude of a Victorian parent towards his children. He 
expected unquestioning obedience to his commands. If a son 
disobeyed, his father would cut him off with 1 shilling. If a daughter had 
an illegitimate child, he would turn her out of the house. His power only 
ceased when the child became 21.”81 
2.58 He added: “I decline to accept a view so much out of date.” Lord 
Denning MR then went on to state that the law should be updated to reflect the 
reality of the position of parents and their teenage children in the second half of 
the 20
th
 century. His analysis, which is set out below, included a reference to 
the 1967 Latey Report whose recommendations would, just one month later, be 
enacted in the Family Law Reform Act 1969. Lord Denning MR stated: 
“The common law can, and should, keep pace with the times. It should 
declare, in conformity with the recent Report on the Age of Majority [the 
1967 Latey Report], that the legal right of a parent to the custody of a 
child ends at the eighteenth birthday; and even up till then, it is a 
dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the 
wishes of the child, the older he is. It starts with a right of control and 
ends with little more than advice.”82 
2.59 The general view of the English Court of Appeal in the Hewer case 
involves an important approach to analysing the relationship between parents 
and their older teenage children. The Court rejected the “legal ownership” 
concept of “custody” taken in the 1883 decision in Re Agar-Ellis. Instead, a 
more realistic analysis was taken, in which the court accepted that it would, for 
example, be futile to insist on enforcing custody orders on someone who was 
almost 16 years old. Indeed, Karminski LJ referred to a 15-nearly-16 year old as 
a “mature boy”, which anticipates the concept of the “mature minor” that was 
developed in later cases, such as the Gillick case discussed below (and 
comparable cases in other countries, also discussed below).  
2.60 Lord Denning MR took the same general approach, noting that the 
virtually complete “control” of parents concerning their very young children gave 
way, realistically, to “little more than advice” as the children reached the age of 
majority of 18. As he noted this was exactly as the 1967 Latey Report had 
recommended and which Lord Denning (who was not only a judge of the Court 
of Appeal but also a member of the UK House of Lords in its legislative role) 
may have been aware was about to be implemented a month later in the 
                                                     
81  [1969] 3 All ER 578, at 582. 
82  [1969] 3 All ER 578, at 582 (emphasis added). 
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English Family Law Reform Act 1969. This approach to the waning of the 
parental role, and the corresponding waxing of the role of children, also 
anticipated the approach taken in later international standards, such as the 
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is now also reflected in 
Irish legislation (such as the Child Care Act 1991 and the Adoption Act 2010) 
and Irish case law (such as the McK case and the D case), discussed above. 
2.61 The position of those under 16 years of age was not dealt with 
explicitly in the English Family Law Reform Act 1969. As already noted, 
however, section 8(3) of the 1969 Act amounted to a “saver” clause, in that it 
preserved whatever capacity was already conferred on those under 16 by the 
existing common law rules on capacity, which the decision in the Hewer case 
had reinforced in a modern setting.  
2.62 This was the background to the landmark 1985 decision of the UK 
House of Lords83 in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority.84 The 
Gillick decision has been described as the most significant English case of the 
20
th
 century on the legal relationship between parents and children,85 though the 
decision in Hewer had already clearly indicated that “mature” persons under 16 
had important decision-making capacity that could operate independently of 
their parents. No doubt, the discussion in 1969 of the decision-making capacity 
of a 15 year old male in the context of the application of limitation periods to 
personal injuries litigation did not attract the publicity that the discussion in 1985 
of the decision-making capacity of a 15 year old to access the contraceptive pill.  
2.63 The Gillick case concerned a challenge by Mrs Gillick, a mother of 
five daughters under the age of 16, to the legality of guidance issued in 1980 by 
the English Department of Health and Social Security to health authorities, 
including West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority. The key part of the 
guidance stated: 
“There is widespread concern about counselling and treatment for 
children under 16. Special care is needed not to undermine parental 
responsibility and family stability. The Department would therefore hope 
that in any case where a doctor or other professional worker [such as a 
nurse] is approached by a person under the age of 16 for advice in 
these matters, the doctor, or other professional, will always seek to 
persuade the child to involve the parent or guardian (or other person in 
loco parentis) at the earliest stage of consultation, and will proceed from 
                                                     
83  Since 2009, replaced in terms of its judicial function by the UK Supreme Court.  
84  [1984] 1 All ER 365 (English High Court); [1985] 1 All ER 533 (English Court of 
Appeal); [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402 (UK House of Lords). 
85  Bainham Children and the Modern Law (3
rd
 ed Family Law 2005) at 346. 
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the assumption that it would be most unusual to provide advice about 
contraception without parental consent. 
It is, however, widely accepted that consultations between doctors and 
patients are confidential; and the Department recognises the 
importance which doctors and patients attach to this principle. It is a 
principle which applies also to the other professions concerned. To 
abandon this principle for children under 16 might cause some not to 
seek professional advice at all. They could then be exposed to the 
immediate risks of pregnancy and of sexually- transmitted diseases, as 
well as other long-term physical, psychological and emotional 
consequences which are equally a threat to stable family life. This 
would apply particularly to young people whose parents are, for 
example, unconcerned, entirely unresponsive, or grossly disturbed. 
Some of these young people are away from their parents and in the 
care of local authorities or voluntary organisations standing in loco 
parentis. 
The Department realises that in such exceptional cases the nature of 
any counselling must be a matter for the doctor or other professional 
worker concerned and that the decision whether or not to prescribe 
contraception must be for the clinical judgement of a doctor.” 
2.64 The 1980 guidance can be broken down into 6 elements: (i) that 
special care was needed “not to undermine parental responsibility and family 
stability” and that, therefore, a doctor “will always seek to persuade the child to 
involve the parent or guardian doctor at the earliest stage of consultation”; (ii) 
that the doctor “will proceed from the assumption that it would be most unusual 
to provide advice about contraception without parental consent”; (iii) that 
consultations between doctors and patients are confidential, and that this 
applies to those under 16; (iv) that the confidentiality of consultations needs to 
be upheld because its absence could cause some under 16s not to seek 
professional advice at all, which could then expose them to “the immediate risks 
of pregnancy and of sexually-transmitted diseases, as well as other long-term 
physical, psychological and emotional consequences which are equally a threat 
to stable family life;” (v) that these risks would apply particularly to young people 
whose parents are, for example, unconcerned, entirely unresponsive, or grossly 
disturbed, and that this would especially apply where the young people are in 
the care of the State or voluntary organisations standing in loco parentis; and 
(vi) that in the “exceptional cases” described in the guidance, the counselling to 
be given is a matter for the doctor or other professional worker, such as a 
nurse, and “that the decision whether or not to prescribe contraception must be 
for the clinical judgement of a doctor.” 
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2.65 The 1980 guidance therefore proceeded on the basis that it would 
be "most unusual" to provide advice about contraception without parental 
consent. Because it also referred to certain cases where difficulties might arise 
if the doctor refused to promise that his advice would remain confidential, it 
concluded that the DHSS realised that “in such exceptional cases” the decision 
whether or not to prescribe contraception must be for the clinical judgment of a 
doctor. In effect, therefore, the guidance stated that in those circumstances a 
doctor would not be acting unlawfully by prescribing contraceptives, primarily 
the contraceptive pill, to a young person under 16 years of age to protect her 
from the risks of pregnancy or sexually-transmitted disease. Crucially, the 
guidance stated that this could be done without parental knowledge let alone 
consent, though only in the “exceptional” and “unusual” cases specified. This 
guidance was based on the authorities‟ view of the then-existing common law 
position concerning the capacity of those under 16 to consent to certain medical 
treatment.  
2.66 Mrs Gillick applied for a declaration that the advice in the guidance 
was unlawful because it breached her parental rights. The Gillick case thus 
required the English courts to consider two related matters: the rights and 
entitlement of parents concerning their children, in particular their adolescent 
children; and the mental capacity of those children. It also required the courts to 
decide whether a version of the “mature minor” rule, which had in some respect 
already been acknowledged in section 8(3) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 
and in the Hewer case (and which was beginning to evolve at that time in other 
countries), could or should be developed in English law.   
2.67 In Gillick the UK House of Lords decided, by a 3-2 majority, that the 
guidance issued by the English Department of Health and Social Security was 
lawful.86 The three judges in the majority agreed with the 1969 decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Hewer v Bryant,87 discussed above, that parental rights in 
relation to their children recede as their child matures, and they also concluded 
that a strict age rule in relation to consent to medical treatment for those under 
16 (as opposed to the clear rule for 16 and 17 year olds in section 8 of the 
English Family Law Reform Act 1969) would not take account of the growing 
maturity and capacity of the child. The majority judgments in Gillick stressed 
that the significant factor in assessing the capacity of a person under 16 was 
                                                     
86  In the English High Court, in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Heath 
Authority [1984] 1 All ER 365 Woolf J had upheld the legality of the 1980 DHSS 
guidance. The English Court of Appeal overturned that decision ([1985] 1 All ER 
533), and the UK House of Lords ultimately took the same view as Woolf J and 
upheld the legality of the DHSS guidance 
87  [1969] 3 All ER 578. 
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not the age of the individual but his or her ability to understand fully what was 
proposed. 
2.68 The House of Lords in Gillick thus decided that a child under the age of 
16 does not lack capacity by virtue of age alone, and that his or her capacity 
should not be determined by reference to a judicially fixed age limit. One of the 
judges in the majority, Lord Scarman stated:88 
“I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine 
whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical 
treatment terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand 
fully what is proposed... The law relating to parent and child is 
concerned with the problems of the growth and maturity of the human 
personality. If the law should impose on the process of „growing up‟ 
fixed limits where nature knows only a continuous process, the price 
would be artificiality and a lack of realism in an area where the law 
must be sensitive to human development and social change.”89 
2.69 It is clear, therefore, that Lord Scarman was reluctant to set down a 
definitive rule concerning those under 16 and preferred a maturity test instead. 
This approach is consistent with the literature on child development and early 
adulthood already discussed by the Commission in Chapter 1, above.  
2.70 One of the other judges in the majority in the Gillick case, Lord 
Fraser, went somewhat further by setting out five matters which, if followed by a 
prescribing doctor, would mean that the doctor would be acting lawfully in 
prescribing contraceptives to an under 16 year old. These five matters, or 
guidelines, have become known as the “Fraser Guidelines” and, crucially mean 
that a doctor can proceed, as Lord Fraser stated, “without the parents‟ consent 
or even knowledge.” In the relevant part of his judgment, Lord Fraser stated:   
“The doctor will, in my opinion, be justified in proceeding without the 
parents‟ consent or even knowledge provided he is satisfied on the 
following matters: 
1. that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his 
advice 
2. that he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him 
to inform the parents that she is seeking contraceptive advice 
3. that she is very likely to begin or to continue having sexual 
intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment 
                                                     
88  [1985] 3 All ER 402, at 422-3. 
89  [1985] 3 All ER 402, at 422-3. 
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4. that unless she receives contraceptive advice or treatment her 
physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer 
5. that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive 
advice, treatment or both without parental consent.”90 
2.71 Although these five matters were set out by Lord Fraser alone, rather 
than a majority of the judges in the Gillick case, the “Fraser Guidelines” as they 
have become known, have virtually achieved the status of definitive rules. The 
“Fraser Guidelines” are certainly followed as best practice in England in the 
context of providing contraception to young people under 16 years of age. 
Indeed, they were repeated in full in guidelines issued by the English 
Department of Health in 1986 and updated in 2004, replacing the 1980 
guidance which had led to the Gillick case itself. The 2004 guidance reiterated 
the principle of confidentiality that had been set out in the 1980 guidance, and 
then stated: 
“It is considered good practice for doctors and other health 
professionals to consider the following issues when providing advice or 
treatment to young people under 16 on contraception, sexual and 
reproductive health. 
If a request for contraception is made, doctors and other health 
professionals should establish rapport and give a young person support 
and time to make an informed choice by discussing: 
 The emotional and physical implications of sexual activity, including 
the risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections. 
 Whether the relationship is mutually agreed and whether there may 
be coercion or abuse. 
 The benefits of informing their GP and the case for discussion with 
a parent or carer. Any refusal should be respected. In the case of 
abortion, where the young woman is competent to consent but 
cannot be persuaded to involve a parent, every effort should be 
made to help them find another adult to provide support, for 
example another family member or specialist youth worker. 
 Any additional counselling or support needs. 
Additionally, it is considered good practice for doctors and other health 
professionals to follow the criteria outlined by Lord Fraser in 1985, in 
the House of Lords‟ ruling in the case of Victoria Gillick v West Norfolk 
and Wisbech Health Authority and Department of Health and Social 
Security. These are commonly known as the Fraser Guidelines: 
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 the young person understands the health professional‟s advice; 
 the health professional cannot persuade the young person to inform 
his or her parents or allow the doctor to inform the parents that he 
or she is seeking contraceptive advice; 
 the young person is very likely to begin or continue having 
intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; 
 unless he or she receives contraceptive advice or treatment, the 
young person‟s physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer; 
 the young person‟s best interests require the health professional to 
give contraceptive advice, treatment or both without parental 
consent.”91 
2.72 It is clear, therefore, in the wake of this revised guidance from the 
DHSS, that English health care practitioners are required to adopt as best 
practice the “Fraser Guidelines” from the Gillick case. The decision in Gillick has 
also had a wider influence in the development of various legislative provisions in 
England dealing with children. While the Gillick case was confined to 
contraception, the “Fraser Guidelines” have become a general template for a 
more wide-ranging “mature minor” rule in English law. Focusing in particular on 
the test of mental capacity referred to by Lord Scarman, and the first matter 
mentioned by Lord Fraser in the “Fraser Guidelines” – that the person under 16 
understands the health care advice being given – the English version of the 
“mature minor” rule is also sometimes summarised as being that the person 
under 16 “is Gillick competent” or “has Gillick competence.” 
2.73 The essence of the English “mature minor” rule, or “Gillick 
competence,” is therefore that the person under 16 understands the health care 
advice being given. This general rule has, since 1985, been included in 
legislative provisions which set out a test of the legal capacity of a person under 
18, including the “mature minor” under 16, to consent to and refuse medical 
treatment generally. In this respect, the English Children Act 1989 contains five 
provisions which give a person under the age of 18 – who has sufficient 
understanding to make an informed decision (referred to by Lord Scarman in 
Gillick and the first matter referred to in the “Fraser Guidelines” in Gillick) – the 
power to refuse to submit to medical and psychiatric examinations and other 
                                                     
91  Best practice guidance for doctors and other health professionals on the provision 
of advice and treatment to young people under 16 on contraception, sexual and 
reproductive health (English Department of Health, 2004), available at 
www.dh.gov.uk. 
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assessments.92 For example, section 38(6) of the English Children Act 1989, 
which deals with interim care orders concerning a “child”, that is, a person under 
18 years of age, states: 
“Where the court makes an interim care order, or interim supervision 
order, it may give such directions (if any) as it considers appropriate 
with regard to the medical or psychiatric examination or other 
assessment of the child; but if the child is of sufficient understanding to 
make an informed decision he may refuse to submit to the examination 
or other assessment.” (emphasis added) 
2.74 As already mentioned, this version of a maturity test is consistent 
with international standards in this area, including for example the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and in comparable provisions 
in Ireland in for example, the Child Care Act 1991. In this context, it is important 
to note that some elements of the “Fraser Guidelines” in the Gillick case, and 
the comparable approach in the English Children Act 1989, take a rights-based 
view of those under 16. It is equally important to note that another important 
element of both the common law and statutory approaches to those under 16 is 
that the “best interests” of the person under 16 remains a matter to take into 
account. Thus, while the Gillick case remains a landmark decision in this area, 
subsequent cases have pointed out that the views of a person under the age of 
16 cannot be equated with those of an 18 year old, who has actually reached 
the age of majority. In some cases, the question that arises is, as in Gillick, what 
role parents have, while in others the question of some other overriding 
consideration, such as the preservation of life, is involved.  
2.75 As to the role of parents, two decisions of the English Court of 
Appeal, Re R93 and Re W,94 led to the development of the concept of 
“concurrent consent.” The first of these cases, Re R, involved a 15 year old girl 
who had a mental health illness which involved periods of violent and suicidal 
behaviour followed by lucid thought. The 15 year old refused to take medication. 
Wardship proceedings, under which she would be subject to court supervision, 
were then initiated. The English Court of Appeal concluded that, even if she 
were “Gillick competent” (and because of the extremity of her behaviour the 
Court held she could not be), consent could be given by somebody else with 
parental responsibility, or by the court using its inherent powers to act as the 
                                                     
92  See sections 38(6), 43(8), 44(7) and paragraphs 4(4)(a) and 5(a) of Schedule 3 of 
the Children Act 1989. See Brazier and Bridge “Coercion or caring: analysing 
adolescent autonomy” (1996) 16 Legal Studies 84 at 96. 
93  Re R (a minor) (wardship: consent to medical treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177. 
94  Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1992] 4 All ER 627. 
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equivalent of a parent (referred to in England as the parens patriae jurisdiction 
of the courts). One of the judges, Lord Donaldson, likened consent to a key and 
concluded that refusal to have treatment by a “Gillick competent” child did not 
prevent the necessary consent being obtained by another source, that is, 
another “key holder”, whether her parents or a court.  
2.76 In the second case, Re W, 95 a 16 year old who had anorexia nervosa 
refused any medical treatment for her condition. As in Re R, above, wardship 
proceedings were then initiated. In this case, the Court decided that section 8 of 
the English Family Law Reform Act 1969, discussed above, did not give the 16 
year old child an absolute right to refuse treatment; rather, it protected the 
doctors from criminal prosecution by allowing her to consent as if she were an 
adult. In this respect, a new analogy was introduced by Lord Donaldson, on the 
basis that keys could lock as well as unlock and a minor cannot lock the door to 
treatment. This was based on viewing consent as a flak jacket, to protect 
doctors from prosecution:  
“Anyone who gives him a flak jacket may take it back, but the doctor 
only needs one and as long as he continues to have one he has the 
legal right to proceed.”96  
2.77 Applying the general approach in the Gillick case, the Court in Re W 
accepted that as a child matured so did his or her ability to express his or her 
wishes and feelings. In this case, however, the Court concluded that the fifth 
matter set out in the “Fraser Guidelines” from Gillick – what was in her best 
interests – meant that her wishes should not be carried out, especially because 
one symptom of anorexia was, at least, in part, a desire not to get better.  
2.78 The analogies used by Lord Donaldson in these two English cases 
have been criticised as reducing consent to a mere formality, designed to 
protect doctors from litigation.97 It has also been suggested that the “concurrent 
consent” approach involves a retreat from Gillick and the approach in the 
English Children Act 1989, creating a precedent that mature minors cannot 
refuse treatment in certain instances. It has also been suggested that this is 
inconsistent with the fundamental principle of consent by setting a higher tariff 
for refusing a medical examination or procedure than for consenting to one.98 
                                                     
95  Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1992] 4 All ER 627. 
96  Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1992] 4 All ER 627 at 
635. 
97  Eekelaar “White Coats or Flak Jackets? Doctors, Children and the Courts-Again” 
(1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 182 at 185. 
98  Devereux et al “Can Children withhold consent to treatment?” (1993) BMJ 1459 at 
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While this criticism of the judgments in Re R and Re W may have some merit, in 
particular by suggesting that “parallel consents” may be valid, the Commission 
notes that the 15 and 16 year olds involved in those cases were living with 
illnesses which greatly affected their judgement and mental capacity to make a 
choice.  
2.79 In addition, the Commission notes that, in some circumstances, it is 
clear that, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction and in applying a “best interests” 
test, a court may come to a result that is at variance with the wishes of the 
young person. This is especially so where the case is one of “life or death,” and 
where the courts may, in cases of doubt, apply a presumption in favour of life. 
Indeed, the Commission also took this view in the case of persons over 18 
years of age in its 2009 Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives.99 This 
was also the outcome in five other English cases, Re E,100 Re S,101 Re L,102 Re 
M103 and Re P,104 which involved the refusal of treatment by a person under 16 
being overridden by the courts for reasons connected to the issue of life 
preservation rather than parental consent. All but Re M involved the refusal of 
blood products on religious grounds.  
2.80 The first of these cases, Re E,105 which was referred to by Keane 
CJ in his judgment in North Western Health Board v HW and CW,106 involved a 
15 year old boy, who was a Jehovah‟s Witness and who had refused a blood 
transfusion that was to be administered to treat his recently-diagnosed 
leukaemia. As Keane CJ pointed out in the North Western Health Board case, 
Ward J in Re E had ordered the blood transfusion to proceed on the ground 
that, among other matters, the 15 year old in question “was not of sufficient 
understanding and maturity to give a full and informed consent.”107 Ward J 
acknowledged that the boy, who would be 16 about 6 weeks after the case was 
                                                     
99  Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives (LRC 94-2009), paragraph 1.106.  
100  Re E (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386. 
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heard, was “of sufficient intelligence to be able to take decisions about his own 
well-being, but I also find that that there is a range of decisions of which some 
are outside his ability fully to grasp their implications.”108  
2.81 Bearing in mind that the boy was nearly 16, Ward J accepted that 
his wish not to have a transfusion as part of his treatment was “a very important 
matter which weighs very heavily in the scales I have to hold in balance.”109 As 
the case was a matter of life and death (Ward J delivered his judgment at 10pm 
on a Friday night having heard the case that day and having visited the boy in 
hospital), Ward J concluded that his refusal of treatment was not the product of 
a full and free informed will. In this respect, the approach of Ward J in Re E is 
comparable to the approach of the High Court in Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2),110 in 
which Laffoy J took into account the gravity of the consequences of refusal of a 
blood transfusion in concluding that the decision of a 23 year old woman did not 
pass the functional test of capacity.  
2.82 It may be that the approach of Ward J in Re E – and of Laffoy J in 
Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2) – is open to the criticism that it implies that the strongly-
held religious beliefs of adolescents – or of a 23 year-old woman – are given 
less standing than would be appropriate.111 In the Commission‟s view, however, 
the decisions in the blood transfusion cases are consistent with other decisions 
in this area. The Commission notes that, in all these cases, the courts have 
emphasised that, in exercising their inherent jurisdiction in any “life or death” 
situation, the life and welfare of the young person (and, in Fitzpatrick v FK 
(No.2), the life and welfare of a 23 year old woman) weighs heavily with the 
courts. Indeed, this was the approach in the English case that did not involve a 
blood transfusion, Re M.112 This case involved a 15 year old girl who refused to 
consent to a heart transplant. Johnson J did not simply state that M was 
incompetent and therefore incapable of refusing the treatment in question. 
Rather, he stated that the authorisation of the treatment was in her best 
interests. 
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2.83 The decision in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health113 has 
signalled a renewed focus on the autonomy of children, and it has been 
suggested that this raises doubts as to any apparent retreat from Gillick.114 The 
circumstances could be described as “Gillick Part 2,” because the claimant 
argued that the English Department of Health‟s 2004 guidelines on the provision 
of contraception to young people under 16 years of age, which had incorporated 
the “Fraser Guidelines,” were unlawful. In the Axon case, the specific complaint 
was that the 2004 guidelines stated that young people under 16 years of age 
are owed the same duty of confidentiality as any other person. Mrs Axon 
claimed that this interfered with her rights and responsibilities as a parent and 
contravened Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
which guarantees respect for family and private life. It was also argued that the 
2004 guidelines went further than the “Fraser Guidelines” in Gillick. 
2.84 In the English High Court, Silber J held against the claimant. He 
concluded that the decision in Gillick had clearly ruled that a doctor could 
lawfully give advice to a competent minor without parental knowledge. 
Furthermore, the claimant‟s argument was contrary to the high duty of 
confidentiality applicable in the context of medical information, the legal rights of 
young people, and international principles of human rights which require respect 
for the autonomy of young people. Competent children, Silber J held, are 
entitled to the same duty of confidentiality as adults and there is a strong public 
interest in the maintenance of confidences, particularly in the context of young 
people seeking advice on matters of sexual health.  
2.85 In relation to the claim concerning Article 8(1) of the ECHR, Silber J 
stated that the ECHR shows that the duty of confidence owed by a medical 
professional to a competent young person is a high one and can only be 
overridden for a very powerful reason. The Axon case served to uphold the view 
that competent young people with capacity, that is, who are Gillick competent or 
who pass a “mature minor” test, are owed the same duty of confidentiality as 
adults. The position in relation to the nature of the duty of confidentiality owed to 
young people who are not Gillick competent, however, remains unclear.  
2.86 Silber J, referring to the Gillick case, stated that the parental right to 
determine whether a young person will have medical treatment terminates if 
and when the young person achieves a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to understand fully what is proposed. 
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2.87 Commenting on the Axon case, Herring sees this statement as an 
implication that, if a child is competent, a parent has no right to determine what 
treatment a child will receive, thereby rejecting the notion of concurrent 
consents.115 The Commission accepts that Herring‟s analysis cannot, however, 
be taken as a definitive view of English law. Nonetheless, it appears to be 
consistent with developments in other countries, notably in Canada, which are 
discussed below.116 At the very least, however, the Axon case can be seen as a 
strong affirmation of the principles laid down in Gillick and an explicit recognition 
of the decision-making rights of young people.117   
(2) Northern Ireland 
2.88 The law – and related guidance – in Northern Ireland has, broadly, 
followed developments in England and Wales – and those in this State. Thus, 
the Age of Majority Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 was enacted by the Parliament 
of Northern Ireland (whose legislative functions are now carried out, since post-
1998 devolution, by the Northern Ireland Assembly) in order to implement the 
key element of the 1967 Latey Report. The Northern Ireland 1969 Act thus 
reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18 and also mirrored other comparable 
provisions in the English Family Law Reform Act 1969. Thus, section 4 of the 
Age of Majority Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 is worded in identical terms to 
section 8 of the English 1969 Act (which, as already noted, was the model for 
section 23 of the Non-Fatal offences Against the Person Act 1997) and states: 
“(1) The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years 
to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of 
consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as 
effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has 
by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it 
shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or 
guardian. 
(2) In this section “surgical, medical or dental treatment” includes any 
procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section 
applies to any procedure (including, in particular, the administration of 
an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that 
treatment. 
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(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective 
any consent which would have been effective if this section had not 
been enacted.” 
2.89 Northern Ireland legislation has also implemented a “mature minor” 
test of “sufficient understanding” along the lines of the comparable provisions in 
English legislation (and the equivalent legislation in this State). Thus, Article 
57(6) of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, which deals with interim 
care orders concerning a “child”, that is, a person under 18 years of age, is 
worded virtually identically to section 38(6) of the English Children Act 1989 
(and in this State in the Child Care Act 1991) and states: 
“Where the court makes an interim care or interim supervision order, it 
may give such directions (if any) as it considers appropriate with regard 
to the medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment of the 
child; but if the child is of sufficient understanding to make an informed 
decision he may refuse to submit to the examination or other 
assessment.” (emphasis added)  
2.90 Similarly, in the context of adoption, Article 9 of the Adoption 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1987 provides that a court or adoption agency must 
ensure that the welfare of the child involved is the most important consideration. 
Article 9(b) adds that (as is the case under the Adoption Act 2010 in this State), 
the court or adoption agency is required to: 
“ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision 
and give due consideration to them, having regard to his age and 
understanding.” 
2.91 Delivering a public lecture in 2003,118 the Northern Ireland High Court 
judge Gillen J noted that the obligation in Article 57(6) of the Children (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1995 to give due weight to the views of the child implemented in 
Northern Ireland the provisions of Article 12 of the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC).119 He added: 
“If we are to make progress we must increasingly consider the concept 
of rights which visualises that children will either take their own 
decisions or at least have a strong say in matters affecting them. We 
                                                     
118  Gillen, “O Tempore, O Mores” (2004) 55 NILQ 55 (the Daniel O‟Connell Lecture, 
delivered at St Malachy‟s College, Belfast, 23 November 2003). The title of the 
lecture (“Oh the Times, Oh the Customs”) refers to one of Cicero‟s famous 
oratorical phrases in a speech to the Roman Senate in 63BC condemning the 
attempted overthrow of the Roman Republic by Catilina.  
119  Ibid, at 64-65. 
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must be wary lest compassion for children shades into unthinking 
condescension...120 In our court system children need a voice, someone 
who is able to listen to anything they wish to say and tell them what 
they need to know”121 
2.92 In 2005, Gillen J applied the approach he had set out in his 2003 
public lecture in Re Z and T (Freeing Order Application),122 in which he had to 
consider whether a 6 year old girl should be placed for adoption. He noted that 
Article 9 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (referred to above) 
emphasises the child‟s welfare as a significant consideration, and it also 
provides that the court should ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child 
having regard to the child‟s age and understanding. In this respect, Gillen J 
stated:123  
“I recognise that this child is not Gillick competent and would... 
accommodate herself to an adoption, nonetheless I regard her stated 
wishes that she does not want to be adopted as having some 
significance.”   
2.93 Thus, while Gillen J noted that the 6 year old was not Gillick 
competent, her views were relevant to the decision of the court under the 
Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. Gillen J ultimately concluded that an 
adoption order would not be compatible with the child‟s welfare and best 
interests. The decision in this case indicates that the courts in Northern Ireland 
have applied the principles in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Heath 
Authority.  
2.94 Indeed, the judicial application of Gillick in Northern Ireland had been 
anticipated in an article by Gillian Kerr written in 1984.124 She had pointed out 
that the 1983 decision of the English High Court in Gillick, which had upheld the 
                                                     
120  Ibid, at 65, citing Bainham, “Can we Protect Children and Protect their Rights?” 
(2002) 32 Family Law 279 
121  Ibid, at 65, citing Re A [2001] 1 FLR 715. 
122  [2005] NIFam 6. 
123  Re Z and T (Freeing Order Application) [2005] NIFam 6, at para 21 of the 
judgment. Similarly, in Re Jakub and Dawid [2009] NIFam 23, at paragraph 45 of 
the judgment, Stephens J stated that he had “taken into consideration the 
views of the children in accordance with their age and maturity” in a case 
involving the recognition and enforcement of a Polish court‟s residence 
order under Regulation (EC) No.2201/2003 (“Brussels II bis”) on the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in family proceedings. 
124  Kerr, “Medical Treatment of Children” (1984) 35 NILQ 185. 
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validity of the 1980 DHSS guidance at issue (and which the UK House of Lords 
subsequently upheld in 1985125), largely reflected existing common law on the 
capacity of minors to consent to treatment. She commented: “[i]n relation to the 
consent of minors to medical treatment for themselves, the better view seems to 
be that their consent is effective where they understand the full implications of 
the procedure.”126 In the difficult cases involving, for example, treatment related 
to “pregnancy, sexually transmitted disease and drug abuse,” she commented 
that “faced with a choice between giving necessary treatment in confidence or 
the rejection of treatment and advice, most doctors and judges would agree that 
confidentiality was appropriate.”127 These comments largely reflect the ultimate 
reception of Gillick in Northern Ireland, as indicated by decisions such as Re Z 
and T (Freeing Order Application).128  
2.95 In addition, as already noted, in this respect the legislative provisions 
and case law in Northern Ireland also mirror the literature on child development 
and relevant international standards in this area, including the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which the Commission has 
discussed in Chapter 1. In broad terms, therefore, the legal position in Northern 
Ireland concerning those under 18 is virtually identical to the position in England 
and Wales. They also reflect the comparable statutory provisions in this State, 
discussed above. 
2.96 As to relevant guidance in this area, in the wake of the decision of the 
UK House of Lords in 1985 in the Gillick decision, in 1987 the Northern Ireland 
Department of Health and Social Services reviewed its guidance on providing 
contraceptive services to young people. The 1987 guidance reflected the 
revised English DHSS guidance published in 1986 after the Gillick case (and 
further revised in 2004). The Northern Ireland Department of Health and Social 
Services concluded that, since the UK House of Lords was the highest court in 
the UK (since 2009, replaced by the UK Supreme Court) and since the decision 
was based on an analysis of the comparable common law, “there is no reason 
                                                     
125  Gillian Kerr‟s 1984 article was written shortly after the decision of the English High 
Court in 1983 in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Heath Authority [1984] 
1 All ER 365, in which Woolf J had upheld the legality of the 1980 DHSS 
guidance. The article was written before the Court of Appeal had overturned that 
decision ([1985] 1 All ER 533) and before the House of Lords ([1985] UKHL 7, 
[1985] 3 All ER 402) had ultimately taken the same view as Woolf J and had 
upheld the legality of the DHSS guidance. 
126  Kerr, “Medical Treatment of Children” (1984) 35 NILQ 185, at 193.   
127  Ibid, at 193.  
128  [2005] NIFam 6. 
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to suppose therefore that the decision in the Gillick case would not be followed 
by the Northern Ireland courts.”129 This approach is supported by the use of 
“Gillick competence” in the courts in Northern Ireland as a basis for determining 
the maturity of persons under 16, as evidenced in Re Z and T (Freeing Order 
Application).130  
2.97 In this light, in 2003 the Northern Ireland Department of Health, 
Social Services and Public Safety issued a Reference Guide to Consent for 
Examination, Treatment or Care.131 This 2003 Reference Guide builds on the 
Department‟s 1987 guidance document referred to above, and provides 
comprehensive guidance to health and social care professionals concerning 
consent to, and refusal of, treatment, both for adults over 18 and young persons 
and children under 18. The 2003 Reference Guide draws on relevant English 
case law on this issue, including the Gillick case and the subsequent English 
case law on consent to and refusal of treatment, which has been discussed 
above.132  
2.98 As to persons under 18, the 2003 Reference Guide points out that, 
under section 4 of the Age of Majority Act (Northern Ireland) 1969, “people aged 
16 or 17 are entitled to consent to their own medical treatment, and any 
ancillary procedures involved in that treatment, such as an anaesthetic.”133 It 
also points out that the same test of capacity as applies to adults, the functional 
test, is applicable to 16 and 17 year olds. As to parental involvement with 16 
and 17 year olds, it states:134 
                                                     
129  Family planning service. HSS(CH)1/87 (Northern Ireland Department of Health 
and Social Services, 8 May 1987). See also Re Shearer and Corrie's Judicial 
Application [1993] 2 NIJB 12, High Court of Northern Ireland (Queen‟s Bench 
Division) 22 January 1993 (Carswell J), in which the Court appeared to accept the 
applicability in Northern Ireland of the English DHSS 1986 guidance issued after 
Gillick. 
130  [2005] NIFam 6. 
131  Available at http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk.  
132  The 2003 Reference Guide does not refer to any decisions of the Northern 
Ireland courts. It was published before the decision in Re Z and T (Freeing Order 
Application) [2005] NIFam 6.  
133  Reference Guide to Consent for Examination, Treatment or Care (Northern 
Ireland Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2003) (available 
at http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk), Chapter 3, paragraph 2.1, p.20. 
134  Ibid., Chapter 3, paragraph 2.4, at 21. 
 76 
“If the requirements for valid consent are met, it is not legally necessary 
to obtain consent from a person with parental responsibility for the 
young person in addition to that of the young person. It is, however, 
good practice to encourage the young person to involve their family in 
the decision-making process, unless the young person specifically 
wishes to exclude them.”  
2.99 As to those under 16, the 2003 Reference Guide states: 135 
“Following the case of Gillick, the courts have held that children who 
have sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable them to 
understand fully what is involved in a proposed intervention will also 
have the capacity to consent to that intervention. This is sometimes 
described as being „Gillick competent‟... As the understanding required 
for different interventions will vary considerably, a child under 16 may 
therefore have the capacity to consent to some interventions but not to 
others.” 
2.100 The 2003 Reference Guide adds:136 
“The concept of Gillick competence is said to reflect the child‟s 
increasing development to maturity. In some cases, for example 
because of a mental disorder, a child‟s mental state may fluctuate 
significantly so that on some occasions the child appears Gillick 
competent in respect of a particular decision and on other occasions 
does not. In cases such as these, careful consideration should be given 
to whether the child is truly Gillick competent at any time to take this 
decision.” 
2.101 As to parental involvement with those under 16, the 2003 
Reference Guide states: 137  
“If the child is Gillick competent and is able to give voluntary consent 
after receiving appropriate information, that consent will be valid and 
additional consent by a person with parental responsibility will not be 
required. However where the decision will have on-going implications, 
such as long-term use of contraception, it is good practice to encourage 
the child to inform his or her parents unless it would clearly not be in the 
child‟s best interests to do so.” 
2.102 The Commission notes that the 2003 Reference Guide provides 
extremely useful guidance for all health and social care professionals in 
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Northern Ireland concerning the position of those under 18. The Commission 
also notes that the guidance applies across the range of professionals who are 
likely to be involved in the wide scope of health care, as already defined in this 
Report in Chapter 1, which those under 18 are likely to seek. In this State, while 
the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour, discussed 
already, provides some useful guidance in this respect, it is not as detailed as 
the comparable elements in the 2003 Reference Guide, nor does it (nor could it) 
provide guidance to professionals other than doctors. 
2.103 Having noted that the 2003 Reference Guide provides extremely 
useful guidance for all health and social care professionals, the Commission 
also notes that its discussion of the concept of Gillick competence, that is, the 
“mature minor” concept, does not set out clearly all of the factors, such as the 5 
factors set out in the “Fraser Guidelines,” which are to be found more clearly 
articulated in the English DHSS guidance discussed above. The Commission 
concludes, nonetheless, that the approach taken in the 2003 Reference Guide 
provides an extremely helpful basis on which to develop guidance that would 
supplement an appropriate legal framework. 
(3) Scotland 
2.104 Scottish law differs from the law in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland in an important respect, in that the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 
1991 sets the age of majority at 16. The 1991 Act implemented the 
recommendations made in the Scottish Law Commission‟s 1987 Report on the 
Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Minors and Pupils.138 The Commission‟s 
1987 Report recommended that 16 should be the age at which a person has full 
legal capacity, including capacity to consent to medical treatment. The Scottish 
Commission recommended a flexible exception for persons under 16 years of 
age, in effect mirroring the test in what became the English Children Act 
1989,139 discussed above, and which derived from the “mature minor” rule in the 
Gillick case.  
2.105 Section1(1)(b) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 
states that, in general: 
“a person of or over the age of sixteen years shall have legal capacity 
to enter into any transaction.” 
                                                     
138  Scottish Law Commission Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of 
Minors and Pupils (Report 110 1987). 
139  Ibid, at 3.67. 
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2.106 Section 9 of the 1991 Act defines “transaction” as a transaction 
which has legal effect and includes the giving by a person of any consent 
having legal effect. 
2.107 The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 therefore gives young 
people full legal capacity to enter into most transactions at the age of 16. Under 
the 1991 Act, there appear to be no grounds to enable a parent, guardian or the 
courts to override the refusal of treatment by a 16 year old, unless the 16 year 
old in question otherwise lacks capacity, based on a functional test. 
2.108 As to persons under 16, section 2(4) of the Age of Legal Capacity 
(Scotland) Act 1991 states: 
“A person under the age of sixteen shall have legal capacity to 
consent on his own behalf to any surgical, medical or dental 
treatment where, in the opinion of a qualified medical practitioner 
attending him, he is capable of understanding the nature and 
possible consequences of the procedure or treatment.” 
2.109 The language of section 2(4) is enabling in that it refers only to 
capacity to consent with no mention of refusal of medical treatment as the 
corollary of consent. A number of commentators have treated this provision as 
encompassing the legal capacity to refuse medical treatment as well as the 
capacity to consent to medical treatment.140 The wording of section 2(4) also 
suggests that no concurrent power of consent is retained by the parent of a 
“section 2(4) competent” child (that is, a “mature minor”). Furthermore, section 
90 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 states that a child who is capable under 
section 2(4) may only be examined or treated under the 1995 Act if he or she 
consents to the examination or treatment. As discussed above, the comparable 
statutory provisions in the English Children Act 1989 have been interpreted as 
being subject to the inherent protective role of the courts concerning children 
(reflecting its long-standing wardship or parens patriae jurisdiction) to override a 
refusal where the courts consider that the person under 16 lacks capacity. In 
order to ensure that any such approach would avoid a paternalistic view that 
does not take account of the relevant rights of a person under 16, it may be that 
the approach taken in the English Axon case, discussed above, would be 
followed in Scotland. 
2.110 In 2006, the Scottish Executive‟s Department of Health issued A 
Good Practice Guide on Consent for Health Professionals in the NHS Scotland. 
The 2006 Good Practice Guide is, broadly, comparable to the English (2004) 
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and Northern Ireland (2003) Guides discussed above, but reflects the different 
position in Scottish law as to the age of majority. Thus, the 2006 Good Practice 
Guide points out that, under the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, 
when persons reach their 16
th
 birthday, they gain the legal capacity to make 
decisions which have legal effect, unless the person lacks the appropriate 
mental capacity.141 The 2006 Good Practice Guide also states that where a 
child, that is a person under 16, has capacity to make a health care decision, 
the 1991 Act requires that the child‟s decision should be respected, even where 
it differs from the opinion of the healthcare professional and the child‟s parents.  
2.111 In re Houston, Applicant142 involved a 15 year old boy who was 
deemed competent under section 2(4) of the 1991 Act and who resisted an 
application under section 18 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 to have 
him admitted to a mental health hospital. The central question to be decided 
was whether parental consent could override the refusal of a competent minor. 
The judge in the Sheriff‟s Court who dealt with the case held that section 2(4) of 
the 1991 Act applied to both consent and refusal, so that the consent of the 15 
year old‟s mother could not override his refusal. He stated: 143 
“It seems to be illogical that, on the one hand, a person under the 
age of 16 should be granted the power to decide upon medical 
treatment for himself while, on the other hand, his parents have the 
right to override his decision. I am inclined to the view that the 
minor‟s decision is paramount and cannot be overridden.” 
2.112 There are, however, limitations to the Houston case.144 Thus, section 
11(2) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 provides for the making of 
applications in relation to parental rights and responsibilities. An application for 
a specific issue order can be made by a person with an interest, such as a 
doctor. This is limited to persons under 16 years of age because sections 1(2) 
and 2(7) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 provide for the cessation of 
parental responsibilities and rights when a child reaches the age of 16, except 
for the responsibility to provide guidance which ends on a child‟s 18
th
 birthday. 
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Section 6 of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 states that, for the 
purposes of the Act, an adult is a person who has attained the age of 16 years.  
2.113 It is clear that in Scotland the age of 16 is well established in law as 
the age at which a young person may assume responsibility for his or her 
healthcare. In respect of essential medical treatment, it is worth noting the 
discussion of the Scottish Law Commission in the 1987 Report which preceded 
the enactment of the 1991 Act as to a proposed requirement that the treatment 
be in the young person‟s best interests: 
“If it is accepted that a child may consent if he or she  is of sufficient 
maturity to understand the treatment proposed then the test should 
apply whether the treatment concerned is for his benefit or not. In 
that respect, the young person should be treated no differently from 
anyone else capable of consenting.”145 
2.114 The absence of a best interests requirement raises some questions 
in relation to the refusal of essential medical treatment. For example, may a 
competent young person under the age of 16 refuse medical treatment which is 
in his or her best interests? The legal situation is not clear in this respect. The 
deliberate absence of a best interests requirement suggests that a young 
person with capacity may make healthcare decisions regardless of what is 
deemed to be in his or her best interests. However if the Age of Legal Capacity 
(Scotland) Act 1991 is read in conjunction with the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
a different conclusion may be reached. Section 16 of the 1995 Act states that 
the welfare of a child shall be the court‟s paramount consideration. 
2.115 The 2006 Good Practice Guide issued by the Scottish Executive‟s 
Health Department also states that refusal of consent by or on behalf of a child 
may be overridden by the courts under Section 11(2) of the 1995 Act, which 
provides for applications in relation to parental rights and responsibilities. An 
application for a specific issue order can be made by a person with an interest, 
such as a doctor.  
(4) Canada 
2.116 In Canada, many Provinces retain 18 as the general age of 
majority, but in respect of medical treatment there has been a general move 
towards conferring full capacity on persons from 16 years of age. In addition, for 
those under 16 years of age, a “mature minor” rule is well established.146 While 
the “mature minor” rule has predominantly been developed at common law, a 
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Minors and Pupils (Report 110 1987) at 3.77. 
146  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 4.19 to 4.51. 
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number of relevant statutory provisions have also been enacted.147 Provisions 
enacted in British Columbia and New Brunswick in 1973 and 1975 are similar to 
those enacted in other countries at the time, such as England and Australia.148 
These provisions can be contrasted with more recent legislative developments 
in Ontario and Prince Edward Island,149 which are based on a functional 
approach to capacity and the general presumption that a person is capable of 
making a healthcare decision. A number of statutory provisions in force in other 
provinces, in relation to substitute decision making and health care directives, 
confer a presumption of legal capacity on individuals aged 16 years of age in 
terms of health care decision making.  
2.117 A number of the Canadian provinces and territories, including 
Alberta and Manitoba, have not enacted specific healthcare consent legislation 
in this respect, and continue to rely on the mature minor rule, supplemented by 
child welfare legislation.  
2.118 The relationship between the mature minor rule and child welfare 
legislation has been debated in the courts, primarily in respect of refusal of 
essential medical treatment. If a mature minor makes a decision to which child 
welfare authorities object, the authorities may seek to override the mature 
minor‟s status of legal capacity and have the decision to refuse medical 
treatment quashed, on the basis that the child is in need of protection.150 The 
incorporation of the best interests principle in various statutory provisions 
means that mature minors will only have their decision to refuse medical 
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treatment upheld if the decision is deemed to be in their best interests. Several 
cases involving the refusal of medical treatment, primarily in the context of 
refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah‟s Witnesses, have come before the 
courts. These have led to important decisions on the legal capacity of a person 
under 16 to refuse medical treatment and how child welfare legislation and the 
courts‟ inherent jurisdiction to protect children (based on the long-standing 
wardship or parens patriae jurisdiction) can affect this.   
2.119 In this respect, the Commission considers that a 2009 decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada provides a valuable analysis of the law on 
healthcare decision-making in the context of refusal of essential treatment. In 
AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)151 the Supreme Court of 
Canada analysed Canadian law on the mature minor rule and the legal capacity 
of competent minors to make health care decisions. The case involved a 14 
year old girl who was admitted to hospital with internal bleeding caused by 
Crohn‟s disease. She was a devout Jehovah‟s Witness, and some months 
before hospitalisation she had signed an advance care directive refusing blood 
products on account of her religious beliefs. After receiving advice on her 
situation, she stated that she understood the reason why a blood transfusion 
was recommended and the consequences of refusal. When her condition 
deteriorated, her doctors stated that the bleeding was now causing an imminent 
serious risk to her health and perhaps her life.  
2.120 The Manitoba Director of Child and Family Services considered that 
she was a child in need of protection and applied for a treatment order 
authorising a blood transfusion under section 25(8) of the Manitoba Child and 
Family Services Act which provides, subject to section 28(9), for the 
authorisation of treatment for a person under 16 where the court considers this 
is “in the best interests of the child.” Section 25(9) of the Act states that where a 
person is 16 or over, no medical treatment can be ordered by the court without 
the child‟s consent unless the court is satisfied that the child is unable to 
understand either the relevant information or the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of the treatment decision.  
2.121 After a relatively brief hearing, the Manitoba High Court made the 
order requested; three units of blood were given to the girl and she made a full 
recovery within days. The girl and her parents appealed the order to the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal, and also argued that section 25(8) of the Manitoba 
Child and Family Services Act was in breach of her constitutional rights under 
the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, notably her right to 
freedom of conscience and religion, her right to life and her right to equal 
treatment under the law. In particular, it was noted that section 25(9) of the 
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Manitoba Act contained a presumption of capacity for a person over 16 years of 
age (the age of capacity or majority) whereas no such presumption of capacity 
applied to a person under 16. The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the 
constitutional claims and also approved the blood transfusion treatment orders 
made. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the case by 
a 6-1 majority. 
2.122 The leading joint judgment of four of the judges of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the AC case, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ, 
was delivered by Abella J. Abella J described the mature minor rule as a 
recognition by the common law that children are entitled to a degree of 
decision-making autonomy that reflects their evolving intelligence and 
understanding.152 The evolutionary and contextual character of maturity makes 
it difficult to define and evaluate, yet the right of mature adolescents to have 
their medical decision making ability valued means that an assessment of 
maturity must be undertaken with respect and rigour.153 Abella J stated: 
“It is a sliding scale of scrutiny, with the adolescent‟s views becoming 
increasingly determinative depending on his or her ability to exercise 
mature, independent judgement. The more serious the nature of the 
decision, and the more severe its potential impact on the life or health 
of the child, the greater the degree of scrutiny that will be required.”154 
2.123 In her judgment in the AC case, Abella J reviewed the development 
of the “mature minor” rule in the wake of the UK House of Lords decision in 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,155 discussed above, 
noting that it had been applied on many occasions in the Canadian courts. She 
also referred to the extensive literature on child development and adolescence, 
which the Commission has already referred to briefly in this Report. In this 
respect, Abella J notably considered that the mature minor rule must be carried 
out in tandem with a best interests test. She also noted that respect for the 
autonomy of the person under 16 must not be equated with accepting the views 
of that person in all instances. Abella J commented:  
“There is considerable support for the notion that while many 
adolescents may have the technical ability to make complex decisions, 
this does not always mean they will have the necessary maturity and 
independence of judgment to make truly autonomous choices. As Jane 
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Fortin significantly observes: „... cognitive capacity to reach decisions 
does not necessarily correlate with “mature” judgment‟ (Children’s 
Rights and the Developing Law (2nd ed. 2003), at p. 73)...   
Clearly the factors that may affect an adolescent‟s ability to exercise 
independent, mature judgment in making maximally autonomous 
choices are numerous, complex, and difficult to enumerate with any 
precision. They include „the individual physical, intellectual and 
psychological maturity of the minor, the minor‟s lifestyle [and] the nature 
of the parent-child relationship‟ (Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 
Minors’ Consent to Health Care, p. 32). While it may be relatively easy 
to test cognitive competence alone, as the social scientific literature 
shows, it will inevitably be a far more challenging exercise to evaluate 
the impact of these other types of factors. The difficulty and uncertainty 
involved in assessing maturity has prompted some experts to suggest 
that children should be entitled to exercise their autonomy only insofar 
as it does not threaten their life or health.” 156 
2.124 The approach of Abella J in the AC case reflects, therefore, the 
literature on child development and adolescence, namely, that (a) the technical 
or cognitive capacity of adolescents to make decisions does not necessarily 
mean their decisions will always be mature; (b) many complex and varying 
factors must be considered in determining whether a particular person under 16 
is capable of making mature judgements; and (c) while the growing maturity of 
the person must be taken into account as they reach young adulthood, where 
their immediate health or life is at issue the court must assess on an objective 
basis what is in their “best interests.”  
2.125 Abella J then applied this approach in concluding that the “best 
interests” test in section 25(8) of the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act 
was not in conflict with AC‟s rights under the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. She accepted that any legislation would be “inherently arbitrary” 
if it deprived an adolescent under the age of 16 the opportunity to demonstrate 
sufficient maturity, but that this was not the situation in this instance. Abella J 
stated:157 
“... the “best interests” test referred to in s. 25(8) of the [Manitoba Child 
and Family Services Act], properly interpreted, provides that a young 
person is entitled to a degree of decisional autonomy commensurate 
with his or her maturity. The result of this interpretation of s. 25(8) is 
that adolescents under 16 will have the right to demonstrate mature 
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medical decisional capacity. This protects both the integrity of the 
statute and of the adolescent. It is also an interpretation that precludes 
a dissonance between the statutory provisions and the [1982 Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms], since it enables adolescents to 
participate meaningfully in medical treatment decisions in accordance 
with their maturity, creating a sliding scale of decision-making 
autonomy. This, in my view, reflects a proportionate response to the 
goal of protecting vulnerable young people from harm, while respecting 
the individuality and autonomy of those who are sufficiently mature to 
make a particular treatment decision.” 
2.126 Abella J noted in this respect that the “best interests” test had also 
been included in the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, discussed 
above, to which Canada (like Ireland) is a State party. In the Commission‟s 
view, Abella J‟s analysis is entirely consistent with the comparable approach 
taken by the Irish Supreme Court in the McK case and the Irish High Court in 
the D case, discussed above. It is also consistent with the analysis in the 
English cases such as Hewer and Gillick, also discussed above.  
2.127 Bearing in mind that Abella J surveyed the general literature on 
child development and adolescence that had emerged since the mid 1980s 
(when the Gillick case was decided), the Commission notes that she also set 
out a list of 7 factors which could be taken into account in this respect. Abella J 
stated: 158 
“[T]he evolutionary and contextual character of maturity makes it 
difficult to define, let alone definitively identify. Yet the right of mature 
adolescents not to be unfairly deprived of their medical decision-making 
autonomy means that the assessment must be undertaken with respect 
and rigour. The following factors may be of assistance: 
[1] What is the nature, purpose and utility of the recommended medical 
treatment? What are the risks and benefits? 
[2] Does the adolescent demonstrate the intellectual capacity and 
sophistication to understand the information relevant to making the 
decision and to appreciate the potential consequences? 
[3] Is there reason to believe that the adolescent‟s views are stable and 
a true reflection of his or her core values and beliefs? 
[4] What is the potential impact of the adolescent‟s lifestyle, family 
relationships and broader social affiliations on his or her ability to 
exercise independent judgment? 
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[5] Are there any existing emotional or psychiatric vulnerabilities? 
[6] Does the adolescent‟s illness or condition have an impact on his or 
her decision-making ability? 
[7] Is there any relevant information from adults who know the 
adolescent, like teachers or doctors?” 
2.128 Abella J emphasised that this list of 7 factors was not intended as a 
mandatory formula, but instead was intended “to assist courts in assessing the 
extent to which a child‟s wishes reflect true, stable and independent choices.” 
The Commission agrees that this is the correct approach to take in what is a 
complex area. The Commission also notes that these 7 factors have at least 
three important benefits: (a) they clearly take a rights-based approach to 
assessing the competence of decision-making of mature minors, those under 
16; (b) they acknowledge the many factors that should be taken into account in 
respect of medical treatment, including an objective assessment of the “best 
interests” of those under 16; and (c) they are more than an updated version of 
the “Fraser Guidelines” from the Gillick case, because they are not confined to 
the narrow issue discussed in Gillick of access to the contraceptive pill. In the 
Commission‟s view, therefore, the analysis by Abella J in the AC case 
constitutes a very useful basis on which to formulate specific recommendations 
concerning those “mature minors” under 16, to which the Commission turns in 
Part D, below.  
(5) Australia 
2.129 In Australia, there has also been a gradual move towards conferring 
full capacity on persons from 16 years of age, in particular in respect of medical 
treatment. In addition, for those under 16 years of age, the common law in 
Australia mirrors the mature minor approach developed in England, Scotland, 
Canada and New Zealand.  
2.130  Legislation on the subject of young people‟s capacity to consent to 
medical treatment has also been enacted in New South Wales and South 
Australia.159  
2.131 In 1992, in Secretary, Dept of Health and Community Services v 
JWB,160 the High Court of Australia developed a mature minor rule. The joint 
judgment for the Court (of Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) 
approved the general approach taken by the majority of the UK House of Lords 
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in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,161 which has been 
discussed in detail above. The High Court of Australia stated: 
“The proposition endorsed by the majority in that case [Gillick] was 
that parental power to consent to medical treatment on behalf of a 
child diminishes gradually as the child‟s capacities and maturity grow 
and that the rate of development depends on the individual child... 
This approach although lacking the certainty of a fixed age rule, 
accords with experience and psychology... It should be followed in 
this country as part of common law.” 
2.132 The Court also referred briefly to refusal of treatment, but did not 
endorse the principles laid down by the English Court of Appeal in Re R and Re 
W, discussed above. The joint judgment for the Court contained this footnote 
referring to Re R but also citing criticism of the Court of Appeal‟s decision: 
“As to the priority of parental rights and the capacity of a child to 
refuse medical treatment for mental illness, see In Re R... But also 
see the comment on Lord Donaldson‟s judgment by Bainham in „The 
Judge and the Competent Minor‟...” 
2.133 The status of a minor to refuse medical treatment therefore remains 
unclear in Australian law, but as in the UK and Ireland a court may, using its 
inherent jurisdiction (the equivalent of the old parens patriae jurisdiction), 
override a young person‟s refusal of treatment.  
2.134 In relation to life-sustaining treatment, the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia decided in 2004, in Minister for Health v AS,162 that the court will 
almost always override a child‟s decision to refuse life-sustaining or life-
prolonging treatment, in accordance with the child‟s best interests. Pullin J 
stated that the court‟s power using its inherent jurisdiction to countermand the 
wishes of a child patient is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, but 
that there are cases where it is necessary to do so. He added that the views of 
the child are of course relevant to the best interests analysis and the court 
would exercise great caution in overturning them, but that these wishes alone 
shall not be determinative.  
2.135 The Commission notes that this approach is broadly in line with the 
view taken in the states already reviewed, including Ireland, and with the 
specific guidance set out by Abella J in the Canadian case AC v Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services).163  
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(6) New Zealand 
2.136 The move towards a 16 year old reference point for determining 
capacity to consent, in particular in the context of health care treatment, is also 
evident in New Zealand. Section 36 of the New Zealand Care of Children Act 
2004 states: 
“A consent, or refusal to consent, to any of the following, if given by a 
child of or over the age of 16 years, has effect as if the child were of 
full age: 
(a) any donation of blood by the child 
(b) any medical, surgical or dental treatment or procedure 
(including a blood transfusion... ) to be carried out on the 
child for the child‟s benefit by a person professionally 
qualified to carry it out.” 
2.137 Section 36 of the 2004 Act uses the word “benefit”, which is not 
limited by any qualification, so that this may not be restricted to a health 
benefit.164 The 2004 Act clearly states that young people aged 16 and 17 years 
of age can consent to or refuse medical treatment. Furthermore, their decision 
cannot be overridden by a parent or guardian. The medical practitioner is not 
required to assess the capacity of the 16 or 17 year old in question, rather 
capacity is presumed.  
2.138 It is not clear whether parents retain a co-existing right to consent to 
or refuse medical treatment for their 16 year old child. In light of the Australian 
and Canadian jurisprudence, it is unlikely that New Zealand courts would 
recognise concurrent rights of consent retained by parents of a competent child. 
Section 30 of the 2004 Act states that the High Court and Family Courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction in respect of children and may make an order placing a 
child under the guardianship of the court, either generally or for any particular 
purpose, such as obtaining consent for medical treatment.165 
2.139 Section 36 of the 2004 Act does not refer to the capacity of young 
people under the age of 16 to consent to medical treatment. As is the case in 
the other countries discussed above, it has been suggested that the common 
law rights of a “mature minor” under 16 in relation to medical treatment have not 
been limited by statutory provisions such as the 2004 Act and that: 
“the better view is that minors‟ common law capacity to consent to 
medical treatment has not been extinguished by the New Zealand 
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legislation, and that the consent of those under the age of 16 will 
sometimes be effective in law.”166 
2.140 It appears that, in practice, there is acceptance by the medical 
profession of a capacity-based approach to consent.167 In addition, as with the 
other countries discussed above, it seems likely that, in a situation where the 
life of a minor was threatened by the refusal of medical treatment, the courts 
would intervene and authorise the treatment. Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, which applies equally to children, states that everyone has 
the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment. This is subject, however, 
to section 5 which states that rights and freedoms may be subject to reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.168 
D Discussion and Recommendations on Healthcare Decision 
Making by under 18s  
2.141 In this Part, the Commission sets out its recommendations 
concerning consent to and refusal of medical treatment for those under 18. The 
Commission‟s approach is that this should be as consistent as possible with the 
proposed reform of the law on mental capacity for those over 18, and the 
Commission therefore favours a functional test of capacity. The Commission 
sets out its recommendations concerning 16 and 17 year olds first, and then 
sets out separately its recommendations for those under 16. 
 
(1) The functional test of capacity  
2.142 As already noted in this Report, in its 2006 Report on Vulnerable 
Adults and the Law,169 which contained a draft Scheme of a Mental Capacity 
Bill, the Commission recommended that mental capacity legislation should be 
enacted which would include a presumption of capacity for any person aged 18 
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years or more and that this legislation should also include a functional test of 
capacity. As explained in the 2006 Report, the Commission favours the 
functional approach to capacity because this is consistent with an approach 
based on the individual‟s personal rights and also determines whether the 
person understands the specific decision being considered at the time it is being 
made, whether this involves buying a house or undergoing medical treatment. It 
is also consistent with the right-based approach in the 2006 UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Commission notes that the 
Government‟s Scheme of a Mental Capacity Bill 2008,170 which is intended to 
implement the Commission‟s 2006 Report, also adopts the functional approach 
to capacity. The Commission is also conscious that the Government is 
committed to publishing by the end of 2011 a Mental Capacity Bill that is 
consistent with the 2006 UN Convention.171 
2.143 In the 2006 Report, the Commission rejected the use of a “status 
approach” to determining capacity. The status approach involves making a 
decision on a person‟s legal capacity based on the presence or absence of 
certain characteristics, such as age or mental illness. This approach (which is 
reflected in some current legislation such as the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 
1871) has been replaced in many states, notably because the “status approach” 
involves making a long term judgement on a person‟s capacity, based on a 
once-off examination of their status that often applies indefinitely into the future. 
2.144 The Commission considers that the proposals in this Report must 
be as consistent as possible with this wider context of proposals to introduce a 
modern statutory framework on mental capacity and decision-making for those 
over 18. The Commission notes that the functional test of capacity is also 
consistent with the recognition of the rights of children in the Constitution of 
Ireland, discussed above. It is also consistent with the relevant international 
human rights standards in this area, notably those in the 1989 UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).  
(2) 16 and 17 year olds and presumed capacity to consent to, and 
refuse, medical treatment   
                                                     
170  Available at www.justice.ie. 
171  The Programme for Government 2011-2016 (March 2011), p.38, available at 
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2.145 The Commission has already noted that the Oireachtas has accepted 
in section 23 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 that, in 
connection with medical and healthcare decisions, 16 and 17 year olds should 
be presumed to have capacity to consent to medical treatment (albeit the 1997 
Act is limited to the criminal law sphere). The Commission has also noted that 
the decision of the Supreme Court in McK v Information Commissioner,172 which 
arose in a health care setting, held that the views of a young person who is over 
17 “are very relevant”173 and that they may sometimes override a parent‟s 
presumed entitlement to be able to access health care information concerning 
their children.  
2.146 Having regard to the comparative analysis in Part C, it is clear that 
the approach in the 1997 Act has been replicated in virtually every State 
surveyed in the context of potential civil liability, sometimes by way of court 
decisions but increasingly in terms of legislation that deals specifically with 
consent to, and refusal of, health care treatment. The Commission therefore 
reiterates here the suitability of a functional approach to capacity for 16 and 17 
year olds in the context of potential civil liability concerning health care 
treatment. 
2.147 Following the publication of the Consultation Paper,174 the 
submissions received by the Commission broadly supported the provisional 
recommendations in respect of 16 and 17 year olds. The Commission notes 
that these submissions, and existing practice as evidenced by the Medical 
Council‟s 2009 Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour, have taken the view 
that section 23 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, 
although confined to the criminal law sphere, should be seen as setting the 
correct general approach, namely, that 16 and 17 year olds have capacity to 
consent to medical treatment. Indeed, the submissions suggested that, since 
section 23 of the 1997 Act greatly resembled comparable statutory provisions in 
other countries that apply both in the criminal law and civil law context, it would 
assist all those involved – 16 and 17 year olds, parents, guardians and health 
care professionals – to have the position in Irish law clarified in this manner.  
2.148 The Commission notes that this analysis reflects the picture in 
many other countries, including those already discussed, where legislation has 
provided for many years that 16 and 17 year olds should be deemed fully 
competent both to consent to, and to refuse, medical treatment. Indeed, many 
countries, including Scotland, have moved beyond the area of medical 
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treatment to reduce the age of majority from 18 to 16, so that 16 and 17 year 
olds have the status of adults in those countries and have general competence 
in respect of virtually all decision-making that affect them.  
2.149 The Commission notes that the submissions received also 
supported the view expressed in the Consultation Paper, that this approach 
should apply to consent to, and refusal of, treatment. The Commission agrees 
that issues of consent and refusal should not be treated differently, as the 
literature, clinical practice and case law in this area generally treats refusal as 
the corollary of consent. Indeed, as many of the leading court decisions 
discussed above indicate, to treat them differently would create an unworkable 
distinction because the standard needed to satisfy the capacity test would rise, 
or fall, in accordance with whether a person was consenting to or refusing 
treatment. For this reason, the Commission has concluded, and recommends, 
that the general recommendation concerning 16 and 17 year olds should apply 
to consent to, and refusal of, treatment.  
2.150 The Commission reiterates here that this project and Report is 
confined to health care decision-making rather than this wider scope of 
decision-making. It is sufficient to note for the purposes of this project and 
Report that, as far as health care treatment is concerned, virtually all countries 
have taken the view, both in terms of health care practice and the relevant 
legislative framework, that a 16 year old and 17 year old should, in general, be 
regarded as competent to consent to, and refuse, medical treatment. This 
approach reflects the well-documented literature that this age group has 
reached a state of sufficient understating and maturity that there should be a 
presumption that they have the capacity to make these decisions 
independently, and therefore on the same basis (at least for this purpose, 
whatever about the wider debate as to reducing the general age of majority to 
16) as an 18 year old who, under the current law, has reached the age of 
majority (that is, adulthood).   
2.151 The Commission has therefore concluded, and recommends, that 
legislation should clearly provide that, in general, a person who is 16 or 17 
years of age is presumed to have capacity to consent to, and refuse, health 
care treatment. The effect of this is to clarify that, for the purposes of civil 
liability – section 23 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 
already deals with criminal liability – a 16 and 17 year old is presumed to have 
the same capacity, as far as health care is concerned, as an 18 year old has 
under the current law. The Commission considers that the current wording of 
section 23 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 provides a 
useful statutory precedent in this respect, subject to the need to provide that: (a) 
the proposed statutory framework would apply to the civil liability setting and (b) 
that it would, in general, deal with refusal of treatment and not merely consent 
to treatment. On this basis, the Commission therefore recommends that the 
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proposed statutory framework should provide that a minor aged 16 years of age 
is presumed to have the capacity to consent to, and to refuse, any health care 
treatment, as already defined in this Report; that this capacity is, in the context 
of any potential civil liability, as effective as it would be if he or she were of full 
age, that is 18 years of age; and that where a minor has given such an effective 
consent to, or refused, any such treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain 
any consent for it, or refusal of consent for it, from his or her parent or guardian.  
2.152 As a result, in general terms, a 16 and 17 year old would not be 
subject to any countervailing test, such as whether the specific treatment is in 
their “best interests.” The Commission notes that, since the 16 and 17 year old 
– like an 18 year old under the present law – will be presumed to have capacity, 
this would be subject to contrary evidence that the person lacks capacity. As 
already noted, many of the legislative provisions enacted in other countries in 
this area provide for this situation. Thus, if it is proved on the balance of 
probabilities (the standard of proof in civil cases) that a 16 or 17 year old does 
not have capacity to make a particular healthcare decision, his or her parents or 
guardians will, in general terms, retain the entitlement to make the healthcare 
decision on his or her behalf in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and relevant international instruments concerning the role of 
parents and guardians and the general principles already set out in Chapter 1 of 
this Report. In addition, as discussed below, the “best interests” test may be 
applicable where life sustaining treatment is involved or where a person under 
16 is involved.  
2.153 This general approach is, of course, subject to certain other existing 
legislative limits and requirements. This includes existing requirements in, for 
example, the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987, the European Communities 
(Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use) Regulations 2004,175 the 
Child Care Act 1991 or the Mental Health Act 2001. The Commission is also 
conscious that planned legislation may also affect this general approach, such 
as the proposed Human Tissue Bill, the proposed Health Information Bill176 or 
any proposal, for example, to regulate access to sunbeds for those under 18.  
2.154 The Commission accordingly recommends that, having regard to 
the general principles already set out in this Report, the proposed legislative 
framework on health care treatment should provide that, in general, a person 
who is 16 or 17 years of age is presumed, in the context of any potential civil 
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liability, to have capacity to consent to, and refuse, health care treatment, as 
already defined in this Report; that this capacity is as effective as it would be if 
he or she were of full age, that is 18 years of age; that the presumption of 
capacity is subject to contrary evidence that the person lacks capacity; and that 
where a 16 or 17 year old has given such an effective consent to, or refused, 
any such treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it, or 
refusal of consent for it, from his or her parent or guardian. The Commission 
also recommends that this is subject to certain other existing legislative limits 
and requirements, including existing requirements in, for example, the Control 
of Clinical Trials Act 1987, the European Communities (Clinical Trials on 
Medicinal Products for Human Use) Regulations 2004,177 the Child Care Act 
1991 and the Mental Health Act 2001. The Commission also recommends that 
this should also have regard to planned legislation, such as the proposed 
Human Tissue Bill, the proposed Health Information Bill or any proposal, for 
example, to regulate access to sunbeds for those under 18.  
2.155 The Commission recommends that, having regard to the general 
principles already set out in this Report, the proposed legislative framework on 
health care treatment should provide that, in general, a person who is 16 or 17 
years of age is presumed, in the context of any potential civil liability, to have 
capacity to consent to, and refuse, health care treatment, as already defined in 
this Report; that this capacity is as effective as it would be if he or she were of 
full age, that is 18 years of age; that the presumption of capacity is subject to 
contrary evidence that the person lacks capacity; and that where a 16 or 17 
year old has given such an effective consent to, or refused, any such treatment 
it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it, or refusal of consent for it, 
from his or her parent or guardian. The Commission also recommends that this 
is subject to certain other existing legislative limits and requirements, including 
existing requirements in, for example, the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987, the 
European Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use) 
Regulations 2004, the Child Care Act 1991 and the Mental Health Act 2001. 
The Commission also recommends that this should also have regard to planned 
legislation, such as the proposed Human Tissue Bill, the proposed Health 
Information Bill or any proposal, for example, to regulate access to sunbeds for 
those under 18.  
(3) Refusal of life-sustaining treatment by a 16 and 17 year old  
2.156 It is important to state that, in the majority of situations where a 16 
and 17 year old either consents to or refuses treatment, the consequences of 
such a decision are not life threatening. The Commission accepts that while, in 
general, consent and refusal should be treated similarly, additional 
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considerations need to be taken into account where life-sustaining treatment is 
refused.  
2.157 In this respect, the Commission notes that, in its 2006 Report on 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law,178 the Commission recommended that the issue 
of life sustaining treatment concerning persons over 18 years of age should be 
subject to specific statutory rules. Equally, in its 2009 Report on Bioethics: 
Advance Care Directives,179 the Commission concluded that advance care 
directives involving refusal of life-sustaining treatment should involve specific 
treatment. This reflects the Commission‟s general approach that the law in this 
area should operate on the basis of a presumption in favour of life, and this in 
turn is derived from the important and high status given to the right to life in the 
Constitution of Ireland and, indeed, in international human rights documents 
such as Article 2 of the Council of Europe‟s 1950 Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.  
2.158 This approach is also consistent with the approach taken in the 
Canadian cases discussed above and in the legislative provisions in other 
countries where this matter has been specifically addressed, as also discussed 
above. These cases and legislative provisions involve an assessment of the 
capacity of a person under 18, and they then apply an objective best interests 
standard in a way which ensures that the judgement of a child‟s best interests is 
informed in a real and meaningful way by the voice of the child. 
2.159 In the current project and Report, the Commission reiterates this 
approach, and therefore recommends that in cases where an individual under 
the age of 18 refuses life sustaining treatment, an application should be made 
to the High Court to adjudicate on the refusal. In such a case, the High Court 
could intervene to order treatment that is necessary to save life and where this 
is in the best interests of the young person. In the event of such an application, 
the Commission also recommends that the person under 18 shall be separately 
represented. 
2.160 The Commission recommends that, in the context of refusal of life 
sustaining treatment by a person under the age of 18, an application may be 
made to the High Court to determine the validity of the refusal. The High Court 
may order treatment that is necessary to save life and where this is in the best 
interests of the person under 18 years of age. The Commission also 
recommends that in any such application the person under 18 shall be 
separately represented.  
 
                                                     
178  (LRC 83-2006). 
179  (LRC 94-2009). 
 96 
(4) Advance care directives by 16 and 17 year olds 
2.161 In the 2009 Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives the 
Commission defined the term “advance care directive” as the advance 
expression of wishes by a person, at a time when they have the capacity to 
express their wishes, about certain treatment that might arise at a future time 
when they no longer have the capacity to express their wishes.180 The 
Commission recommended in the 2009 Report that, consistently with the 
Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Principles Concerning Continuing 
Powers of Attorney and Advance Directives for Incapacity,181 a legislative 
framework for advance care directives for those aged 18 and over should be 
enacted in the context of proposed mental capacity legislation. The Commission 
also noted that advance care directives are not restricted to end-of-life settings 
but can also arise in a continuing-life setting.182 In addition, it is important to 
point out that advance care directives be seen in the wider setting of overall 
health care planning (which is not confined to consent to or refusal of medical 
treatment), particularly in the context of children and young people dealing with 
long term illness.  
2.162 The Commission reiterates here the view expressed in the 
Consultation Paper that those under 18 with capacity should not be denied the 
opportunity to engage fully in healthcare planning by way of making an advance 
care directive. In light of the general approach taken above concerning 16 and 
17 year olds, the Commission has concluded, and recommends, that a 16 and 
17 year old should be presumed to have capacity to make an advance care 
directive. The Commission also reaffirms the view it expressed in the 
Consultation Paper that an assessment of a minor and young person by a 
trained and experienced health care professional is crucial in determining 
capacity, rather than assuming capacity – or lack of capacity – purely on the 
basis of age. As the literature on child development discussed in Chapter 1 
illustrates, one cannot disregard the experience of an individual in respect of the 
particular healthcare decision. In that respect the literature supports the view 
that personal experience and understanding are relevant and often 
determinative of a particular child or young person‟s ability to understand and 
make informed decisions regarding his or her health care. This point was 
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echoed in a number of submissions received by the Commission, which 
stressed the importance of the individual‟s particular experience and capacity to 
make an advance care directive. 
2.163 The Commission therefore recommends that the legislation proposed 
in this Report should provide that a 16 or 17 year old is presumed to have 
capacity to make an advance care directive. The Commission also recommends 
that where an advance care directive is being considered by or for a 16 and 17 
year old a specific assessment be made by a trained and experienced health 
care professional of that person‟s capacity to understand the nature and 
consequences of the advance care directive. 
2.164 The Commission recommends that the legislation proposed in this 
Report should provide that a 16 or 17 year old is presumed to have capacity to 
make an advance care directive. The Commission also recommends that where 
an advance care directive is being considered by or for a 16 and 17 year old a 
specific assessment be made by a trained and experienced health care 
professional of that person’s capacity to understand the nature and 
consequences of the advance care directive.  
(5) Persons under 16 and health care treatment  
2.165 The Commission has already noted that the decisions of the 
Supreme Court in McK v Information Commissioner183 and of the High Court in 
D v Brennan and Ors184 recognise that a mature minor under the age of 16 is 
capable, under Irish law, of making significant health care decisions as an 
independent rights holder. This reflects the general principle stated by Walsh J 
in G v An Bord Uchtála185 that the rights of children are “independent of any 
right of the parent as such.” This approach is also seen in specific statutory 
provisions that have regard to the “maturity and understanding” of a child, such 
as the provisions discussed in the Child Care Act 1991 and the Adoption Act 
2010.  
2.166 This approach in Irish law is consistent with the reality of the growing 
maturity of children as they reach adolescence and early adulthood, which is 
reflected in the general literature in this area discussed by the Commission in 
Chapter 1. It is also clear that, in this respect, Irish law reflects developments in 
other countries, including the views expressed in 1969 in the English case 
                                                     
183  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260, discussed at 
paragraph 1.65ff, above. 
184  D v Brennan and Ors High Court, 9 May 2007, discussed in paragraph 2.31ff, 
above. 
185
   G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32 at 69. 
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Hewer v Bryant186 that the authority of parents in respect of their children “starts 
with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.” The generality of 
that statement has given rise to the development of the “mature minor” test in 
decisions such as those of the UK House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority187 and of the Supreme Court of Canada in AC v 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services).188 The more recent decisions, 
such as the Canadian decision AC case, have also specifically taken into 
account the relevant international human rights standards in this area, notably 
the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 
2.167 The Commission reiterates here its view that, in general, the law should 
apply a functional test of capacity to those under 18. The Commission 
considers, however, that a presumption of capacity should not apply to those 
under 16, so that it is necessary to clarify how to assess the maturity and 
understanding of those individuals. In this respect, the Commission 
acknowledges that the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Professional Conduct 
and Ethics189 provides a useful starting point. As already noted, the 2009 Guide, 
though necessarily confined to providing guidance to doctors, reflects in general 
terms the current law as set out in the Irish decisions already referred to, such 
as the G, McK and D cases, which in turn reflect the provisions on the family in 
Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution and in the relevant international standards 
already discussed in this Report. Thus, the 2009 Guide correctly identifies that 
the “usual” position is that parents should be asked for their consent, but that in 
“exceptional circumstances” the doctor would “encourage” the under 16 year old 
to involve their parents, bearing in mind the doctor‟s “paramount responsibility 
to act in the patient‟s best interests.” While this general guidance is useful, the 
Commission notes that it does not provide specific guidance on the nature of 
the “best interests” test. Nor does it refer to a maturity test, which as the 
Commission has already noted is currently part of Irish law (through both the 
case law and legislation already noted in this Report). 
2.168 As the Commission has already noted, in a 2009 study of GPs in 
Ireland,190 it is clear that, in the absence of detailed professional guidance, the 
                                                     
186  [1969] 3 All ER 578, at 582. 
187  [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
188  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181. 
189  Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics (7
th
 ed, 2009), 
available at www.medicalcouncil.ie.  
190  McMahon et al, “The Prescribing of Contraception and Emergency Contraception 
to Girls Aged Less than 16 – What are the Views and Beliefs of GPs and of 
Parents?” (2010) 16, 2 MLJI 91, discussed at paragraph 2.50, above. 
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“Fraser Guidelines” from the Gillick case are viewed as persuasive guidance by 
a significant number of GPs and healthcare practitioners. Since the “Fraser 
Guidelines” have formed the basis for the authoritative guidance documents 
published in England and Wales (1986 and 2004), Northern Ireland (2003) and 
Scotland (2006), discussed above, it is not surprising that health care 
professionals in Ireland would be influenced by these developments. The 
Commission notes that while the “Fraser Guidelines” provide helpful and 
detailed criteria for assessing maturity and related matters, they are restricted to 
the specific issue that arose in the Gillick case, namely, the provision of 
contraception. By contrast, the authoritative guidance documents from other 
countries discussed above involve an analysis of issues of capacity, maturity 
and best interests in the broader context of heath care decision-making 
generally, and also against the background of the relevant international human 
rights standards that have developed since the mid 1980s. In this respect, the 
Commission notes that more recent analysis, such as that by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services),191 
provides a more complete reference point for the development of guiding 
principles in this area. 
2.169 The Commission has already set out in Chapter 1 the relevant 
general guiding principles that apply to this area, in particular the inter-
relationship between the rights of children, the rights of parents and guardians 
and the application of a rights-based “best interests” test. In addition, the 
Commission considers that the “sliding scale” referred to by the Canadian 
decision in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)192 is 
especially relevant in the context of persons under the age of 16 because the 
interpretation of what is in the best interests of a person under 16 is aided by 
the sliding scale approach. This means that there is a scale of scrutiny or 
analysis against which a child‟s best interests is measured. The maturity of the 
child and the decision to be made are both factors which are fed into the sliding 
scale. In Ireland, as the Commission has already noted, the Supreme Court in 
McK v Information Commissioner193 has recognised that the views of the person 
under 16 become increasingly determinative as he or she matures so that the 
greater the child‟s level of maturity the greater the weight granted to the child‟s 
views. This is balanced against the specific decision to be made, because the 
more serious the nature of the decision and the more severe its potential impact 
                                                     
191  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181. 
192  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181. 
193  [2004] IEHC 4, [2004] 1 IR 12; [2006] IESC 2, [2006] 1 IR 260, discussed at 
paragraph 1.65ff, above. 
 100 
on the health and well being of the child, the greater the degree of scrutiny 
required. 
2.170 Consistently with this approach, and in light of the submissions 
received since the publication of the Consultation Paper, the Commission has 
also concluded that, for those under the age of 16, the law should not set out a 
detailed, prescriptive, legislative framework that would differentiate between, for 
example, those aged 14 and 15 and those under the age of 14. In this respect, 
the Commission agrees with the submissions received that the suggestion in 
the Consultation Paper that a distinction might be drawn between those aged 
14 and 15, on the one hand, and those under 14, on the other hand,194 would 
not be practicable and would, rather, run the risk of leading to increased 
complexity for all those involved in this area, whether those under 16, their 
parents or guardians as well as professional heath care providers. In preparing 
this Report, the Commission also accepts that such a prescriptive approach, in 
which age rather than maturity was the determining factor, does not reflect the 
literature on child development (which the Commission discussed in Chapter 1) 
and the reality of gradual maturing and understanding during adolescence.  
2.171 The Commission has therefore concluded, and recommends, that 
for those under 16, a non-prescriptive approach be taken in which the proposed 
legislative framework should not include a presumption of capacity for those 
under 16, but should provide that he or she may consent to, and refuse, health 
care treatment where it is established that the person under 16 has the maturity 
and understanding to appreciate the nature and consequences of the specific 
health care treatment decision. The Commission also recommends that, in the 
case of health care treatment involving those under 16, the usual situation 
should be that parents or guardians, who have the primary responsibility for the 
upbringing and development of children (as provided for in Article 42.1 of the 
Constitution and Article 18 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC)), are involved in the decision-making process. The Commission 
also recommends that the person under 16 should be encouraged and advised 
to communicate with and involve his or her parents or guardians, as already 
provided for in the Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics.195 The Commission therefore also recommends that it is only in 
“exceptional” circumstances (the term used in Article 42.5 of the Constitution, 
and in authoritative published guidance such as the 2003 Northern Ireland 
                                                     
194  See in particular the provisional recommendations in the Consultation Paper, at 
paragraphs 4.127 (14 and 15 year olds) and 4.128 (12 and 13 year olds).  
195  Medical Council‟s 2009 Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics (7
th
 ed, 2009), 
available at www.medicalcouncil.ie.  
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Reference Guide to Consent for Examination, Treatment or Care,196 discussed 
above), and having regard to the need to take account of an objective 
assessment of both the rights and the best interests of the person under 16, 
that health care treatment would be provided for those under 16 without the 
knowledge or consent of parents or guardians.  
2.172 The Commission also recommends that the “sliding scale” test and 
the 7 specific factors identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2009 in AC v 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)197 should also be incorporated 
into the proposed statutory framework. As the discussion of the AC in this 
Report illustrates, the analysis by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2009 took 
account of relevant international human rights standards that have been put in 
place in recent years, notably the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. This rights-based approach also reflects the Commission‟s approach, 
which is itself consistent with the law in Ireland on the respective rights of 
children and parents already discussed in this Report. The approach in the AC 
case has adopted a more wide-ranging analysis when compared with the 
limited scope of the circumstances that the UK House of Lords were required to 
deal with in 1985 in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority.198 
In that respect, the analysis in the AC case reinforces the reality that the 
“mature minor” rule is more wide-ranging in scope than the prescribing of the 
contraceptive pill. Indeed, in 1969, an early version of the “mature minor” rule 
was applied by the English Court of Appeal in Hewer v Bryant199 in the context 
of the application of limitation periods in a personal injuries claim.  
2.173 The Commission accordingly recommends that the proposed 
legislative framework should provide that, in determining whether a minor under 
16 has the maturity and capacity to consent to, and to refuse, health care 
treatment as already defined in this Report, the following factors should be 
taken into account:  
(a) whether he or she has sufficient maturity to understand the 
information relevant to making the decision and to appreciate its 
potential consequences; 
(b) whether his or her views are stable and a true reflection of his or her 
core values and beliefs, taking into account his or her physical and 
                                                     
196  Available at http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk.  
197  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181. 
198  [1985] UKHL 7, [1985] 3 All ER 402.  
199  [1969] 3 All ER 578.  
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mental health and any other factors that affect his or her ability to 
exercise independent judgement; 
(c) the nature, purpose and utility of the treatment; 
(d) the risks and benefits involved in the treatment, and 
(e) any other specific welfare, protection or public health considerations, 
in respect of which relevant guidance and protocols such as the 2011 
Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of 
Children (or any equivalent replacement document)200 must be applied.  
2.174 The Commission recommends that the proposed legislative 
framework should not include a presumption of capacity for those under 16, but 
should provide that a person under 16 may consent to, and refuse, health care 
treatment where it is established that he or she has the maturity and 
understanding to appreciate the nature and consequences of the specific health 
care treatment decision. The Commission also recommends that, in the case of 
health care treatment involving those under 16, the usual situation should be 
that parents or guardians, who have the primary responsibility for the upbringing 
and development of children, are involved in the decision-making process; that 
the person under 16 should be encouraged and advised to communicate with 
and involve his or her parents or guardians; and that, therefore, it is only in 
exceptional circumstances, and having regard to the need to take account of an 
objective assessment of both the rights and the best interests of the person 
under 16, that health care treatment would be provided for those under 16 
without the knowledge or consent of parents or guardians. 
2.175 The Commission also recommends that the proposed legislative 
framework should provide that, in determining whether a person under 16 has 
the maturity and capacity to consent to, and to refuse, health care treatment as 
already defined in this Report, the following factors are to be taken into account:  
(a) whether he or she has sufficient maturity to understand the 
information relevant to making the specific decision and to appreciate 
its potential consequences; 
                                                     
200  In July 2011, the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs launched the revised 
2011 Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of 
Children and indicated that these would be placed on a statutory footing: The Irish 
Times 16 July 2011. The Minister for Justice and Equality also published in July 
2011 the Scheme of a Criminal Justice (Withholding Information on Crimes 
against Children and Vulnerable Adults) Bill 2011, which would, if enacted, 
require reporting of allegations of child sexual abuse.  
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(b) whether his or her views are stable and a true reflection of his or her 
core values and beliefs, taking into account his or her physical and 
mental health and any other factors that affect his or her ability to 
exercise independent judgement; 
(c) the nature, purpose and utility of the treatment; 
(d) the risks and benefits involved in the treatment, and 
(e) any other specific welfare, protection or public health considerations, 
in respect of which relevant guidance and protocols such as the 2011 
Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of 
Children (or any equivalent replacement document) must be applied. 
(6) Defence of good faith 
2.176 The Commission emphasises that the proposed statutory 
framework, including the guiding principles set out in Chapter 1 and the specific 
matters set out in this Part, should be facilitative. This is consistent with the 
Commission‟s approach it its 2009 Report on Bioethics: Advance Care 
Directives.201 It means that the proposed statutory framework is intended to 
clarify the position of all those involved in the process – those under 18, 
parents, guardians and professionals – and that health care professionals who 
act in good faith should not be at risk of any civil liability. Indeed, the risk of 
potential civil liability was referred to in the 2009 study of Irish GPs discussed 
above.202 In this respect, and having regard to the submissions received since 
the publication of the Consultation Paper, the Commission has concluded, and 
therefore recommends, that the proposed statutory framework should include, 
in respect of potential civil liability, a defence of good faith for health care 
practitioners who treat children and young people under 18 years of age. 
Section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 already 
provides a comparable defence in terms of criminal liability. The Commission 
recommends that the defence would apply to a health care practitioner who, 
acting in good faith and exercising due diligence, makes a decision to provide 
medical treatment, or a decision to withhold medical treatment, in respect of a 
child or a young person under 18 years of age. The Commission also 
recommends that acting in good faith and exercising due diligence would be 
defined as where the health care professional acts consistently with the general 
principles and specific matters, including as to assessment of capacity of those 
under 16, in the proposed statutory framework. 
                                                     
201  See Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives (LRC 94-2009), Chapter 4. 
202  McMahon et al, “The Prescribing of Contraception and Emergency Contraception 
to Girls Aged Less than 16 – What are the Views and Beliefs of GPs and of 
Parents?” (2010) 16, 2 MLJI 91. 
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2.177 The Commission recommends that the proposed statutory 
framework should include, in respect of potential civil liability, a defence of good 
faith for health care practitioners who treat children and young people under 18 
years of age. The Commission recommends that the defence would apply to a 
health care practitioner who, acting in good faith and exercising due diligence, 
makes a decision to provide medical treatment, or a decision to withhold 
medical treatment, in respect of a child or a young person under 18 years of 
age. The Commission also recommends that acting in good faith and exercising 
due diligence would be defined as where the health care professional acts 
consistently with the general principles and specific matters, including as to 
assessment of capacity of those under 16, in the proposed statutory framework. 
(7) Statutory Code of Practice 
2.178 The Commission has already noted in the Introduction to this 
Report203 that, ideally, through informed discussion and participation by all those 
involved – those under 18, parents, guardians and health care professionals – 
practical solutions and consensus can be reached that respect the rights and 
interests of all those involved. When this is not possible, however, it is important 
to have in place a clear statutory framework. Given the complexities of the 
issues raised, which is clear from the discussion in this Report, the proposed 
statutory framework cannot provide definitive solutions to all the moral, legal, 
ethical and public policy questions involved.  
2.179 It is clear that, in the countries surveyed in Part C, there is a 
recognised need to supplement any general legislative framework with 
guidance material to provide detailed guidelines that concern situations that 
arise in clinical practice. The Commission notes that, in its 2006 Report on 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law,
204
 which contained a draft Scheme of a Mental 
Capacity Bill, the Commission proposed that a statutory Code of Practice 
should be prepared and published for the purpose of providing practical 
guidance on, for example, the application in practice of the presumption of 
capacity and related matters. Similarly, the Commission reiterated this approach 
in its 2009 Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives205 concerning 
guidance as to the applicability and validity of advance care directives. In the 
context of this Report, a statutory Code of Practice would provide detailed 
guidance on complex issues of consent, refusal and confidentiality, allowing 
health care professionals to treat children and young people in a manner which 
recognises their rights and those of their parents and guardians, while also 
                                                     
203  See paragraph 15 of the Introduction to the Report, above.  
204  (LRC 83-2006). 
205  See Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives (LRC 94-2009), Chapter 4. 
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enabling the practitioner to work in a manner which is consistent with relevant 
ethics frameworks.  
2.180 It is important to note that complex medical situations involve 
circumstances which are specific and personal to the particular individual with 
the particular medical concern. As the many court decisions surveyed in this 
Report indicate, there are a range of complex medical and ethical issues which 
patients and healthcare professionals face on a daily basis, for example the 
refusal of blood products, the treatment of anorexia, the dilemmas faced by 
patients coping with a terminal illness – these examples reflect the diversity and 
difficulty inherent in health care decision making, which is more pronounced 
when the patient concerned is under 18 years of age. In this respect, the 
Commission notes that a number of models exist on which to base any Code of 
Practice, such as the Guides developed in Northern Ireland (2003), England 
and Wales (2004) and Scotland (2006) that have been referred to and 
discussed in Part C, above. The Commission notes that a guide such as the 
2003 Northern Ireland Reference Guide to Consent for Examination, Treatment 
or Care206 has the advantage of providing wide-ranging guidance on health care 
treatment both for those over 18 and those under 18 within the general context 
of a reformed law on mental capacity.  
2.181 In addition to providing needed practical guidance, another 
advantage associated with such Codes of Practice is that they may be regularly 
revised, and thus provide an up to date guide to health care practice and ethics, 
without the need to amend the legislative framework.  
2.182 The Commission accordingly recommends that the Minister for 
Health and the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs should establish a broad-
based Working Group which would assist the Ministers in preparing a Code of 
Practice in this area. The Commission does not intend to set out a prescriptive 
list of those who might be members of such a Working Group or who would be 
consulted in preparing the Code of Practice, but clearly it would need to involve 
a wide range of bodies. Those involved or consulted could include, for example, 
the Medical Council, the Irish College of General Practitioners, the Irish College 
of Psychiatry, the Mental Health Commission, An Bord Altranais, the Dental 
Council, the National Parents Council, the HSE Crisis Pregnancy Programme, 
the Ombudsman for Children, Headstrong (the National Centre for Youth Mental 
Health) and Barnardos.  
2.183 As with the possible membership of the Working Group that would 
assist in preparing the Code of Practice, the Commission does not intend to set 
out a prescriptive list of the range of health care treatment settings on which 
guidance should be provided. It is sufficient to note that it would involve both 
                                                     
206  Available at http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk.  
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physical and mental health care settings. It could, therefore, provide guidance 
on:  
 dental care and treatment  
 eye care and treatment 
 over-the-counter medicine of specific relevance to adolescents, such as 
products related to skin conditions 
 prescription for antibiotics  
 prescription for contraception 
 advice and counselling on general health and development   
 counselling and treatment concerning mental health  
 prescription for anti-depressants 
 admission to approved mental health care centre 
 X ray  
 surgery and treatment related to a broken arm 
 surgery for removal of the appendix  
 surgery and treatment connected to cancer 
 surgery and treatment connected with a chronic condition such as 
cystic fibrosis and 
 paediatric research and clinical trials.  
2.184 The Commission has concluded, and therefore recommends, that 
the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs, in consultation with the Minister for 
Health, should establish a broad-based Working Group which would assist the 
Minister in preparing and publishing a Code of Practice based on the principles 
in the proposed statutory framework. The Commission also recommends that 
the Code of Practice would provide detailed guidance as to the application of 
the proposed statutory framework in the context of all forms of health care and 
treatment settings as already defined in this Report.  
2.185 The Commission recommends that the Minister for Children and 
Youth Affairs, in consultation with the Minister for Health, should establish a 
broad-based Working Group which would assist the Minister in preparing and 
publishing a Code of Practice based on the principles in the proposed statutory 
framework. The Commission also recommends that the Code of Practice would 
provide detailed guidance as to the application of the proposed statutory 
framework in the context of all forms of health care and treatment settings as 
already defined in this Report. 
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3  
CHAPTER 3 MENTAL HEALTH 
A Introduction 
3.01 In this chapter the Commission discusses issues of capacity and 
healthcare decision-making involving children and young people who engage 
with mental health services. The Commission notes that the general principles 
and detailed recommendations set out in Chapters 1 and 2 also apply in the 
context of mental health provision. In this Chapter, the Commission‟s discussion 
does not deal with mental health law in general, but focuses primarily on the 
admissions process under the Mental Health Act 2001. The Commission notes 
that the Programme for Government 2011 to 2016 proposes a general review of 
the Mental Health Act 2001 and the Commission considers that the 
recommendations made in this Chapter could form part of that general review.1 
Part B contains a brief overview of the extent of mental health issues involving 
children and young people in Ireland and the appropriateness of available 
services. Part C examines the rights of children and young people in the context 
of mental health legislation and service provision. Part D discusses the 
provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 as they relate to children and young 
people, including its shortcomings in this respect. Part E contains the 
Commission‟s recommendations for reform of the Mental Health Act 2001 as it 
applies to children and young people, which includes recommending the 
introduction of a new category of “intermediate” admission and treatment.  
B Mental Health Issues and Appropriate Mental Health Services 
3.02 The extent of mental health issues involving children and young 
people was discussed in detail in the Consultation Paper, drawing on 
information and statistics from a range of reports and research papers. Mental 
health issues were also raised by many children and young people with whom 
the Commission consulted.2  
                                                     
1  For this reason, the Commission‟s recommendations in this Chapter have been 
incorporated into the Outline Scheme of a Mental Health (Amendment) Bill in 
Appendix B of this Report.   
2   (LRC CP 59-2009) at 1.59 
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(1) The range of mental health issues  
3.03 Submissions received by the Commission from young people have 
highlighted mental health as a subject of particular concern, stating that not 
enough information and support is available in this area. Young people have 
emphasised that relevant legislation ought to look at the issue of mental health 
from a young person‟s perspective, and should aim to protect the young person, 
taking their best interests into consideration. 
3.04 A submission received by the Commission suggested that a child or 
young person with experience of mental illness be represented on the Mental 
Health Commission. The Commission agrees that the experience and views of 
the child or young person would add greatly to the work of the Mental Health 
Commission. This is discussed in more detail below. 
3.05 Children of any age can suffer from a mental illness or mental 
health difficulties, but adolescence is a typical time for the development of such 
problems. Headstrong, the National Centre for Youth Mental Health, has 
estimated that in Ireland, at any given time, one in five young people are 
experiencing serious emotional distress. 
“Young people experiencing mental health difficulties often imagine 
that everyone else is somehow managing to cope and that they are 
in some way different or weird for feeling the way they do. The reality 
is that mental health problems are a lot more common in young 
people than most of us realise.”3 
3.06 Adolescent mental distress and concerns can have long term 
implications. The 2008 Annual Report of the Child and Adolescent Mental 
Health Services (CAMHS) stated that the majority of illnesses borne in 
childhood, and particularly in adolescence, is caused by mental disorders. 
Furthermore, the majority of adult mental health disorders have their onset in 
adolescence.4 The Report also stated that the prevalence of mental health 
disorders in young people is increasing with time.5 
3.07 The high rates of suicide in Ireland have been well documented, with 
suicide considered as the leading cause of death amongst young people.6 
There is a strong link between suicide and self harm, as engaging in self harm 
is the strongest predictor of future suicidal behaviour. The 2008 Report of the 
                                                     
3  Bates et al Someone to Turn To Someone to Talk To (Headstrong 2009) at 16. 
4  Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services: First Annual Report 2008 (Health 
Service Executive 2009) at 6. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Bates et al Someone to Turn To Someone to Talk To (Headstrong 2009) at 18.  
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National Registry of Deliberate Self Harm Ireland revealed a total of 11,700 
presentations to hospitals in Ireland, an increase of 6% from 2007 figures.7  
These figures do not include the numbers of people who engage in self harm 
without receiving medical attention. 
3.08 Deliberate self harm is largely confined to younger age groups, 
particularly young women. The peak rate for self-harm in relation to age and 
gender is found amongst young women aged 15-19.8 The 2008 Report found 
that one in every 156 adolescent girls were treated in hospital as a result of 
deliberate self harm. The Report also found an increase in deliberate self harm 
amongst boys and girls aged 10-14 years.9 
(2) Appropriate service provision 
3.09 It is clear that children and young people need appropriate, high-
quality, accessible mental health services to help them cope with such 
concerns. At a local level there is a need for a holistic, community-based 
approach to the prevention of mental health problems. A vital aspect of health 
care for adolescents is simply to have access to a reliable person to confide in 
and talk to about their difficulties and health concerns. This is particularly 
important in relation to mental health difficulties such as depression, insecurity 
and low self-esteem. The importance of GPs as an early point of contact, 
offering opportunities for timely intervention and treatment, was documented in 
the National Strategy for Action on Suicide Prevention.10 Moreover, the 2008 
Annual Report of the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) 
revealed that the vast majority of referrals come from general practitioners.11  
                                                     
7  National Registry of Deliberate Self Harm Ireland: Annual Report 2008 (National 
Suicide Research Foundation) at i. 
8  National Office for Suicide Prevention Annual Report 2008 (Health Service 
Executive) at 28, National Office for Suicide Prevention Annual Report 2006 
(Health Service Executive) at 26. 
9  National Registry of Deliberate Self Harm Ireland: Annual Report 2008 (National 
Suicide Research Foundation) at i. 
10  Reach Out: National Strategy for Action on Suicide Prevention 2005-2014 (Health 
Service Executive 2005) at 31. 
11  In 2008, 76.6 % of referrals were from general practitioners and child health 
services, 9.4% of referrals were from educational services, 5.6% were from 
primary care services, 3.2% of referrals were from social services, 2.7% of 
referrals were self referrals and 2.4% of referrals were from other sources. Child 
and Adolescent Mental Health Services: First Annual Report 2008 (Health 
Service Executive 2009) at 14.  
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3.10 As discussed in the Consultation Paper, children as young as 13 
have availed of addiction services. Alcoholism is a huge problem in Irish 
society, and children who become addicted to alcohol from an early age often 
do not have adequate support from parents and family, particularly if there is a 
family history of alcohol abuse.  
3.11 People from all social classes and backgrounds can develop a 
mental health disorder but certain young people may be particularly at risk due 
to a history of mental illness, family breakdown, abuse, learning disability, 
bereavement or substance abuse.12 Children and young people sometimes face 
a clash of personalities and attitudes in their home and familial environment, 
leading to disruptive behaviour and the consequent development of mental 
health problems. Disruptive and aggressive behaviour, however, can be the 
product of intolerance and hostility rather than an inherent mental health issue. 
This is particularly relevant in light of concerns raised by the Mental Health 
Commission with regard to behaviourally disturbed children who come under 
the auspices of the Mental Health Act 2001 as opposed to the Children Act 
2001. These children may be disruptive, hostile and in need of expert care and 
supervision but this does not mean that they should be placed in the mental 
health system.13 It has been suggested that the provisions of the Children Act 
2001 on family welfare conferences could be utilised in such circumstances to 
guard against the unnecessary and unsuitable placement of children in the 
mental health system.14 The Mental Health Commission‟s Annual Report 2009 
drew attention to the practice, stating: 
“We are concerned by the occupation of scarce CAMH [Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health] beds by individuals with no diagnosable 
mental disorder often with social problems „with nowhere to go‟. This 
is inappropriate and potentially damaging to these individuals as well 
as depriving others of needed beds.”15 
3.12 A number of commentators have discussed appropriate and 
beneficial responses to youth mental health and recommended the introduction 
or improvement of different mental health services. It is widely acknowledged 
that mental health services are not meeting current demand and there are 
                                                     
12  Get Connected: Developing an Adolescent Friendly Health Service (National 
Conjoint Child Health Committee 2001) at 23. 
13  Mental Health Commission Response to the Law Reform Consultation Paper on 
Children and the Law: Medical Treatment (2010) at 10. 
14  Part 2 of the Children Act 2001. 
15  Annual Report 2009: Book One Part Two (Mental Health Commission 2010) at 
83. 
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considerable gaps in service provision.16 In 2009, the Mental Health 
Commission stated that Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 
(CAMHS), which has responsibility for providing services to all children up to 18 
years of age, were at that time not in a position to fulfil their obligations.17 
Community facilities such as day hospitals and clinics were at that time 
inadequate, and waiting for an appointment could take over a year.18 The 
CAMHS Annual Report 2008 served to confirm this as it revealed that only 54 of 
the recommended 99 CAMH teams were then in place, and staff numbers in 49 
community teams were below recommended levels. There was also a 
significant variation in the distribution and disciplinary composition of the 
workforce across teams and regions with 18 teams rating their premises as 
inadequate or totally unsuitable.19  
3.13 One of the key failings in respect of necessary mental health services 
for children and adolescents is the shortage of approved centres for in-patient 
treatment which has led to the practice of treating young people, as young as 
11 years of age, in adult psychiatric wards.20 The Mental Health Commission 
referred to this practice as: 
“inexcusable, counter-therapeutic and almost purely custodial in that 
clinical supervision is provided by teams unqualified in child and 
adolescent psychiatry.21 
3.14 In 2009, the Mental Health Commission published an addendum to 
the Code of Practice relating to the admission of children under the Mental 
                                                     
16
  See Lynch et al “Challenging Times: Prevalence of psychiatric disorders and 
suicidal behaviours in Irish adolescents” (2006) 29 Journal of Adolescence 570; 
Kilkelly Children’s Rights in Ireland (Tottel Publishing 2008) at 433; “Mental 
Health Services still do not reflect new policies” The Irish Times 15 May 2009; 
and “Major gaps still exist in psychiatric teen services” The Irish Times 31 March 
2009. 
17  Annual Report 2008: Book One Part Two (Mental Health Commission 2009) at 
63. 
18  Annual Report 2008: Book One Part Two (Dublin: Mental Health Commission 
2009) at 63. 
19  Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services: First Annual Report 2008 (Health 
Service Executive 2009) at 24. 
20  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 6.18. See Report of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals for 
year ending 2003 (Dept of Health and Children 2004) at 25. 
21  Annual Report 2008: Book One Part One (Mental Health Commission 2009) at 
29. 
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Health Act 2001, aimed at phasing out the admission of children and 
adolescents to adult units and centres. By December 2011 no child under 18 
years of age should be admitted to an adult unit in an approved centre, save in 
exceptional circumstances. Regarding children and adolescents who live a 
considerable distance away from the approved centres for children, it is 
probable that they will fall under the category of exceptional circumstances, and 
continue to be treated in local approved centres for adults (modified to address 
their particular needs) in order to remain close to family support.  
3.15 Such an admission should only take place in exceptional 
circumstances, where there is no available alternative. It should also be noted 
that it may in fact be for the benefit of the child or young person that he or she 
be admitted to a centre which is not geographically close to home, in 
circumstances where that child‟s problems begin at home or are exacerbated by 
the family home environment. The practice of placing children and young 
people in adult psychiatric wards and approved centres for adults represents a 
violation of the rights of children under a number of international instruments. In 
respect of age appropriate accommodation, the Council of Europe‟s 2000 White 
Paper on the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of People Suffering from a 
Mental Disorder refers specifically to the living conditions of minors, stating that 
they should be treated and reside in separate premises from those in which 
adults reside, unless this is against the interest of the minor in question.22 
Similarly, the 1991 UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental 
Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care also state that the 
environment and living conditions in mental health facilities shall be as close as 
possible to those of the normal life of persons of similar age.23 Article 29 of the 
2003 UN General Comment on Adolescent Health and Development focuses 
specifically on young people with mental illness, stating that in the event of 
hospitalisation or institutionalisation, adolescents should be separated from 
adults, where appropriate.24  
3.16 The Commission also notes that the English Mental Health Act 1983, 
as amended by the Mental Health Act 2007 (the amendments coming into effect 
                                                     
22  Council of Europe White Paper on the protection of human rights and dignity of 
people suffering from a mental disorder, especially those placed as involuntary 
patients in a psychiatric establishment (Council of Europe 2000) at 8.4 
23   Ibid at 13(2). 
24  Committee on the Rights of the Child “Adolescent health and development in the 
context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” (General Comment No 4 of 
2003 CRC/GC/2003/4 1 July 2003) at 29. 
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in 2010),25 has addressed concerns in relation to the negative experiences of 
young people placed on adult psychiatric wards. Section 131 of the 1983 Act, 
as amended, provides that children and young people under the age of 18 
should be accommodated in an age-appropriate environment, with access to 
physical and educational facilities in order to allow to their personal, social and 
educational development to continue. 
3.17 The Commission notes that, since 2009, considerable improvements 
have taken place in this aspect of the CAMH services. In its Annual Report 
2010,26 the Mental Health Commission pointed out that in 2010, 36% of 
admissions (155 admissions) were to adult units, which was a 24% decrease by 
comparison with 2009 (193 admissions). Similarly, there was a 65% increase in 
admissions of children to child units in 2010 by comparison with 2009.27 The 
Commission echoes the Mental Health Commission‟s welcome to and approval 
of these development, subject to this proviso: if a completely holistic approach 
to service provision is applied, it must also be asked whether hospital 
admission, even to an age-appropriate ward, is actually “appropriate” in its 
widest sense.  
3.18 In this respect, it has been noted in a 2010 Report for the Mental 
Health Commission that, for example, young people with drug and alcohol 
problems have been admitted to hospital inappropriately, leading sometimes “to 
inappropriate short term admissions that... in many other areas would be 
considered „social admissions,‟ more appropriately dealt with by social 
services.”28 The Commission also notes that any such “social admissions” are 
highly questionable in terms of the rights of children under the Constitution of 
Ireland and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In particular, 
they must give rise to questions as to whether they can be seen as conforming 
with an objective assessment of the best interests of the child or young person, 
as discussed in Chapter 1 of this Report. In the Commission‟s view, it is 
                                                     
25  The amendments made by the 2007 Act to the 1993 Act arose in part from a 
report published by the Children‟s Commissioner for England, which revealed 
widespread negative experiences of young people on adult psychiatric wards. 
See Pushed into the shadows - young people’s experiences of adult mental 
health facilities (Children‟s Commissioner for England, 2007). 
26  Annual Report 2010: Book One Part Two (Mental Health Commission 2011) at 
42. 
27  Ibid. at 43. 
28  See Bonnar, Report for the Mental Health Commission on Admission of Young 
People to Adult Mental Health Wards in the Republic of Ireland (Mental Health 
Commission, December 2010), at paragraph 2.4, available at www.mhcirl.ie.  
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imperative that a young person, going through an important stage of physical 
and mental development, receives appropriate treatment in its widest sense, 
encompassing family, school and community support – and, if suitable and 
appropriate, medical treatment (including treatment in hospital).  
C Rights of the Child in the Context of Mental Health Legislation 
3.19 In this Part, the Commission discusses some of the shortcomings of 
the Mental Health Act 2001 in respect of the protection of the individual rights of 
children and young people admitted and treated under the 2001 Act. 
3.20 One matter of concern is that there is no specific section of the 
Mental Health Act 2001 which relates specifically to persons under 18 years of 
age. This has led to confusion over which provisions are applicable to children 
and adults and which are applicable to adults only.29 To quote from the Mental 
Health Commission: 
“The provisions of the 2001 Act with regard to children need to be 
completely redrafted to take account of specific principles applying 
under human rights law and in national law. Children are being made 
to fit within the parameters of a law that was drafted with adults in 
mind.”30 
3.21 The Commission notes that the rights of children under Irish law, and 
relevant international human rights standards, as already discussed in this 
Report, are particularly relevant to the present discussion of the admission and 
treatment of children and young people under mental health legislation. The 
Mental Health Act 2001 contains no clear reference to the rights of children and 
young people who are patients under the 2001 Act. Section 4 of the 2001 Act 
does contain a statement of rights, but it is unclear whether this section has a 
broad application in respect of both children and adults: 
“(1) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or 
treatment of a person (including a decision to make an admission 
order in relation to a person), the best interests of the person shall be 
the principal consideration with due regard being given to the 
interests of other persons who may be at risk of serious harm if the 
decision is not made. 
                                                     
29  Sections 22, 59 and 69 have been noted in particular as causing considerable 
confusion. 
30  Mental Health Commission Response to the Law Reform Consultation Paper on 
Children and the Law: Medical Treatment (2010) at 34. 
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(2) Where it is proposed to make a recommendation or an admission 
order in respect of a person, or to administer treatment to a person, 
under this Act, the person shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
be notified of the proposal and be entitled to make any 
representations in relation to it and before deciding this matter due 
consideration shall be given to any representations duly made under 
this section. 
(3) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or 
treatment of a person (including a decision to make an admission 
order in relation to a person) due regard shall be given to the need to 
respect the right of the person to dignity, bodily integrity, autonomy 
and privacy.” 
3.22 The Mental Health Commission has stated that section 4 of the 
2001 Act should be interpreted as applying to both children and adults. 
However, as discussed in Part D below, it is clear that the specific rights and 
best interests of children and young people are not currently provided for 
specifically in the 2001 Act. Indeed, children and young people are not granted 
the opportunity to make decisions or representations in respect of their 
admission and treatment. Furthermore, there is no requirement to inform the 
child or young person, much less take their views into account, which seems to 
be at variance with section 4(2) of the 2001 Act. 
3.23 In the Commission‟s view, more concrete provisions outlining the 
rights of children and young people are necessary to ensure that these rights 
are upheld and protected. The principle of best interests, for example, is a 
fundamental cornerstone of children‟s rights and is an important element of the 
Commission‟s recommendations in respect of healthcare and the medical 
treatment of children and young people. As discussed in Chapter 1, an 
assessment of the best interests of a child should be informed by the views of 
the child. Furthermore, an interpretation of best interests must be carried out 
from a holistic viewpoint, encompassing emotional as well as physical well-
being, and to avoid the “social admissions” already mentioned. 
3.24 Recognition of the evolving capacities of children and young people, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, is another principle which must be respected in the 
context of mental health legislation. Articles 5 and 12 of the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) are particularly significant. 
Article 5 refers to the evolving capacities of children, and the responsibility of 
parents and others to continually adjust the levels of support and guidance 
offered to children, gradually enabling children to participate more in the 
realisation of their rights. Article 12 also carries an obligation to inform children, 
to ensure that they receive all the necessary advice and information to make a 
decision in their best interests. It is clear that the operation of the Mental Health 
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Act 2001 does not permit children and young people to realise their Article 12 
rights. As outlined below, all rights in respect of information, participation and 
decision making are vested entirely in the parents or guardians of the child or 
young person, or the District Court. 
3.25 Article 24 of the UNCRC refers to the rights of children in the context 
of healthcare provision, namely the right of the child to the highest attainable 
standard of health. Article 25 provides that State Parties: 
“recognise the right of a child who has been placed by the competent 
authorities for the purpose of care, protection or treatment of his or 
her physical or mental health, to a periodic review of the treatment 
provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or 
her placement”. 
3.26 Article 29 of the General Comment on Adolescent Health and 
Development builds on Article 24, focusing specifically on the treatment of 
adolescents with mental disorders, stating that the adolescent patient should be 
given the maximum possible opportunity to enjoy all his or her rights as 
recognised under the UNCRC.31 Also, State parties must ensure that 
adolescents have access to a personal representative other than a family 
member to represent their interests, where necessary and appropriate. This is 
discussed below, in light of the failure to represent and advocate for children 
and young people who are admitted and treated under the 2001 Act. 
3.27 As discussed below, the Mental Health Act 2001 is silent on the 
rights of children and young people to be informed and partake in discussions 
and decisions concerning their mental health. The development by the Mental 
Health Commission of the Headspace Toolkit is very important in this respect. 
The Toolkit is a guide aimed at providing age appropriate, accessible 
information to young people who are inpatients of mental health services. The 
Toolkit is written in a familiar, colloquial manner and covers essential topics 
such as the rights afforded to inpatients, what a patient may expect in terms of 
accommodation and treatment, and how a child or young person can speak out 
or make a complaint.  
3.28 Section 25 of the Mental Health Act 2001, which provides for the 
involuntary admission of children, is discussed below. For present purposes it is 
sufficient to state that section 25 does not contain any significant safeguards 
                                                     
31  Committee on the Rights of the Child “Adolescent health and development in the 
context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” (General Comment No 4 of 
2003 CRC/GC/2003/4 1 July 2003). 
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which would ensure that children and young persons who are involuntarily 
admitted and treated have access to information and representation.  
(1) Comparative mental health law  
3.29 A brief examination of mental health legislation in force in other 
countries serves to highlight the lack of attention paid to the rights of children 
and young people by the Mental Health Act 2001. Mental health legislation in 
many other countries, discussed below, places a higher emphasis on the 
capacity of children and young people (particularly those aged 16 and 17 years 
of age) to participate, either partially or fully in healthcare decision making.  
3.30 In England and Wales, the Code of Practice on the Mental Health 
Act 1983, updated in light of the Mental Health Act 2007, contains a detailed 
chapter on the admission and treatment of children and adolescents.32 The 
updated Code of Practice provides a clear and detailed overview of how mental 
health law in England has changed in order to respect and safeguard the rights 
of children and young people. Again, the Code refers to a number of principles, 
echoing those found in Australian legislation, discussed below. Fundamentally, 
the best interests of the child or young person must always be a significant 
consideration and their views, wishes and feelings should always be 
considered. Children and young people should also be kept as fully informed as 
possible, just as an adult would be, and should receive clear and detailed 
information concerning their care and treatment, explained in a way they can 
understand and in a format that is appropriate to their age. 
3.31 Similarly, Part 2 of the South Australia Mental Health Act 2009 
contains a list of objects and guiding principles, which state that services should 
take into account the different developmental stages of children and young 
persons; and that children and young persons should be cared for and treated 
separately from other patients as necessary to enable the care and treatment to 
be tailored to their different developmental stages. Patients should be provided 
with comprehensive information about their illnesses, orders that apply to them, 
their legal rights, the treatments and other services that are to be provided or 
offered to them and what alternatives are available. Also, information should be 
provided in a way that ensures as far as practicable that it can be understood by 
those to whom it is provided. 
3.32 The New South Wales Mental Health Act 2007 also contains a list 
of principles for care and treatment, which include the principle that the age-
related, gender-related, religious, cultural, language and other special needs of 
people with a mental illness or mental disorder should be recognised. Every 
effort that is reasonably practicable should be made to involve persons with a 
                                                     
32   Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983 (Department of Health TSO 2008). 
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mental illness or mental disorder in the development of treatment plans and 
plans for ongoing care, and people with a mental illness or mental disorder 
should be informed of their legal rights and other entitlements under the Act and 
all reasonable efforts should be made to ensure the information is given in the 
language, mode of communication or terms that they are most likely to 
understand. 
(2) Discussion: 2001 Act and the rights of the child  
3.33 Reverting to the 2001 Act, the Mental Health Commission‟s Code of 
Practice Relating to the Admission of Children under the Mental Health Act 
2001 is an important document, and highlights some of the shortcomings of the 
Act in respect of the rights of children and young people. The Code draws 
particular attention to the failure of the Act to address issues of capacity and 
healthcare decision making. Also, the Code states that all children receiving 
treatment pursuant to the Act should be involved, consistent with their identified 
needs and wishes, in the planning, implementation and evaluation of their care 
and treatment. The Code of Practice, however, is not legally binding and does 
not provide a comprehensive statement of rights and principles for children and 
young people who are admitted and treated under the Mental Health Act 2001. 
In the Commission‟s view, it is doubtful whether the guiding principles contained 
in the Code of Practice and the few safeguards under section 25 of the 2001 
Act, discussed below, are adequate to provide a robust defence of children‟s 
rights, particularly their right to participate in health care decisions.  
3.34 Generally speaking, the focus of mental health legislation and service 
provision has changed considerably. The nature of service provision is much 
more inclusive and is focused on promoting capacity and accommodating 
persons with mental health problems within their community. This is reflected in 
a rights-based, capacity building approach to mental health legislation. The 
provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 as they pertain to children and young 
people do not reflect a rights-based approach to legislating for persons with 
mental illness or disorders.  
D Specific Provisions on Children and Young People in the Mental 
Health Act 2001  
3.35 The key structures and definitions upon which the Mental Health 
Act 2001 are based apply to all persons treated under the 2001 Act. The 
definition of mental disorder in the 2001 Act applies to both children and adults, 
as do the categories of voluntary and involuntary admission.  
(1) Voluntary admission  
3.36 A voluntary patient is defined in the 2001 Act as “a person receiving 
care and treatment in an approved centre who is not the subject of an 
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admission order or a renewal order”. As discussed in the Consultation Paper, in 
light of the Supreme Court decision in E.H. v St Vincent’s Hospital & Ors,33 the 
definition of a voluntary patient is a negative one, centred on what a voluntary 
patient is not, rather than what a voluntary patient is. The Commission reiterates 
its view that a voluntary admission must contain an element of voluntariness on 
behalf of the patient to consent to admission and treatment. A voluntary patient 
is not the subject of an admission or renewal order and therefore is not suffering 
from a mental disorder under section 2 of the 2001 Act. A voluntary patient is 
therefore regarded as a person who has the requisite capacity to consent to 
admission and treatment. A voluntary patient, who is under 18 years of age, 
however, is treated differently. 
3.37 As mentioned above, the structures and definitions upon which the 
scheme of the 2001 Act is based, namely mental disorder, voluntary admission 
and involuntary admission, are applicable to both children and adults. There 
are, however, significant differences in the practical application of these 
important terms and definitions. 
3.38 Importantly, the distinction between a voluntary and an involuntary 
patient is maintained in principle, but circumvented in practice in respect of 
persons under 18 years of age. The majority of children and young people 
requiring in-patient treatment are admitted at the request of, or through 
obtaining the consent of, a parent or guardian. This practice was questioned in 
the Consultation Paper and the Commission reiterates its view that the practice 
of admitting a child or a young person “voluntarily,” solely on the basis of 
parental consent, is flawed and out of line with the rights of children and the 
general principles set out in Chapter 1 of this Report. 
3.39 The issue of obtaining parental consent for the voluntary admission 
and treatment of a child or young person appears to have developed as a 
response to the lack of reference to issues of capacity and consent in the 2001 
Act in respect of persons under 18 years of age. This omission has caused 
considerable confusion over the capacity of a young person to make healthcare 
decisions in respect of his or her mental health.  
3.40 The traditional acceptance of 16 years as the age at which young 
people have the legal capacity to make healthcare decisions is discussed above 
in Chapter 2. The Mental Health Act 2001, however, does not engage with 
section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, which 
provides that a minor aged 16 years of age may consent to medical treatment. 
The uneasy relationship between section 23 of the 1997 Act and the 2001 Act 
raises questions over the status of consent or refusal given by a young person 
                                                     
33   [2009] IESC 46. 
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aged 16 years of age under the 2001 Act.34 This uncertainty also extends to 
issues of capacity and consent in respect of young people under 16 years of 
age.   
3.41 A quote from the Mental Health Commission‟s Code of Practice 
illustrates the failure of the Mental Health Act 2001 to recognise the capacity of 
young people admitted as voluntary patients: 
“where a child who is 16 years or older is being treated as a voluntary 
patient in an approved centre on the basis of consent given by his or 
her parents, it would appear that the child would not have a right to 
leave as such” 
3.42 The term “voluntary” is not an accurate description of a patient who 
has not given consent to his or her admission, cannot consent to treatment and 
cannot leave the centre. Furthermore, persons who are admitted as voluntary 
patients do not have the same level of automatic protections and safeguards 
available to persons admitted as involuntary patients. The safeguards in place 
for children admitted as involuntary patients are in need of significant reform but 
at least the presence of such safeguards, regardless of their adequacy, serves 
to recognise that the rights of children and young people admitted in such 
circumstances must be protected. 
3.43 The limited nature of the safeguards in place to protect the rights of 
children and young people admitted and detained under the 2001 Act is evident 
from the blurred distinction between voluntary and involuntary patients. Where 
this distinction is blurred, it is doubtful if appropriate safeguards can be applied 
as many of the available protections and safeguards are triggered only when a 
patient is admitted as an involuntary patient. The majority of children and young 
people are admitted as voluntary patients and therefore do not have an 
opportunity to engage with the safeguards available to patients admitted as 
involuntary patients. Furthermore, it is likely that the section 25 process of 
involuntary admission is being circumvented by simply obtaining parental 
consent to admit children and young people as voluntary patients. It is highly 
unsuitable to treat the terms of voluntary and involuntary as interchangeable by 
circumventing procedures of involuntary admission. This practice results in 
young people with a mental disorder being treated as voluntary patients, which 
may have an adverse effect on the type of treatment they receive and, as 
mentioned above, has an impact on the number and strength of safeguards 
available to them.  
                                                     
34  See Keyes “Guarded Welcome for Mental Health Bill 1999” (2000) 6(1) Medico 
Legal Journal of Ireland at 29; and deVries “The New Mental Health Bill - Failing 
to be Progressive” (2000) 6(1) Medico Legal Journal of Ireland at 26. 
 121 
3.44 The Mental Health Commission‟s Headspace Toolkit, mentioned 
above,35 attempts to clarify the confusion created by the use of the word 
“voluntary” in the context of the 2001 Act and the word in its ordinary context: 
“Most of the young people you meet will be there as voluntary 
patients. The word voluntary may seem a little strange if you have not 
agreed to being admitted but according to the law your admission is 
voluntary if you are under 18 and your parents agreed to it.”36 
3.45 The Mental Health Commission has also referred to the detrimental 
effect which the practice of voluntary admission may have on the relationship 
between parents or guardians and their children, who are admitted under the 
Act as a direct result of parental consent.37 For example, a young person aged 
16 or 17 years of age who has capacity to make day to day decisions about his 
or her education, money, leisure, and general healthcare may become 
distrusting and hostile towards his or her parents who have consented to 
admission and treatment which may well be against the young person‟s wishes. 
The quality of the parent-child relationship is a vital and an extremely influential 
part of every child and young person‟s life, particularly when the young person 
is experiencing mental health difficulties. Family dynamics and relationships are 
obviously important to any child or young person, but are a particularly 
important source of support to the child or young person experiencing mental 
health difficulties. The majority of children and young people are treated with 
their families, and many interventions are targeted at both the patient and the 
family unit as a whole.  
3.46 In the Commission‟s view, it is also likely that the shortcomings of the 
2001 Act in respect of the voluntary admission of children and young people 
infringe the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In Nielson v 
Denmark,38 the European Court of Human Rights held that parents have rights 
of parental authority which are protected under Article 8. These rights, however, 
are limited and it is incumbent on the State to provide safeguards against 
abuse. This view was reiterated in Johanssen v Norway,39 where the court held 
                                                     
35  Paragraph 3.27 above.  
36  Headspace Toolkit: For Young People who are inpatients of Mental Health 
Services (Mental Health Commission 2009) at 8. 
37  Mental Health Commission Response to the Law Reform Consultation Paper on 
Children and the Law: Medical Treatment (2010) at 9. 
38  (1988) 11 EHRR 175. 
39  (1996) 23 EHRR 33, at paragraphs 76-78. 
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that Article 8 of the ECHR should not be interpreted in a way which protects 
family life to the detriment of a child‟s health and development. 
3.47 The decision in Storck v Germany40 is particularly relevant to the 
present evaluation of the provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 as they 
pertain to children and young people detained as voluntary patients. The 
applicant was a woman who had spent 20 years in psychiatric institutions and 
hospitals, after her initial admission at 15 years of age, by way of parental 
consent.  After a considerable period of time, it was revealed that the applicant 
had never suffered from schizophrenia, despite receiving treatment for the 
disorder, and her behaviour had been caused by conflict with her family. The 
court held that Member States have a positive obligation under Articles 5 and 8 
of the ECHR to ensure effective supervision and review of decisions to detain or 
to treat without consent.41 Member States are also under an obligation to 
provide effective supervision and review of deprivations of liberty and 
interferences with the physical integrity of a young person.42  
3.48 Significant reforms have been carried out in England and Wales to 
strengthen the rights of children and young people who could otherwise be 
treated against their wishes, but with their parent‟s consent. Prior to the reforms 
brought about by the Mental Health Act 2007, practice in England was similar to 
the current situation in Ireland, where children and young people were admitted 
by their parents or guardians. Section 131 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was 
amended by Section 43 of the Mental Health Act 2007 to end the admission of 
16 and 17 year olds on the basis of parental consent. As a result, 16 and 17 
year olds who have capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 may consent 
to admission, even where one or more persons may have parental responsibility 
for them. This is consistent with section 8 of the English Family Law Reform Act 
1969, which, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, is the statutory precedent for 
section 23 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.  
3.49 In respect of children who are less than 16 years of age, those with 
capacity to consent to admission may do so, without the need for additional 
parental consent. In this regard, the child‟s capacity must be assessed carefully 
in relation to each decision that needs to be made, as the understanding for 
different interventions and treatments will vary considerably.  
3.50 The law in other countries on the issues of capacity and consent in 
respect of mental health treatment indicate a much closer, and more 
appropriate, relationship between the law of capacity in respect of physical 
                                                     
40  (2005) 43 EHRR 96. See also HL v UK [2004] ECHR 471. 
41  (2005) 43 EHRR 96 at 113.  
42  See Fenell Mental Health: The New Law (Jordans, 2007) at 305. 
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treatment and the law on capacity in respect of mental health treatment. For 
example, in New South Wales, a child or a young person may consent to 
admission as a voluntary patient, in tandem with rules of parental notification 
and rights of consent, which are linked to the age of the child in question.43  The 
traditional threshold of 16 years of age is retained in the legislation, discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2 above. In New South Wales, the age of 16 has been 
recognised as the age of consent to general medical treatment since 1970.44 
3.51 The South Australia Mental Health Act 2009 applies to children in the 
same way as it applies to persons of full age. However, a distinction is drawn 
between young people aged 16 and 17 and those aged less than 16 years of 
age, in that a right conferred on a person under the Act may be exercised by a 
parent, if the person is under 16 years of age.45  Similar to the legal position in 
New South Wales, the age of 16 is accepted as the age of consent to medical 
treatment. Section 6 of the Consent to Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995, 
discussed in Chapter 2, states that a person of 16 years of age may make 
decisions about his or her medical treatment as validly and effectively as an 
adult. 
3.52 In New Zealand, section 36 of the Care of Children Act 2004 states 
that a young person aged 16 years of age may consent to or refuse medical 
treatment, and this is mirrored in the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment 
and Treatment) Act 1992 which states that the consent of a parent or guardian 
for the assessment or treatment of a person who has reached 16 years of age, 
shall not be sufficient consent for the purposes of the Act.46 
3.53 The Commission considers that the 2001 Act should be amended to 
end the practice of admitting children and young people as voluntary patients, 
solely on the basis of parental consent. Furthermore, the failure to recognise the 
capacity of children and young people, particularly those aged 16 and 17 years 
of age in respect of consent to mental health admission and treatment creates 
an arbitrary distinction between physical and mental health. Following the 
publication of its Consultation Paper, the Commission received a considerable 
number of submissions outlining the deficiencies of the practice of voluntary 
admission as it currently applies to children and young people, and supporting 
the Commission‟s recommendations to end the current practice of such 
admissions. 
                                                     
43  Section 6 of the New South Wales Mental Health Act 2007. 
44  Section 49 of the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970. 
45   Section 4 of the South Australia Mental Health Act 2009. 
46  Section 87 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992. 
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(2) Involuntary admission  
3.54 Section 25 of the Mental Health Act 2001 provides for the 
involuntary admission of children and young people. This system of involuntary 
admission is different to the system in place of the involuntary admission and 
treatment of adults. Children and young people clearly have different needs 
than adults but safeguards relating to the involuntary placement and treatment 
of children and young people should be at least as stringent as those in place 
for adults admitted and treated as involuntary patients.47 
3.55 In order to have a person involuntarily admitted, the Health Service 
Executive (HSE) may apply to the District Court for an order authorising the 
detention of a child in an approved centre, where it appears that the child is 
suffering from a mental disorder and the child requires treatment which he or 
she is unlikely to receive unless an order is made under section 25. The child or 
young person must be examined by a consultant psychiatrist who reports to the 
court as part of the application. Section 25(3) of the 2001 Act provides an 
exception to the general rule that the child or young person must be examined 
by a psychiatrist, where a parent is unwilling or unable to consent to the 
examination. Following an application under section 25(3) the court may give 
directions in respect of the appropriate care of the child, which may include 
detention. Section 25 of the 2001 Act does not contain a specific time frame 
within which a child must be examined by a psychiatrist, or what constitutes a 
permissible period of detention pending final determination, aided by the report 
of a psychiatrist. The Mental Health Commission has drawn attention to this 
issue, stating that the lack of objective medical expertise confirming the 
presence of a mental disorder may infringe Article 5(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.48  
3.56 Furthermore, section 25 of the 2001 Act refers to the report of a 
consultant psychiatrist. As stated in the Consultation Paper, children and young 
people have specific mental health issues, which are not dealt with in general 
psychiatric adult practice.49 The Mental Health Commission has recommended 
                                                     
47   (LRC CP 59-2009) at 6.49. 
48  Mental Health Commission Response to the Law Reform Consultation Paper on 
Children and the Law: Medical Treatment (2010) at 10.  See also Litwa v Poland 
(2001) 33 EHRR 53. 
49  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 6.10. 
 125 
that, in so far as is practicable, the HSE should arrange for such a report to be 
made by a child and adolescent consultant psychiatrist.50 
3.57 As to the time frames under section 25 of the 2001 Act, the 
permissible periods of detention following a successful application consist of an 
initial detention period not exceeding 21 days, followed by periods not 
exceeding 3 and 6 months. As stated in the Consultation Paper, there is no 
mechanism for a person detained under section 25 of the 2001 Act to challenge 
a detention or seek a review of his or her detention or treatment. Therefore, a 
child or a young person detained under section 25 of the 2001 Act cannot 
challenge a period of detention between the initial admission order and a 
subsequent renewal order, or the period of time between each renewal order, 
which as noted above, may last for 6 months. The 6 month detention period 
between renewal orders under section 25 may be excessive in some cases and 
raise concerns in respect of proportionality.  
3.58 The decision of the High Court in SM v Mental Health Commission51 
is relevant in this respect, as it pertains to section 15 of the Mental Health Act 
2001, which is concerned with the involuntary detention and treatment of adult 
patients. The central issue in the SM case was whether the power vested in a 
consultant psychiatrist under section 15 of the 2001 Act was satisfied when he 
or she makes a renewal order which states that the order does not exceed 12 
months. The period of 12 months is the maximum period of time permitted 
under section 15(3). Mc Mahon J stated: 
“Section 15, since it purports to restrict a constitutional right to liberty, 
albeit for the patient‟s own good and the safety of others, should be 
interpreted in a proportionate way so that the detention is not for 
longer periods than are necessary to achieve the object of the 
legislation. The approach to an interpretation of the section should be 
that which is most favourable to the patient while yet achieving the 
object of the Act.” 
3.59 The High Court held in the SM case that section 15, which refers to 
a renewal order for a period not exceeding 12 months, may not be interpreted 
as a renewal order for a fixed period of 12 months. Such an interpretation would 
prevent the psychiatrist from making shorter orders, in the best interests of the 
patient. The maximum period of 12 months detention orders may of course be 
used where appropriate, but otherwise the specific period of time must be 
                                                     
50  Mental Health Commission Code of Practice: Code of Practice Relating to 
Admission of Children under the Mental Health Act 2001 (Mental Health 
Commission 2006) at 18. 
51  [2008] IEHC 441. 
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clearly indicated. The decision in the SM case resulted in the requirement to 
insert a specific date when renewal orders of the detention of adult patients are 
being made. The Mental Health Commission has stated that the same 
requirement should apply in respect of children and young people detained 
under section 25 of the 2001 Act.  
3.60 The Mental Health Act 2001 has relied heavily on the Child Care 
Act 1991 in attempting to safeguard the rights of children and secure their best 
interests.52 The 1991 Act is primarily concerned with children in care and 
recognises the District Court as the primary forum for the adjudication of such 
care proceedings.53 Section 25(14) of the 2001 Act incorporates a number of 
provisions from the 1991 Act, intended to safeguard the rights of children and 
young people who are involuntary patients.54 As stated in the Consultation 
Paper, these provisions are not sufficient in the context of children and young 
people detained as involuntary patients.  
3.61 For example, section 30 of the 1991 Act makes provision for the 
presence of a child during a court hearing. As discussed in the Consultation 
Paper, the provision is rather limited.55 The provision seems to indicate that a 
child may only be present where his or her presence is necessary for the 
disposal of the case. Although a child or young person may request to be 
present, the utility of this is largely dependent on his or her knowledge that the 
provision exists. There is no reference to the maturity of the child, or his or her 
understanding of the particular proceedings. 
3.62 Section 24 of the 1991 Act refers to the duty of the court to take the 
wishes of the child into consideration during court proceedings. The 
shortcomings of section 24 are discussed in the Consultation Paper56 but for 
present purposes it is sufficient to state that section 24 does not ensure that the 
                                                     
52  The safeguards granted to children and young people admitted as involuntary 
patients under the 2001 Act are discussed at length in the Consultation Paper. 
53  Section 28 of the Child Care Act 1991. 
54  Section 25(14) of the Mental Health Act 2001 states: “The provisions of sections 
21, 22, 24 to 35, 37 and 47 of the Child Care Act 1991 shall apply to proceedings 
under this section as they apply to proceedings under those sections with the 
modification that references to proceedings or an order under Part III, IV or VI of 
that [1991] Act shall be construed as references to proceedings or an order under 
this section and with any other necessary modifications.” 
55  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 6.83. 
56  (LRC CP 59-2009) at 6.79. 
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voice of the child (discussed in Chapter 1 of this Report) is heard in line with 
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Sections 21 and 22 
of the 1991 Act deals with the appeal, variation and discharge of orders, which 
infers that a court may vary or discharge an order made under section 25. It is 
unlikely that a child or young person admitted under section 25 could utilise this 
provision, to have their admission reviewed, bearing in mind that the Act is 
rather silent on the participation rights of children and young people. 
3.63 Section 26 of the 1991 Act provides for the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem. This is particularly important to children and young people 
detained under section 25, as they have no effective way of seeking review of 
their admission and treatment. The appointment of an advocate would support 
them and ensure that their views are taken into account. The guardian ad litem 
system, however, is under severe pressure at present. Therefore, much like 
sections 21 and 22 of the 1991 Act, discussed above, the practical utility of 
section 26 of the 1991 Act in relation to a child or young person who is detained 
as an involuntary patient is rather negligible. 
3.64 The guiding principles in the Mental Health Commission‟s Code of 
Practice and the best interests requirement contained in section 4(2) of the 
2001 Act may be considered as additional safeguards to supplement those 
contained in section 25. These supplementary safeguards are not, however, 
sufficient to form an adequate defence to protect the rights of children and 
young people admitted and treated under the 2001 Act.  
3.65 Section 16 of the 2001 Act makes provision for information to be 
provided to persons who are admitted to approved centres. Although the 
application of this section is not restricted to adults detained as involuntary 
patients, it seems to have been interpreted to that effect. This provision of 
information is extremely important. Patients are alerted to their rights under the 
2001 Act such as their right to legal representation and their right to 
communicate with the Inspector of Mental Health. The statement also informs 
the patient that they may be admitted as a voluntary patient if they wish, and 
that their admission as an involuntary patient shall be reviewed by the Mental 
Health Tribunal. This statement of information is a vital element of ensuring that 
patients are informed and aware of the nature of their admission. There is no 
reason why children and young people should not receive similar information, 
provided to them in a comprehensible, age-appropriate manner. 
(3) Treatment 
3.66 As discussed above, the 2001 Act does not engage with issues of 
capacity and healthcare decision making in respect of persons under 18 years 
of age. The uncertain relationship between the 2001 Act and section 23 of the 
Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 has created considerable 
practical difficulties, as a young person aged 16 or 17 years of age may make a 
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range of healthcare decisions but cannot make any decisions which would fall 
within the remit of the 2001 Act. 
3.67  A 16 year old may make healthcare decisions which are 
considered to be outside the remit of the 2001 Act, for example, when 
presenting to an Accident and Emergency Unit for mental distress or attending 
an outpatient or day care appointment. Similarly, a young person aged 16 years 
of age may consent to medical treatment which is unrelated to his or her mental 
illness or disorder. For example, a 16 or a 17 year old may leave the centre 
where he or she is receiving treatment under the 2001 Act, in order to consent 
to and receive medical treatment in another medical setting. When the young 
person returns to resume treatment in respect of his or her mental illness, 
however, he or she will have lost all rights in relation to healthcare decision 
making. 
3.68 The Commission received a number of submissions which drew 
attention to the considerable confusion and inconsistencies caused by the lack 
of clarity on the relationship between capacity in respect of mental health and 
capacity in respect of physical health. It is difficult and somewhat arbitrary to 
attempt to draw a clear line between care and treatment of the physical self and 
care and treatment of the mind. 
3.69 The illogicality of the present legal position as regards capacity 
under the 2001 Act is highlighted by the consideration of a typical situation 
involving a 16 or 17 year old experiencing mental health difficulties. The young 
person attends a GP and may consent to pharmaceutical treatment, with an 
anti-depressant for example. However, perhaps the young person feels that the 
treatment is not appropriate or perhaps the GP is unsure as to the most 
effective course of treatment. The GP may decide to refer the matter to a Child 
Psychiatrist. Upon receiving the referral however, it seems a line has been 
crossed, in terms of legal capacity to make healthcare decisions. The Child 
Psychiatrist, in light of the current confusion over the relationship between the 
Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 and the Mental Health Act 
2001, cannot treat the young person in question without parental involvement 
and consent. 
3.70 In respect of voluntary patients, the Mental Health Commission‟s 
Code of Practice states that in order for treatment to be administered to a child 
who has been admitted voluntarily, that is admitted by parental consent, 
consent for the treatment must be obtained from one or both of the child‟s 
parents. Again, as discussed above, this serves to highlight the unsuitability of 
the term „voluntary‟ to describe children and young people whose voluntary 
status under the Act derives solely from parental consent, and who cannot 
consent to or refuse treatment. The Commission is aware that in day to day 
practice, clinicians make these treatment decisions based on the best interests 
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of their patient, and such treatments are not available simply at the request of a 
parent. Nevertheless, clarity is important to ensure that patient‟s rights are 
protected, both in theory and in practice.  
3.71 Section 61 of the 2001 Act regulates the provision of treatment of 
children and young people who are involuntary patients under section 25. The 
shortcomings of section 61 of the 2001 Act are discussed in the Consultation 
Paper. The 2007 Review of the Operation of the Mental Health Act 200157 
referred to the drafting error in section 61, stating that the process of detention 
in respect of persons under 18, provided for in section 25, is quite different to 
the involuntary admission of an adult which is not reflected correctly in section 
61. The Minister for Health has acknowledged the drafting error in section 61, 
which will be amended as soon as a suitable opportunity arises. 
3.72 Section 61 states that where medication has been administered to a 
child or young person for a period of three months, the authorisation of the 
treating consultant psychiatrist and a second consultant psychiatrist is 
necessary in order to continue treatment for a further three month period. As 
stated in the Consultation Paper the three month period which passes before 
medication is approved under section 61 is excessive and should be addressed. 
Under the Act as it stands, it is permissible to prescribe medication to a child or 
a young person for a period of three months without even obtaining a second 
opinion.58 Furthermore, the child or young person does not have the right to 
consent or even assent to the proposed treatment. Under section 60, the patient 
may be prescribed treatment without engaging in a discussion with his or her 
psychiatrist on the nature of the treatment, its merits and any side effects.  
3.73 This represents a failure to respect the rights of children and young 
people who are patients under the Mental Health Act 2001. It is of the utmost 
importance to involve children in the management of their health care plans, to 
facilitate their participation and allow them to develop the skills to make 
decisions and assume responsibility for aspects of their health care. On a 
practical level, studies have shown that increased participation and patient 
choice can lead to improved treatment outcomes.59  A presumption that the 
                                                     
57  Review of the Operation of the Mental Health Act 2001: Findings and Conclusions 
(Department of Health and Children 2007) at 28.  
58  There is no requirement to discuss the proposed treatment with anyone, such as 
an advocate for the child, or the child‟s parents. It seems that a psychiatrist has 
relatively unrestricted decision-making power. See Donnelly “Treatment for a 
Mental Health Disorder: The Mental Health Act 2001, Consent and the Role of 
Rights” (2005) 40 Irish Jurist at 240.  
59
  Madden Medicine, Ethics and the Law (Butterworths 2002) at 474. 
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child or young person cannot understand and express their views about their 
admission and treatment must not be made solely on the basis of the patient‟s 
minority status. 
3.74 A requirement to discuss the proposed treatment with the child or 
adolescent would strengthen that child‟s rights. The child or young person 
should have an opportunity to participate in the drawing up of an individualised 
treatment plan. Under section 60 of the 2001 Act, which provides for the 
treatment of adults who are involuntary patients, patients are given the 
opportunity to consent to treatment in writing. An adult patient‟s proposed 
treatment plan is also contained in the statement of information presented to 
them upon their admission as an involuntary patient. 
3.75 It is clear that, in respect of treatment administered under the 
Mental Health Act 2001, children and young people do not have their rights 
protected to the same degree as adults. As stated above in respect of 
admission and detention under the 2001 Act, safeguards in place to protect the 
rights and civil liberties of patients under mental health legislation should apply 
to all persons, including those under 18 years of age. Indeed, in some 
circumstances, the fact that children are often reliant on others to exercise their 
rights means that the safeguards in place for children and young people need to 
be more robust than those in place for adults. 
3.76 Under section 25 of the 2001 Act, court approval must be obtained 
for more serious aspects of treatment, namely psychosurgery or electro-
convulsive therapy. Again, there is no requirement to inform the child or young 
person or discuss treatment options. There is no representative to act on behalf 
of the child, nor is the child or young person required to be present in court 
when his or her treatment is being discussed and approved. 
3.77 The court process in respect of obtaining consent for psychosurgery 
or electro-convulsive therapy is unclear. Section 25 does not provide any detail 
as to reports or evidence to be presented to the court to assist in such decision 
making, or whether for example a second opinion from an independent 
psychiatrist is necessary. The Mental Health Commission has stated that 
independent opinions in such situations are essential.60 
3.78 It is evident from the discussion in the preceding paragraphs that 
reform is needed in respect of the administration of treatment to children and 
young people who are admitted under the Mental Health Act 2001, whether as 
voluntary or involuntary patients. 
                                                     
60  Mental Health Commission Response to the Law Reform Consultation Paper on 
Children and the Law: Medical Treatment (2010) at 17. 
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E Recommendations on Reform of the Mental Health Act 2001 
3.79 In this Part, the Commission sets out its final recommendations for 
reform of the Mental Health Act 2001 in so far as it applies to children and 
young people. In Part D, the Commission has discussed the absence in the 
2001 Act of specific provisions concerning children and young persons. While 
the general principles discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 would, if enacted, apply to 
the 2001 Act, the Commission considers that it would be more appropriate to 
include in the 2001 Act a detailed set of suitably tailored provisions. These 
would allow those involved in the implementation of the 2001 Act a clear set of 
criteria by which the appropriateness of admissions could be gauged. 
(1) Guiding principles and best interests 
3.80 The Commission begins with a consideration of general principles. 
Based on the general recommendations in Chapter 2, these principles would 
clarify the specific approach to capacity of persons under 18 in connection with 
admissions under the 2001 Act. In keeping with this approach, the Commission 
also considers that the 2001 Act should include the type of objective best 
interests test discussed in Chapter 1. This would assist in ensuring that a full 
assessment is made of the most appropriate outcome for each child or young 
person. The best interests test would also assist in preventing the inappropriate 
“social admissions” referred to in Part D, above. 61 
3.81 The Commission has accordingly concluded, and therefore 
recommends, that the 2001 Act be amended to include specific provisions for 
persons under the age of 18, based on the general principles already 
recommended in this Report. The Commission also recommends that the 2001 
Act should be amended to provide: 
(a) that children and young people admitted under the 2001 Act should 
be accommodated in an environment that is suitable for their age;  
(b) that children and young people may only be admitted under the 
2001 Act if such an admission is in their best interests, objectively 
assessed by reference to their rights; 
(c) that the provisions outlined in the Mental Health Commission‟s Code 
of Practice should be followed to ensure that children and young people 
can avail of age appropriate facilities and activities to allow their 
personal, social and educational development to continue; 
                                                     
61  See Bonnar, Report for the Mental Health Commission on Admission of Young 
People to Adult Mental Health Wards in the Republic of Ireland (Mental Health 
Commission, December 2010), discussed at paragraph 3.18, above.  
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(d) that children and young people should receive the least intrusive 
and restrictive treatment possible, in the least restrictive environment 
possible, for the shortest possible period in accordance with an 
individualised care plan; 
(e) that children and young people should be provided with clear 
information regarding their proposed admission and treatment in a 
manner which is accessible and appropriate with regard to their age 
and understanding; and that this information should include details of 
their legal rights, and it should include information on the purpose, side 
effects, and any alternatives to the proposed treatment; 
(f) that children and young people should have access to independent, 
specialised advocacy services and should have access to a personal 
representative, other than a family member, in circumstances where 
this is necessary and appropriate, and 
(g) that the protections that apply to adults with respect to mental health 
treatment under the 2001 Act should apply equally to persons under 18. 
3.82 The Commission recommends that the Mental Health Act 2001 be 
amended to include specific provisions for persons under the age of 18, based 
on the general principles already recommended in this Report. The Commission 
also recommends that the 2001 Act should be amended to provide: 
(a) that children and young people admitted under the 2001 Act should 
be accommodated in an environment that is suitable for their age;  
(b) that children and young people may only be admitted under the 
2001 Act if such an admission is in their best interests, objectively 
assessed by reference to their rights; 
(c) that the provisions outlined in the Mental Health Commission’s Code 
of Practice should be followed to ensure that children and young people 
the patient can avail of age appropriate facilities and activities to allow 
their personal, social and educational development to continue. 
(d) that children and young people should receive the least intrusive 
and restrictive treatment possible, in the least restrictive environment 
possible, for the shortest possible period in accordance with an 
individualised care plan; 
(e) that children and young people should be provided with clear 
information regarding their proposed admission and treatment in a 
manner which is accessible and appropriate with regard to their age 
and understanding; and that this information should include details of 
their legal rights, and it should include information on the purpose, side 
effects, and any alternatives to the proposed treatment; 
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(f) that children and young people should have access to independent, 
specialised advocacy services and should have access to a personal 
representative, other than a family member, in circumstances where 
this is necessary and appropriate, and 
(g) that the protections that apply to adults with respect to mental health 
treatment under the 2001 Act should apply equally to persons under 18. 
 
(2) Voluntary admission and treatment 
3.83 In order to address the shortcomings of the system of voluntary 
admission, it is necessary to recognise the capacity of children and young 
people to make healthcare decisions in respect of their own admission and 
treatment, and also to address the confusion created by the word “voluntary” in 
ordinary terms and the meaning attributed to it as a categorisation under the 
Mental Health Act 2001. The Commission has also concluded, and therefore 
recommends, that the 2001 Act should be amended to safeguard the rights of 
children and adolescents admitted by parental consent as voluntary patients so 
that they are afforded the same safeguards granted to adults. 
3.84 In respect of decision-making concerning voluntary admission and 
treatment, it is imperative to distinguish between children and young people 
who have the capacity to make such a decision and those who do not. As 
already noted, the Commission‟s recommendations on healthcare decision-
making outlined in Chapter 2 are applicable in the context of mental health. 
Therefore, a young person aged 16 or 17 years of age is presumed to have 
capacity to consent to and refuse healthcare and treatment. Applying this in the 
context of the 2001 Act, young people aged 16 and 17 years of age may 
consent to or refuse voluntary admission and treatment.  
3.85 Where a young person aged 16 or 17 does not have the capacity to 
make the admission or treatment decision in question, his or her parents or 
guardians may not provide an effective consent. In such a case, the only 
options for admission would be involuntary admission (where the child has a 
mental disorder) or intermediate admission (discussed below).  
3.86 The Commission recommends that that the Mental Health Act 2001 
be amended to provide that a person who is 16 or 17 years of age is presumed 
to have capacity to consent to and refuse healthcare and medical treatment, 
including psychiatric treatment. 
3.87 The Commission considers that, to avoid any doubt on the matter, it 
recommends that the recommendations in Chapter 2 concerning persons under 
the age of 16 should also apply to the Mental Health Act 2001. The capacity of 
the child under 16 would have to be assessed in relation to each decision and 
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aspect of admission and treatment. The provision of clear information and 
guidance would be particularly important in such cases, as would the option of 
an independent advocate. 
3.88 The Commission recommends that, to avoid any doubt, the 
recommendations concerning healthcare decision-making by persons under 16 
years of age should also be applied in the context of mental health, including 
decisions in respect of admission and treatment under the Mental Health Act 
2001. 
3.89  Section 23 of the 2001 Act states that where a parent of a child 
who is being treated as a voluntary patient in an approved centre indicates that 
he or she wishes to remove the child, the child may be placed in the care of the 
Health Service Executive (HSE),62 if the relevant medical practitioner is of the 
opinion that the child is suffering from a mental disorder. Unless the HSE 
returns the child or young person to his or her parents, an application must be 
made to the District Court within a 3 day period in order to apply for involuntary 
admission. Under sections 23 and 24 of the 2001 Act, where an adult who is 
being treated as a voluntary patient requests to leave the approved centre, and 
the relevant medical practitioner is of the opinion that he or she is suffering from 
a mental disorder, he or she may be detained for a period not exceeding 24 
hours.  
3.90 In the Commission‟s view, the three day time frame in place under 
section 23 of the 2001 Act seems to be quite long, possibly to accommodate for 
an application to the District Court under section 25 of the 2001 Act. The 
Commission recommends that this should be included in the proposed Code of 
Practice (see Chapter 2, above) and considered in the light of current practice 
and whatever length of time is involved in the making of such an application. 
The Code of Practice could also include appropriate time frames to operate in 
such situations, where children and young people who have consented to 
admission and treatment as voluntary patients, request to leave the approved 
centre. 
3.91 The Commission recommends that the proposed Code of Practice 
already recommended in this Report should include guidance on appropriate 
time frames to operate in cases of voluntary and involuntary admissions.  
(3) Intermediate admission and treatment 
3.92 As discussed in the Consultation Paper, categorisation of patients as 
voluntary or involuntary under the Mental Health Act 2001 is only appropriate in 
relation to children and young people who consent to admission as voluntary 
patients, or are suffering from a mental disorder and are therefore categorised 
                                                     
62  Section 13(4) of the Child Care Act 1991. 
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as involuntary patients. The Commission reiterates here that a third category of 
“intermediate” admission would be more appropriate to describe children who 
do not have the capacity to consent to admission and are admitted by their 
parents. Children under the age of 16, without the capacity to consent to 
voluntary admission and treatment, would be admitted as intermediate patients 
with the consent of their parents or guardians. 
3.93 Intermediate patients would have their admission reviewed in the 
same manner as the review of admission of an involuntary patient, with the 
exception that the psychiatrist on the Mental Health Tribunal would be an age-
appropriate child or adolescent psychiatrist. In respect of the treatment of 
intermediate patients, the provision of information and guidance on the 
proposed treatment, its purpose, possible side effects and any alternatives 
would be discussed with the patient, where appropriate and his or her parents. 
Ideally, a treatment plan would be decided upon by the patient, his or her 
parents, and the psychiatrist, supported by the second opinion of a consultant 
psychiatrist.     
3.94 The Commission recommends the introduction of a third category of 
“intermediate” admission for children and young persons who are admitted 
under the Mental Health Act 2001 by way of the consent of persons having 
parental responsibility for them. The admission and treatment of intermediate 
patients would be subject to regular review, in the same manner as involuntary 
patients. 
(4) Involuntary admission 
3.95 The Commission also accepts that the Mental Health Act 2001 
should be amended to safeguard the rights of children and young people with 
mental disorders who are admitted as involuntary patients under section 25 of 
the 2001 Act. The small number of safeguards imported into the 2001 Act from 
the Child Care Act 1991 should be replaced with stronger and more definite 
protections, accessible and appropriate for children and young people.   
3.96 Firstly, there are a number of procedural aspects under section 25 
which may be improved. For example, section 25 refers to a report by a 
consultant psychiatrist. The Commission agrees with the Mental Health 
Commission that such a report should be made by a consultant child and 
adolescent psychiatrist.63 An additional point made by the Mental Health 
Commission is that the system of involuntary admission operates on the 
assumption that, if the HSE is not involved, parents or guardians are only 
                                                     
63  Mental Health Commission Code of Practice: Code of Practice Relating to 
Admission of Children under the Mental Health Act 2001 (Mental Health 
Commission 2006) at 18. 
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permitted to make voluntary applications. Parents or guardians or interested 
persons such as a medical practitioner, a psychiatrist or a relative could make 
an application in some cases where the child or young person has a mental 
disorder and is in need of admission and treatment.  
3.97 Copies of the admission order granted under section 25 should be 
given to parents and guardians to ensure they are kept informed. This also 
applies to the child or young person who is admitted, which is discussed further 
below.  
3.98 The Commission reiterates its view, expressed in the Consultation 
Paper, that the system of involuntary admission of children and young people 
must be addressed. As stated in the Consultation Paper, there is no mechanism 
for a person detained under section 25 to challenge a detention or seek a 
review of his or her detention or treatment. A child or a young person detained 
under section 25 cannot challenge a period of detention between the initial 
admission order and a subsequent renewal order, or the period of time between 
each renewal order, which as noted above, may last for 6 months. 
3.99 Also, in light of the decision in SM v Mental Health Commission 
2008,64 the consultant psychiatrist must be in a position to recommend an 
admission or renewal order for a period of time which is less than the maximum 
permissible period of time. 
3.100 It has been suggested to the Commission that within a week of 
admission, a discussion shall take place between the treating psychiatrist and a 
second independent psychiatrist, possibly with input from other staff members. 
This meeting would discuss the general suitability of the admission and 
proposed treatments. 
3.101 The Commission recommends that a system of regular review of 
involuntary admissions be established, to be carried out by a consultant 
independent of the consultant involved in the initial admission. The opinion of 
the reviewing consultant should be supported by a second independent opinion.  
(5) Forum for review 
3.102 The Mental Health Act 2001, drawing on the Child Care Act 1991, 
provides that the District Court is the appropriate forum to determine matters 
concerning a person under 18. This is reflected in section 25 of the 2001 Act, 
where the admission and review of children and young people who are 
involuntarily detained is carried out by the court. The admission of an adult who 
is detained as an involuntary patient is reviewed by the Mental Health Tribunal. 
The Tribunal comprises a legal member, a lay person and a consultant 
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psychiatrist. The Mental Health Commission‟s Reference Guide to the Mental 
Health Act states that the primary function of the Tribunal is to ensure the 
protection of the rights of patients.65 Patients have a right to attend the Tribunal 
if they wish and may be represented by a legal representative.  
3.103 Submissions received by the Commission on the issue were in 
favour of a more informal arena of review, with an age appropriate focus and 
awareness of the importance of the voice of the child. The Commission 
reiterates its view, expressed as a provisional recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper, that a less formal arena, with an age appropriate focus is a 
more fitting option. Therefore, the Tribunal ought to be made up of a legal 
representative, a lay representative, and an age appropriate child psychiatrist. It 
is important that a forum which reviews the admission and treatment of children 
and young people must respect Article 12 of the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and give the child or young person the opportunity to 
express his or her views and give them due weight in accordance with his or her 
age and maturity. The child or young person must be given the opportunity to 
participate, by attending the informal hearing, or possibly submitting his or her 
opinion in writing. The representative of the child or young person would also 
attend the hearing, to advocate for the patient. 
3.104 The Commission recommends that the District Court make the 
initial decision on admission of children and young people as involuntary 
patients for the purposes of the Mental Health Act 2001, but that a Mental Heath 
Tribunal (with an age appropriate focus) rather than the District Court should 
review the admission. 
3.105 A significant shortcoming in the operation of section 25 of the 2001 
Act is the failure to give children and young people, detained as involuntary 
patients, the choice to be admitted as voluntary patients. Adults who are 
detained as involuntary patients are provided with this choice, presented to 
them in the statement of information they receive within 24 hours of admission. 
Children and young people who have capacity should also be able to choose 
the least restrictive option of detention available to them. 
3.106 The Commission recommends that a consultant psychiatrist initially 
assess the child in order to decide which type of admission is appropriate under 
the circumstances and to assess whether the minor is providing consent or not, 
where the child has capacity to provide such consent. However, where the child 
has a mental disorder within the terms of section 25 of the 2001 Act, the choice 
of a child to become a voluntary patient could clearly be overridden.  
                                                     
65  Reference Guide Mental Health Act 2001: Part One Adults (Mental Health 
Commission) at 1.8.1 
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3.107 The Commission also recommends that where a child is admitted 
as an involuntary patient, that individual should have the option to change their 
status to a voluntary patient where they satisfy the relevant criteria.   
(6) Information and advocacy 
3.108 Children and young people detained under section 25 of the 2001 Act 
are particularly vulnerable and it is important that they are informed and 
represented. Therefore, the Commission recommends that children and young 
people, who are detained as involuntary patients, be presented with a statement 
of information, similar to the information given to adults detained as involuntary 
patients. Clearly, a statement of information aimed at children and young people 
must be age appropriate, and communicated to them in a manner and language 
with which they are comfortable. 
3.109 The Commission recommends that persons under 18 years of age 
who are admitted as involuntary patients under the Mental Health Act 2001 be 
given a statement of information, communicated to them in an age appropriate 
manner. 
3.110 As stated in the Consultation Paper, the Commission considers that 
independent and specialised advocacy services should be available to children 
and adolescents admitted and treated under the Mental Health Act 2001, as 
voluntary, involuntary or intermediate patients. The guiding principles outlined 
above at also highlight the importance of specialised advocacy services for 
children and young people.  
3.111 The Commission recommends that all children and adolescents 
admitted and treated under the Mental Health Act 2001 should have access to 
an independent advocate. 
(7) Treatment 
3.112 The Commission has also concluded that reform of the 2001 Act is 
required in respect of treatment of children and young people who are admitted 
and detained under the 2001 Act. It is of the utmost importance to involve 
children in the management of their health care plans, to facilitate their 
participation and allow them to develop the skills to make decisions and assume 
responsibility for aspects of their health care. Consistently with the 
Commission‟s recommendations outlined in Chapter 2, above, children and 
young people with the capacity to make a treatment decision could do so. If the 
treatment decision in question concerned the refusal of life sustaining treatment, 
the purported refusal would be addressed and adjudicated by the District Court. 
It is important to note that the proposed Code of Practice would include a 
number of guidelines to support clinicians in this context, helping them to make 
a decision on what treatments are considered to be life sustaining in different 
circumstances. 
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3.113 Where a child or young person does not have capacity to make a 
treatment decision, it is essential that safeguards are put into place to ensure 
that treatment is subject to regular and effective review. Review should be 
carried out by the treating consultant psychiatrist, supported by a second 
opinion, independent of the treating psychiatrist. Furthermore, both psychiatrists 
must discuss the treatment with the patient, and his or her views must be taken 
into account in determining whether or not the treatment is necessary and in the 
best interests of the patient.  
3.114 The Commission accordingly recommends that the proposed Code of 
Practice recommended in this Report consider the time frame for review of 
treatment under the Mental Health Act 2001. The Commission has discussed 
the time frame with a number of medical specialists in this area and, while no 
general consensus has emerged, the Commission agrees with the views 
expressed to it that this might, initially, involve review after one month. The 
Commission recommends that this timeframe should be considered in the 
context of the development of the Code of Practice. The Commission also 
recommends that the Code of Practice consider stricter rules with respect to 
ECT and psycho-surgery with a view to prohibiting psycho-surgery for persons 
under 18 years of age. 
3.115 The Commission recommends that the proposed Code of Practice 
recommended in this Report consider the time frame for review of treatment of 
persons under the age of 18 under the Mental Health Act 2001, and that an 
initial review after one month should be considered in the context of the 
development of the Code of Practice. The Commission also recommends that 
the Code of Practice consider stricter rules with respect to ECT and psycho-
surgery with a view to prohibiting psycho-surgery for persons under 18 years of 
age. 
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4  
CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations made by the Commission in this Report are as follows. 
4.01 The Commission recommends that legislation should be enacted 
dealing with consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment concerning persons 
under the age of 18, and that it should include the following general principles: 
having regard to the recognition in the Constitution and international 
instruments of the family as the fundamental group in society, parents and 
guardians have primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of 
their children; the State may intervene to supply the place of parents in 
exceptional circumstances where this is necessary; the rights of the child, and 
their best interests, must always be taken into account in this context; a child 
has rights that are independent of any right of the parent as such; these rights 
are, during the child‟s early years, exercised on behalf of the child, usually by 
the child‟s parents or guardians; these rights remain the rights of the child as 
they develop towards maturity and adulthood; and there are various points, 
sometimes based on an age threshold and sometimes based on an assessment 
of maturity and capacity, at which the law recognises that the child can exercise 
these rights independently of their parents or guardians even before they reach 
full adulthood at the age of 18. [paragraph 1.32] 
4.02 The Commission recommends that its proposed legislation on 
consent to, and refusal of, health care and medical treatment concerning 
persons under the age of 18 should include as a primary consideration the best 
interests of the child, assessed objectively by reference to the rights of the child. 
[paragraph 1.35] 
4.03 The Commission recommends, that, for the purposes of its 
proposed legislation on health care and treatment concerning persons under 
the age of 18, health care and medical treatment should be defined as 
including:  
(a) the provision of surgical, medical, nursing, pharmaceutical, dental 
and mental health care or treatment, including the prescription or 
supply of drugs; 
(b) any assessment or examination for the purposes of diagnosis, 
including invasive exploratory acts; 
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(c) any procedure undertaken for the purposes of preventing a disease 
or illness; 
(d) any procedure which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that 
treatment (including but not limited to anaesthesia); 
(e) a course of treatment or a group of associated treatments; 
(f) any treatment carried out by a health and social care professional, 
within the meaning of the Health and Social Care Professionals Act 
2005; 
(g) health promotion, and  
(h) the provision of advice, information and counselling in connection 
with any of the above. [paragraph 1.47] 
4.04 The Commission recommends that, when treating children, health 
care professionals must give children an opportunity to express their views and 
to give these views due weight, in accordance with the child‟s age and maturity. 
[paragraph 1.59] 
4.05  The Commission recommends that when treating persons 
under 18, health care professionals must ensure respect for confidentiality, 
subject to any specific statutory obligations to disclose medical records. The 
Commission further recommends that this confidentiality must also have regard 
to the rights of parents and guardians to access to relevant health information, 
and that this information should be given where it would, having regard to all of 
the circumstances and to the general principles already set out in this Report, 
be in the best interests of the person under 18. [paragraph 1.68] 
4.06 The Commission recommends that, having regard to the general 
principles already set out in this Report, the proposed legislative framework on 
health care treatment should provide that, in general, a person who is 16 or 17 
years of age is presumed, in the context of any potential civil liability, to have 
capacity to consent to, and refuse, health care treatment, as already defined in 
this Report; that this capacity is as effective as it would be if he or she were of 
full age, that is 18 years of age; that the presumption of capacity is subject to 
contrary evidence that the person lacks capacity; and that where a 16 or 17 
year old has given such an effective consent to, or refused, any such treatment 
it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it, or refusal of consent for it, 
from his or her parent or guardian. The Commission also recommends that this 
is subject to certain other existing legislative limits and requirements, including 
existing requirements in, for example, the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987, the 
European Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use) 
Regulations 2004, the Child Care Act 1991 and the Mental Health Act 2001. 
The Commission also recommends that this should also have regard to planned 
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legislation, such as the proposed Human Tissue Bill, the proposed Health 
Information Bill or any proposal, for example, to regulate access to sunbeds for 
those under 18. [paragraph 2.155] 
4.07 The Commission recommends that, in the context of refusal of life 
sustaining treatment by a person under the age of 18, an application may be 
made to the High Court to determine the validity of the refusal. The High Court 
may order treatment that is necessary to save life and where this is in the best 
interests of the person under 18 years of age. The Commission also 
recommends that in any such application the person under 18 shall be 
separately represented. [paragraph 2.160] 
4.08 The Commission recommends that the legislation proposed in this 
Report should provide that a 16 or 17 year old is presumed to have capacity to 
make an advance care directive. The Commission also recommends that where 
an advance care directive is being considered by or for a 16 and 17 year old a 
specific assessment be made by a trained and experienced health care 
professional of that person‟s capacity to understand the nature and 
consequences of the advance care directive. [paragraph 2.164] 
4.09 The Commission recommends that the proposed legislative 
framework should not include a presumption of capacity for those under 16, but 
should provide that a person under 16 may consent to, and refuse, health care 
treatment where it is established that he or she has the maturity and 
understanding to appreciate the nature and consequences of the specific health 
care treatment decision. The Commission also recommends that, in the case of 
health care treatment involving those under 16, the usual situation should be 
that parents or guardians, who have the primary responsibility for the upbringing 
and development of children, are involved in the decision-making process; that 
the person under 16 should be encouraged and advised to communicate with 
and involve his or her parents or guardians; and that, therefore, it is only in 
exceptional circumstances, and having regard to the need to take account of an 
objective assessment of both the rights and the best interests of the person 
under 16, that health care treatment would be provided for those under 16 
without the knowledge or consent of parents or guardians. [paragraph 2.174] 
4.10 The Commission also recommends that the proposed legislative 
framework should provide that, in determining whether a person under 16 has 
the maturity and capacity to consent to, and to refuse, health care treatment as 
already defined in this Report, the following factors are to be taken into account:  
(a) whether he or she has sufficient maturity to understand the 
information relevant to making the specific decision and to appreciate 
its potential consequences; 
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(b) whether his or her views are stable and a true reflection of his or her 
core values and beliefs, taking into account his or her physical and 
mental health and any other factors that affect his or her ability to 
exercise independent judgement; 
(c) the nature, purpose and utility of the treatment; 
(d) the risks and benefits involved in the treatment, and 
(e) any other specific welfare, protection or public health considerations, 
in respect of which relevant guidance and protocols such as the 2011 
Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of 
Children (or any equivalent replacement document) must be applied. 
[paragraph 2.175] 
4.11 The Commission recommends that the proposed statutory 
framework should include, in respect of potential civil liability, a defence of good 
faith for health care practitioners who treat children and young people under 18 
years of age. The Commission recommends that the defence would apply to a 
health care practitioner who, acting in good faith and exercising due diligence, 
makes a decision to provide medical treatment, or a decision to withhold 
medical treatment, in respect of a child or a young person under 18 years of 
age. The Commission also recommends that acting in good faith and exercising 
due diligence would be defined as where the health care professional acts 
consistently with the general principles and specific matters, including as to 
assessment of capacity of those under 16, in the proposed statutory framework. 
[paragraph 2.177] 
4.12  The Commission recommends that the Minister for Children 
and Youth Affairs, in consultation with the Minister for Health, should establish a 
broad-based Working Group which would assist the Minister in preparing and 
publishing a Code of Practice based on the principles in the proposed statutory 
framework. The Commission also recommends that the Code of Practice would 
provide detailed guidance as to the application of the proposed statutory 
framework in the context of all forms of health care and treatment settings as 
already defined in this Report. [paragraph 2.185] 
4.13 The Commission recommends that the Mental Health Act 2001 be 
amended to include specific provisions for persons under the age of 18, based 
on the general principles already recommended in this Report. The Commission 
also recommends that the 2001 Act should be amended to provide: 
(a) that children and young people admitted under the 2001 Act should 
be accommodated in an environment that is suitable for their age;  
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(b) that children and young people may only be admitted under the 
2001 Act if such an admission is in their best interests, objectively 
assessed by reference to their rights; 
(c) that the provisions outlined in the Mental Health Commission‟s Code 
of Practice should be followed to ensure that children and young people 
the patient can avail of age appropriate facilities and activities to allow 
their personal, social and educational development to continue. 
(d) that children and young people should receive the least intrusive 
and restrictive treatment possible, in the least restrictive environment 
possible, for the shortest possible period in accordance with an 
individualised care plan; 
(e) that children and young people should be provided with clear 
information regarding their proposed admission and treatment in a 
manner which is accessible and appropriate with regard to their age 
and understanding; and that this information should include details of 
their legal rights, and it should include information on the purpose, side 
effects, and any alternatives to the proposed treatment. 
(f) that children and young people should have access to independent, 
specialised advocacy services and should have access to a personal 
representative, other than a family member, in circumstances where 
this is necessary and appropriate, and 
(g) that the protections that apply to adults with respect to mental health 
treatment under the 2001 Act should apply equally to persons under 18. 
[paragraph 3.82] 
4.14 The Commission recommends that that the Mental Health Act 2001 
be amended to provide that a person who is 16 or 17 years of age is presumed 
to have capacity to consent to and refuse healthcare and medical treatment, 
including psychiatric treatment. [paragraph 3.86] 
4.15 The Commission recommends that, to avoid any doubt, the 
recommendations concerning healthcare decision-making by persons under 16 
years of age should also be applied in the context of mental health, including 
decisions in respect of admission and treatment under the Mental Health Act 
2001. [paragraph 3.88] 
4.16 The Commission recommends that the proposed Code of Practice 
already recommended in this Report should include guidance on appropriate 
time frames to operate in cases of voluntary and involuntary admissions. 
[paragraph 3.91] 
4.17 The Commission recommends the introduction of a third category 
of “intermediate” admission for children and young persons who are admitted 
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under the Mental Health Act 2001 by way of the consent of persons having 
parental responsibility for them. The admission and treatment of intermediate 
patients would be subject to regular review, in the same manner as involuntary 
patients. [paragraph 3.94] 
4.18 The Commission recommends that a system of regular review of 
involuntary admissions be established, to be carried out by a consultant 
independent of the consultant involved in the initial admission. The opinion of 
the reviewing consultant should be supported by a second independent opinion. 
[paragraph 3.101] 
4.19 The Commission recommends that the District Court make the 
initial decision on admission of children and young people as involuntary 
patients for the purposes of the Mental Health Act 2001, but that a Mental Heath 
Tribunal (with an age appropriate focus) rather than the District Court should 
review the admission. [paragraph 3.104] 
4.20 The Commission recommends that a consultant psychiatrist initially 
assess the child in order to decide which type of admission is appropriate under 
the circumstances and to assess whether the minor is providing consent or not, 
where the child has capacity to provide such consent. However, where the child 
has a mental disorder within the terms of section 25 of the 2001 Act, the choice 
of a child to become a voluntary patient could clearly be overridden. [paragraph 
3.106] 
4.21 The Commission also recommends that where a child is admitted 
as an involuntary patient, that individual should have the option to change their 
status to a voluntary patient where they satisfy the relevant criteria. [paragraph 
3.107] 
4.22 The Commission recommends that persons under 18 years of age 
who are admitted as involuntary patients under the Mental Health Act 2001 be 
given a statement of information, communicated to them in an age appropriate 
manner. [paragraph 3.109] 
4.23 The Commission recommends that all children and adolescents 
admitted and treated under the Mental Health Act 2001 should have access to 
an independent advocate. [paragraph 3.111] 
4.24 The Commission recommends that the proposed Code of Practice 
recommended in this Report consider the time frame for review of treatment of 
persons under the age of 18 under the Mental Health Act 2001, and that an 
initial review after one month should be considered in the context of the 
development of the Code of Practice. The Commission also recommends that 
the Code of Practice consider stricter rules with respect to ECT and psycho-
surgery with a view to prohibiting psycho-surgery for persons under 18 years of 
age. [paragraph 3.115] 
 147 
APPENDIX A DRAFT HEALTH (CHILDREN AND CONSENT TO 
HEALTH CARE TREATMENT) BILL 20111 
  
                                                     
1  This draft Bill implements the general reforms set out in the Report. The 
recommendations In Chapter 3, which concern the Mental Health Act 2001, are 
set out in the Outline Scheme of a Bill in Appendix B. 
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Child Care Act 1991       1991, No. 17 
 
Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987     1987, No. 28 
 
Health and Social Care Professionals Act 2005   2005, No. 27 
 
Mental Health Act 2001      2001, No. 25 
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DRAFT HEALTH (CHILDREN AND CONSENT TO HEALTH CARE 
TREATMENT) BILL 2011 
 
 
 
BILL 
 
entitled 
 
 
AN ACT TO PROVIDE THAT CHILDREN, THAT IS THOSE UNDER 18 
YEARS OF AGE, MAY CONSENT TO AND REFUSE HEALTH CARE 
TREATMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFIED PRINCIPLES AND 
CONDITIONS; AND TO PROVIDE FOR RELATED MATTERS 
  
   
  
BE IT ENACTED BY THE OIREACHTAS AS FOLLOWS: 
 
 
 
Short title and commencement   
 
1.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Health (Children and Consent to Health 
Care Treatment) Act 2011. 
 
(2) This Act comes into operation on such day or days as the Minister for 
Children and Youth Affairs, after consultation and with the consent of the 
Minister for Health, may appoint by order or orders either generally or with 
reference to any particular purpose or provision, and different days may be so 
appointed for different purposes or provisions. 
 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
2.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— 
 
“child” means a person who has not reached the age of 18; 
 
“health care and treatment” includes— 
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(a) the provision of surgical, medical, nursing, pharmaceutical, dental and 
mental health care or treatment, including the prescription or supply of 
drugs; 
 
(b) any assessment or examination for the purposes of diagnosis, including 
invasive exploratory acts; 
  
(c) any procedure undertaken for the purposes of preventing a disease or 
illness; 
 
(d) any procedure which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that 
treatment (including but not limited to anaesthesia); 
 
(e) a course of treatment or a group of associated treatments; 
 
(f) any treatment carried out by a health or social care professional, within 
the meaning of the Health and Social Care Professionals Act 2005; 
 
(g) health promotion; and 
 
(h) the provision of advice, information and counselling in connection with 
any of the above; 
 
“parent” has the same meaning as in the Children and Parental Responsibility 
Act [20XX].
2
 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
The definition of “health care and treatment” in this section implements the 
recommendation in paragraph 1.47 of the Report. 
 
 
 
General principles 
 
3. — Every person concerned in the application of this Act shall have regard to 
the following general principles—  
 
                                                     
2
  This refers to the draft Children and Parental Responsibility Bill in the Commission‟s 
Report on Family Relationships (LRC 101-2010). The draft Bill in the 2010 Report 
would replace, with amendments, the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, as amended. 
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(a) in light of the role of the family as the fundamental group in 
society, and that parents and guardians have primary responsibility 
for the upbringing and development of their children, the State may 
intervene to supply the place of parents in exceptional 
circumstances where this is necessary;  
 
(b) the rights of the child, and their best interests, must always be 
taken into account in this context;  
 
(c) a child has rights that are independent of any right of the parent 
as such; that these rights are, during the child’s early years, 
exercised on behalf of the child, usually by the child’s parents or 
guardians; and 
 
(d) these rights remain the rights of the child as they develop 
towards maturity and adulthood; and there are various points, 
sometimes based on an age threshold and sometimes based on an 
assessment of maturity and capacity, at which the law recognises 
that the child can exercise these rights independently of their 
parents or guardians even before they reach full adulthood at the 
age of 18. 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendation in paragraph 1.32 on the guiding 
principles to be applied in the legislative framework. 
 
 
 
Best interests of child to be primary consideration 
 
4.— Every person concerned in the application of this Act shall have regard to 
the best interests of the child, assessed objectively by reference to the rights of 
the child, as a primary consideration.  
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendation in paragraph 1.35 that the best 
interests of the child, assessed objectively by reference to the rights of the child, 
is to be a primary consideration in the legislative framework. 
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Due weight for views of child in accordance with child’s age and maturity 
  
5.— When providing health care and treatment to a child, a health care 
professional shall give a child an opportunity to express his or her views 
and to give these views due weight, in accordance with the child’s age and 
maturity. 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendation in paragraph 1.59 that a child be 
given the opportunity to express his or her views and that these be given due 
weight, in accordance with the child’s age and maturity. 
 
 
 
Confidentiality 
  
6.— (1) When providing health care and treatment to a child, a health care 
professional shall ensure respect for confidentiality,  
 
(2) The confidentiality in this section —  
 
(a) is subject to any specific statutory obligations to disclose medical 
records, and 
 
(b) shall have regard to the rights of parents and guardians to access to 
relevant health information, and this information shall be given where 
it would, having regard to all of the circumstances, be in the best 
interests of the child and to the general principles in section 3. 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 1.68 concerning 
confidentiality. 
 
 
 
Health care and treatment involving 16 and 17 year old: general  
  
7.— (1) Subject to section 8, a person who is 16 or 17 years of age shall be 
presumed, in the context of any potential civil liability, to have capacity to 
consent to, and refuse, health care and treatment. 
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(2) The capacity of a person who is 16 or 17 years of age is as effective as 
it would be if he or she were of full age, that is, 18 years of age. 
 
(3) The presumption of capacity of a person who is 16 or 17 years of age 
is subject to contrary evidence that the person lacks capacity. 
 
(4) Where a 16 or 17 year old has given an effective consent to, or 
refused, any such treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it, 
or refusal of consent for it, from his or her parent or guardian.  
 
(5) This section is without prejudice to other relevant statutory 
provisions, including the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987, the European 
Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use) 
Regulations 2004, the Child Care Act 1991 and the Mental Health Act 2001.  
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.155 concerning 
the general position as to health care and treatment involving 16 and 17 year 
olds. In general terms, it applies in the civil law setting the approach to consent 
involving 16 and 17 year olds already set out in section 23 of the Non-Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997.  
 
Subsection (5) implement the specific recommendation in paragraph 2.155 that 
this general approach is without prejudice to other current relevant statutory 
provisions, including those in the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987, the 
European Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use) 
Regulations 2004, the Child Care Act 1991 and the Mental Health Act 2001. 
Paragraph 2.155 also recommends that this should also have regard to planned 
legislation, such as the proposed Human Tissue Bill, the proposed Health 
Information Bill or any proposal, for example, to regulate access to sunbeds for 
those under 18. These proposed legislative provisions have not been included in 
subsection (5). 
 
 
 
Refusal of life-sustaining treatment by person under 18 years of age  
  
8.— (1) Where a person under the age of 18 refuses life sustaining treatment, an 
application may be made to the High Court to determine the validity of the 
refusal.  
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(2) The High Court may order treatment that is necessary to save life and 
where this is in the best interests of the person under 18 years of age.  
 
(3) In any such application to the High Court, the person under 18 shall 
be separately represented. 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.160 concerning 
the refusal of life-sustaining treatment by a person under 18 years of age. 
 
 
 
Advance care directive by 16 and 17 year old  
  
9.— (1) A person who is 16 or 17 years of age shall be presumed to have 
capacity to make an advance care directive.  
 
(2) Where a person who is 16 or 17 years of age is considering making an 
advance care directive, a specific assessment shall be made by a trained and 
experienced health care professional of that person’s capacity to understand the 
nature and consequences of the advance care directive. 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.164 concerning 
the making of an advance care directive by a 16 and 17 year old. The 
Commission’s 2009 Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives (LRC 94-
2009) deals with advance care directives by persons aged 18 years and over.  
 
 
 
Health care and treatment involving person under 16 years of age: general  
 
10.— (1) Subject to section 8 and subsection (2), a person who is under 16 
years of age shall not be presumed, in the context of any potential civil liability, 
to have capacity to consent to, and refuse, health care and treatment. 
 
(2) A person who is under 16 years of age may consent to, and refuse, 
health care treatment where it is established that he or she has the maturity and 
understanding to appreciate the nature and consequences of the specific health 
care and treatment decision. 
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(3) It shall be presumed, in the case of health care treatment involving a 
person under 16 years of age, that parents or guardians, who have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of children, are involved in 
the decision-making process. 
 
(4) A person under 16 shall be encouraged and advised to communicate 
with and involve his or her parents or guardians and, therefore, it is only in 
exceptional circumstances, and having regard to the need to take account of an 
objective assessment of both the rights and the best interests of the person under 
16, that health care and treatment is provided for those under 16 without the 
knowledge or consent of parents or guardians. 
 
(5) In determining whether a person under 16 has the maturity and 
capacity to consent to, and to refuse, health care and treatment, the following 
factors shall be taken into account — 
 
(a) whether he or she has sufficient maturity to understand the 
information relevant to making the specific decision and to 
appreciate its potential consequences; 
(b) whether his or her views are stable and a true reflection of his or her 
core values and beliefs, taking into account his or her physical and mental 
health and any other factors that affect his or her ability to exercise 
independent judgement; 
(c) the nature, purpose and utility of the treatment; 
(d) the risks and benefits involved in the treatment; and 
(e) any other specific welfare, protection or public health considerations, 
in respect of which relevant guidance and protocols such as the 2011 
Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of 
Children (or any equivalent replacement document) must be applied.  
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.174 and 2.175 
concerning the general position as to health care and treatment involving those 
under 16 years of age.  
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Civil liability: defence of good faith  
 
11.— (1) No civil liability shall be imposed on a health care practitioner who, 
acting in good faith and exercising due diligence, makes a decision to provide 
medical treatment, or a decision to withhold medical treatment, in respect of a 
person under 18 years of age.  
 
(2) In this section, acting in good faith and exercising due diligence 
means where the health care professional acts consistently with the general 
principles and specific matters, including as to assessment of capacity of those 
under 16, in this Act. 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.177 concerning 
the defence of good faith, in terms of potential civil liability, for a health care 
practitioner. 
 
 
 
Code of Practice  
 
12.— (1) The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs, in consultation with the 
Minister for Health, shall establish a Working Group to assist the Minister to 
prepare and publish a Code of Practice based on the principles in this Act. 
 
(2) The Code of Practice shall provide detailed guidance as to the 
application of this Act in all forms of health care and treatment settings as 
defined in this Act.  
 
 
 
Explanatory Note 
This section implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.185 concerning 
the publication of a Code of Practice by the Minister for Children and Youth 
Affairs, in consultation with the Minister for Health. The Code of Practice, 
based on the assistance of a broad-based Working Group, would provide 
detailed guidance as to the application of the Commission’s proposed legislative 
framework in all forms of health care and treatment settings as defined in the 
Report. 
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APPENDIX B OUTLINE SCHEME OF MENTAL HEALTH 
(AMENDMENT) BILL1 
 
 
ARRANGEMENT OF HEADS 
 
 
Head 1. General principles concerning detention of persons under 18 years 
of age  
 
Head 2. Presumption of capacity of person who is 16 or 17 years of age 
 
Head 3. General principles concerning persons under 16 years of age 
 
Head 4. Intermediate admission 
 
Head 5. Review of involuntary admissions 
 
Head 6. Review role of District Court and of Mental Heath Tribunal 
 
Head 7. Initial assessment of person under 18 years of age 
 
Head 8. Change from involuntary to voluntary patient 
 
Head 9. Statement of information 
 
Head 10. Access to independent advocate 
 
Head 11. Code of Practice 
 
                                                     
1  The Commission has not included these provisions in the draft Health (Children 
and Consent to Health Care Treatment) Bill in Appendix A as the Programme for 
Government 2011 to 2016 proposes a general review of the Mental Health Act 
2001. The Commission has concluded that it is preferable that the Outline 
Scheme of a Bill in this Appendix would form part of that general review. 
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OUTLINE SCHEME OF MENTAL HEALTH (AMENDMENT) BILL 
 
 
Head 1. General principles concerning detention of persons under 18 years 
of age  
(1) Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to include specific 
provisions for persons under the age of 18, based on the general principles in 
the draft Health (Children and Consent to Health Care Treatment) Bill in this 
Report.  
 
(2) Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide: 
(a) that children and young people admitted under the 2001 Act should 
be accommodated in an environment that is suitable for their age;  
(b) that children and young people may only be admitted under the 
2001 Act if such an admission is in their best interests, objectively 
assessed by reference to their rights; 
(c) that the provisions outlined in the Mental Health Commission’s 
Code of Practice should be followed to ensure that children and young 
people can avail of age appropriate facilities and activities to allow their 
personal, social and educational development to continue. 
(d) that children and young people should receive the least intrusive and 
restrictive treatment possible, in the least restrictive environment 
possible, for the shortest possible period in accordance with an 
individualised care plan; 
(e) that children and young people should be provided with clear 
information regarding their proposed admission and treatment in a 
manner which is accessible and appropriate with regard to their age and 
understanding; and that this information should include details of their 
legal rights, and it should include information on the purpose, side 
effects, and any alternatives to the proposed treatment. 
(f) that children and young people should have access to independent, 
specialised advocacy services and should have access to a personal 
representative, other than a family member, in circumstances where this 
is necessary and appropriate; and 
(g) that the protections that apply to adults with respect to mental health 
treatment under the 2001 Act should apply equally to persons under 18.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendations in paragraph 3.82 of the 
Report. 
 
 
  
 162 
Head 2. Presumption of capacity of person who is 16 or 17 years of age 
Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to include a provision that 
a person who is 16 or 17 years of age is presumed to have capacity to consent to 
and refuse healthcare and medical treatment, including psychiatric treatment.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendation in paragraph 3.86 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 3. General principles concerning persons under 16 years of age  
Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide that the 
provisions in the draft Health (Children and Consent to Health Care Treatment) 
Bill in this Report concerning healthcare decision-making by persons under 16 
years of age should also be applied in the context of mental health, including 
decisions in respect of admission and treatment under the 2001 Act. 
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendation in paragraph 3.88 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 4. Intermediate admission 
(1) Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide for the 
introduction of a third category of “intermediate” admission for children and 
young persons who are admitted under the Mental Health Act 2001 by way of 
the consent of persons having parental responsibility for them.  
 
(2) Provide that the admission and treatment of intermediate patients would be 
subject to regular review, in the same manner as involuntary patients.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendations in paragraph 3.94 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 5. Review of involuntary admission 
(1) Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide for a system 
of regular review of involuntary admissions, to be carried out by a consultant 
independent of the consultant involved in the initial admission.  
 
(2) Provide that the opinion of the reviewing consultant should be supported by 
a second independent opinion.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendations in paragraph 3.101 of the 
Report. 
 
 163 
 
Head 6. Review role of District Court and of Mental Heath Tribunal 
(1) Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide that the 
District Court make the initial decision on admission of children and young 
people as involuntary patients for the purposes of the Mental Health Act 2001. 
 
(2) Provide that a Mental Health Tribunal (with an age appropriate focus) rather 
than the District Court should review the admission.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendations in paragraph 3.104 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 7. Initial assessment of person under 18 years of age 
(1) Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide that a 
consultant psychiatrist initially assess the child in order to decide which type of 
admission is appropriate under the circumstances and to assess whether the 
minor is providing consent or not, where the child has capacity to provide such 
consent.  
 
(2) Provide that, however, where the child has a mental disorder within the 
terms of section 25 of the 2001 Act, the choice of a child to become a voluntary 
patient could be overridden.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendations in paragraph 3.106 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 8. Change from involuntary to voluntary patient 
Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide that where a 
child is admitted as an involuntary patient he or she should have the option to 
change their status to a voluntary patient where he or she satisfies the relevant 
criteria.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendation in paragraph 3.107 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 9. Statement of information 
Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide that persons 
under 18 years of age who are admitted as involuntary patients under the Mental 
Health Act 2001 be given a statement of information, communicated to them in 
an age appropriate manner.  
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Note: this Head implements the recommendation in paragraph 3.109 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 10. Access to independent advocate 
Provide that the Mental Health Act 2001 be amended to provide that all children 
admitted and treated under the Mental Health Act 2001 should have access to an 
independent advocate.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendation in paragraph 3.111 of the 
Report. 
 
 
Head 11. Code of Practice 
(1) Provide that the proposed Code of Practice already recommended in this 
Report should include guidance on appropriate time frames to operate in cases 
of voluntary and involuntary admissions.  
 
(2) Provide that the proposed Code of Practice already recommended in this 
Report consider the time frame for review of treatment of persons under the age 
of 18 under the Mental Health Act 2001, and that an initial review after one 
month should be considered in the context of the development of the Code of 
Practice.  
 
(3) Provide that the proposed Code of Practice already recommended in this 
Report consider stricter rules with respect to ECT and psycho-surgery with a 
view to prohibiting psycho-surgery for persons under 18 years of age.  
 
Note: this Head implements the recommendations in paragraphs 3.91 and 3.115 
of the Report. 
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